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**Globalization and the Foreign Ministry:
A Comparative Study of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian Models**

by
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APPROVAL PAGE

GLOBALIZATION AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE U.S., CANADIAN, AND SLOVENIAN
MODELS

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

**Globalization and the Foreign Ministry:
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By Candace Halo

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Powered by the information revolution, globalization is ushering in one of history's most rapid changes in world politics. The state and its position in this millennium are different from the one it occupied in the seventeenth century. The governmental structure of the past was organized vertically and operated in an up-down fashion with high authority at the top. Significant pressures arising from new global entities provide the broad frame of reference for the effects of changes in the traditional role of the state. But the erosion of the power and influence of the state from within is every bit as important. At the heart of some of these internal changes, lies the foreign ministry.

The evolutionary changes of information technology have been so rapid that their effects and consequences are unclear. This presents an important problem in world politics and, in particular, the foreign ministry, because it has for the last four centuries been considered the interface of political, economic, and social activity between the state and the rest of the world. Diplomacy is the first line of defense in preventing international disputes and competition from leading to the unacceptable destruction of war. The question motivating this dissertation is: What evidence exists that changes in foreign ministries are a response to the processes of globalization? The purpose of this

thesis is to investigate whether the effects of globalization on the role of the states has also affected their competency in managing foreign affairs. This is accomplished by reviewing and comparing the formal structure and functioning of the U.S, Canadian, and Slovenian models.

The qualitative and quantitative findings of this study reveal that the foreign ministries of these states developed differently from one another. These findings also reflect that in each case, no *significant* change has occurred in either the functioning or growth of each of these foreign ministries up until the last decade. The observations made about the current functioning and the responses of these three foreign ministries were significantly similar; therefore, the conclusion of this study is that a correlation exists between changes in the foreign ministry and globalization.

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INTRODUCTION

Powered by the information revolution, globalization is ushering in one of history's most rapid changes in world politics. The state¹ and its position in this millennium are different from the one it occupied in the seventeenth century when it first appeared. After the Peace of Westphalia², the idea of a state was based on a well-defined territory, a unified population, and an exclusive, sovereign authority that did not allow any interference in its internal jurisdiction. The governmental structure of the past was organized vertically and operated in an up-down fashion with high authority at the top. This vertically structured and territorially arranged system of government has, in some of its functions, been pushed over by the advent of the most recent communications revolution. Significant strains and pressures arising from new global entities such as non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations provide the broad frame of reference for the effects of changes in the traditional role of the state. But the erosion of the power and influence of the state from within is every bit as important. At the heart of some of these internal changes, lies the foreign ministry.

At the inception of this project I was asked why identifying how several foreign

¹ The term **nation state** or **nation-state**, while often used interchangeably with the term state, refers more properly to a state in which a single nation is dominant. Over the last few centuries (and particular over the last half-century, except in Africa), this form of state has become more common, so that now most states claim to be nation states. However, this has not always been so; and even today there are some states where it is questionable whether they contain a single dominant nation. This is made more difficult by the question of what is a nation. There are many states, such as Belgium and Switzerland, with multiple linguistic, religious or ethnic groups within them, without any one being clearly dominant. However, often (and especially in the case of Switzerland and the United States of America) a national identity has been constructed despite these differences. A better example of a non-nation state would be the United Kingdom, which consists of the four nations England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. This dissertation will use, however, "state". <http://www.free-definition.com/search/index.html>

² It is often said that the Peace of Westphalia initiated the modern fashion of diplomacy as it marked the beginning of the modern system of nation-states. Subsequent wars were not about reasons of religion, but rather focused on reasons of state. This allowed Catholic and Protestant Powers to ally, leading to a number of major realignments. Another important result of the treaty was it laid rest to the idea of the Holy Roman Empire having secular dominion over the entire Christian world. The nation-state would be the highest level of government, subservient to no others. <http://www.free-definition.com/search/index.html>

ministries are currently functioning as compared to the past was even an interesting question. The answer is simple. In the last three decades, the evolutionary changes of information technology have been so rapid that their effects and consequences are unclear. This presents an important problem in world politics and, in particular, the foreign ministry, because it has for the last four centuries been considered the interface of political, economic, and social activity between the nation and the rest of the world. Diplomacy is the first line of defense in preventing international disputes and competition from leading to the unacceptable destruction of war. If we are to prevent conflict then (obviously) any changes the foreign ministry is subjected to must be significant. The question motivating this dissertation, therefore, is: What evidence exists that changes in national foreign ministries are a response to the processes of globalization? The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the important effects of globalization on the role of the states has also affected their competency in managing foreign affairs. This is accomplished by reviewing and comparing the formal structure and functioning of the U.S, Canadian, and Slovenian models.

Part I, entitled *Globalization: What is it?*, consequently, has three objectives. The first objective is to examine the major theoretical debates about globalization because they are significantly controversial but poorly understood. The second is to point out the weaknesses of these theories in order to refine ontological givens. And, finally, the third purpose is to clarify what globalization is by defining it as a product of information technology. These three objectives are completed to better understand the important effects of globalization, if any, on the role of states and the character of their governance systems in general.

In Part II entitled, *The Foreign Ministry as the Site of Investigation*, three examples of diplomatic organizations are drawn upon not only because they are manageable units of analysis for the exploration of the effects of globalization, if any, on states but also on their management of external affairs. This section, consequently, begins by briefly explaining *why* the least similar method of comparison was chosen as the methodology for this study and *how* it is used to discern any evidence that the foreign ministries of the United States, Canada, and Slovenia are responding to the processes of globalization. Hence, a review of the critical historical junctures of each nation over the last 180 years is completed in order to identify the variances in their individual economic and military capabilities. This elucidates that the primary differences among the three cases are power asymmetries as measured by current economic ranking and defense spending. Just as the economic and sociological variables point to their major differences, however, measures of the political variable point to their similarities.

The machinery and functioning of the American, Canadian, and Slovenian foreign ministries are then examined individually delineating the character of each diplomatic organization over the last 180 years. By focusing on functioning of these three diplomatic systems over periods of time, an assessment of change (or lack thereof) can be more accurately determined. Each foreign office, consequently, is examined by reviewing the foreign and domestic duties and responsibilities of its principal officers; its diplomatic and consular missions abroad; its treaty making; its participation in international conferences and organizations; its relations with other government departments that possess foreign relations responsibilities, and finally an assessment of the relationship of foreign affairs rulers to the ruled of each state.

The before-and-after pictures of these examples are important for two reasons. First, if we find that these three examples of diplomatic organizations have not changed significantly over the last 180 years but have, as I suspect they do, had similar responses in the above criteria within the last 30 years, then there must be *some* correlation to globalization as operationally defined in this dissertation.

Part I Globalization: What is it?

1.1 The Theoretical Debate: What do colored glasses have to do with globalization?

People have tried for centuries in an undiscourageable effort to make sense of the world that envelops them. Understanding and explaining world politics is only a fragment of that nissus, and vast amounts of information make it difficult to explain the most important aspects. The usual solution to this problem is the resort to theories. A theory is an artificial construct that is supposed to simplify processes in order to determine which are important and which are not. They are akin to glasses. Put one pair of theoretical glasses on and the color of the world may be red. Put on another and the world maybe painted blue. The lenses view the same world, but each lens renders a different view of that world.³ The debate begins over which colored lenses paint the theoretical portrait of the world accurately, and the result is that each sees globalization differently. The point here is that there have tended to be several main theoretical views used to understand world politics, and that a review and analyses of them is necessary in order to better identify what globalization is.

Much has been written and debated about globalization and its effects -- or lack thereof--on the state. The argument that nation-states are or are not experiencing major transformations is a familiar one. Scholars have tended to gravitate to at least two different "worldview " approaches and do not agree on several important points. At one

³ Baylis & Smith. **The Globalization of World Politics.** Oxford University Press, 2001. P.2. The use of colored glasses to describe the world is not the sole property of these two authors. The analogy has been used to describe the world in other works that do not pertain to the discussion of globalization including essays written by this author.

end of the spectrum is the view rejecting the prospect that the nation-state is weakening or experiencing a transformation in the post-modern era. At the other end of the spectrum lies the view that the world is moving toward an intertwined world organism in which the vertical hierarchy of the nation-state is waning. Understanding what globalization is begins with knowledge of the fundamental divide in world politics between actor-oriented theories that take actors as the ontological givens and sociological-oriented theories that take institutions as the ontological givens. These two approaches have different perspectives about the nature of actors and institutions. For example, neo-realism and neo-liberalism are major theories of international politics in which the state is the starting point.⁴ Institutions are formal or informal rules/norms that are created by actors to increase their individual utility. Each state is autonomous: it is free to choose the course of action that will best serve its own national interest, subject only to constraints imposed by the *external* environment. They are conceived as unitary, positional actors motivated primarily by the will to survive. States vary only in their power capabilities. Thus, they are not motivated by absolute gains in the international system, but rather by the need to enhance their position vis a vis other states in order to survive. Both neo-realist and neo-liberal models begin with the same analytical assumption: the state is the primary actor. What distinguishes neoliberalism from realism is its different understanding of the characteristic problem for these Westphalia states. For neoliberals the problem is the resolution of market failures; for realism it is

⁴ Major realist works include: Waltz, Kenneth, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1959). Waltz, Kenneth, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (1988). Greico, Joseph. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization* 42 (1988). Krasner, Stephen, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

security and distribution conflicts.⁵

This approach, consequently, views the state as having the "sole role" in world politics. Globalization does not and has not altered the most significant characteristic of world politics, namely the territorial division of the world into nation-states. The logic is while the interconnectedness between economies and societies is increasing, it does not follow that states are obsolete. The importance of the threat of the use of force and the balance of power remains minimally impacted by the threads of globalization. Globalization may effect cultural, social, and economic aspects of societies, but it does not transcend the international political system of states and the struggle for power between them.⁶

In contrast, the Yale school, constructivism, and world culture are theories that start with institutions as formal or informal rules that produce more specific agents or entities. For example, judges could not exist without courts, nor could teachers without schools, or diplomats without embassies. Thus, the interests and power of actors are defined by the roles they play in the larger institutional structure: judges can sentence, teachers can grade, and diplomats can negotiate.⁷

The ontological given for sociological approaches is the underlying institutional structure, a structure that is defined by a set of mutually shared norms and expectations. This structure cannot be directly observed; rather it is reflected in the behavior of

⁵ Krasner, Stephen. **Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy**. (US: Princeton University Press, 1999) p45.

⁶ *Ibid.* See footnote 3 for list of Realist and Neo-realist works.

⁷ Arend, Beck, & Lugt. **International Rules**. (US: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 3-6.

individuals in their capacity as representatives of states. The defining characteristic of the present international system is that the independent state has everywhere become the standard political unit. The actors in this system such as statesmen, public officials, or political leaders, however, have internalized the same basic rules of the game. Actions of these participants follow particular patterns not because of the threat of higher power or the relative capabilities of other states, but because these actors share a common accepted worldview. It has been described as an international social consciousness or as a set of shared world values and concepts that are intersubjectively understood⁸. Thus, human institutions exist not in terms of physical facts but in terms of shared consensus. For example, if humans disappeared, American currency would just be a bunch of green paper, but because humans agree that these pieces of paper represent value, they can be exchanged for goods.

This approach weighs heavily towards the side of the scale that views the state as having almost "no role" in world politics. Globalization has fundamentally changed the nation-state system making it hollow because its borders no longer correspond broadly to the relevant economic, cultural, and social spaces.⁹ Simply, states are no longer sealed units, and, consequently, the world is a much more complex web of relations.

Can we understand the nature of globalization in the context of these approaches to world politics? Realist international theory appears to operate according to the

⁸ Smith, Steve. "Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Theory", **The Globalization of World Politics** (US: Oxford University Press, 2002) 226-248.

⁹ Ferguson, Yale & Mansbach, Richard. **Politics: Authority, Identities, and Change**. (US: University of South Carolina Press, 1996). Kenichi Ohmae, **The End of the Nation-State**. (NY: New York Free Press, 1995) p. 2. Strange, Susan. **The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy**. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 4.

assumption that, domestically, the problem of order and security is solved. This is born out of the unwritten contract between individuals and the state. The presence of a sovereign authority domestically implies that individuals need not worry about their own security, since this is provided for them. The first move then, for the realist, is to organize power and security domestically, and then to accumulate power and security internationally.¹⁰ The idea is that individual humans live in a natural state of anarchy, because the most common source of friction is the various and unequal distribution of resources between them. But through reason humans have come to understand that the creation of civil government is necessary in order to achieve self-preservation, mutual protection, and the security of civil peace. Since the regularity of conflict and war among humans has been resolved domestically by the creation of the state, the ultimate problem has become the security of that state, because, there is no central world authority. One might point out that what proceeds from this approach is the following. Just as unwritten contracts between individuals and states have emerged in domestic society, so too should contracts among the collective wills of states have emerged in international society. Out of reason, states would somehow come to understand that self-preservation, mutual protection, and the security of peace among states could be resolved by the creation of the next political unit. But according to realism, this is not the case. Hence, realism asserts that states engage *individually* in the balance-of-power game in order to survive, and not through the reason of the collective wills of states.

¹⁰ See reviews of literature. Ashley, Richard. "The Poverty of Neorealism" in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (1986), pp.255-300. Keohane, Robert O. "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in A. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: the State of the Discipline* (1983), pp.503-40. Greico, Joseph. *Cooperation Among Nations* (1990).

There are, however, inherent problems with several of these analytical assumptions of the modern world. First, is it the case that individuals are secure inside the state? The regularity of war and conflict is just as familiar in the domestic realm of individual states as it is in the international realm of states. Is it true that in domestic realms citizens do not have to defend themselves? Successive post-cold war conflicts within the domestic societies of Afghanistan, Liberia, Chechnya, Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda make the point. Thus, the inside/outside distinction that realists draw upon between peace and security on the one hand, and violence and insecurity on the other hand, is problematic. One of the purposes of this study is to understand if and how globalization has affected this inside/outside distinction by exploring how the Internet can transfer power to individuals and make it possible to weaken the power of the state to secure control internally and externally. Realists emphasize power both domestically and internationally. Yet the task of accurately assessing the power of states is often reduced to counting the number of troops, tanks, and weapons in the belief that this translates into the ability to get other actors to do something they would not otherwise do. The power of states is also assessed by the ability to get what you want without the use of threat or force. This is accomplished through persuasion and influence.

Sociological international theory also makes several problematic assumptions. Oran Young, for example, argues that, "It just does not make sense for a chess player to refuse to accept the concept of check mate, for a speaker of English to assert that it makes no difference whether subjects and predicates agree. Or for an actor in the existing international society to disregard the rules regarding the nationality of citizens." The inherent problem with this approach is that political units and institutions are not static.

Rules are never fully codified as they are in a game of chess or in the grammar of the English language. In practice, respect for the rules *is* taken for granted. I would argue that the rules of chess could be changed. Consider the opponent who refuses to accept checkmate and knocks over the entire board. Not only have the rules been challenged but so also has the game. More importantly, even if actors are constrained by institutions, so are institutions constrained by actors. Consider for instance the institution of slavery that was a fundamental global practice for centuries. Did slavery sire the role of the slave or the slave-master? The fact that a majority of humans may share an intersubjective understanding of a particular institution does not mean that others cannot make objective judgments about the character of a institution

The inherent problem with this approach becomes even clearer in this study because its focus is diplomacy. It is difficult to find any practices or norms that are taken for granted in international law. Rules such as the treatment of diplomats have been grossly violated. When the Tehran mob broke into the Russian embassy and murdered all its diplomats, the dead toll included one of the most brilliant and promising stars in the early 19th-century Russian literary and political firmament: Alexander Gribovov.¹¹ The seizure of American diplomats by Iran and the lack of international reaction make the point. The United States broke diplomatic relations but other states did not. What the Iranian case suggests is that rules, when they exist in the international environment, are instrumental under certain circumstances but not deeply embedded. It served a domestic interest among the new rulers of Iran to violate the practices of diplomacy.

¹¹ Laurence, Kelly. **Diplomacy and Murder in Tehran: Alexander Gribovov and Imperial Russia's Mission to the Shah of Persia**, (NY: Palgrave Co., 2002).

And, it was not in the interest of other states to isolate Iran.

Further complications about assessing the nature of globalization are also manifested in the debate among the two approaches about the fundamental function of theory itself. Actor-oriented approaches tend to be explanatory theories, which see the task of theory as being to report on a world that is external to our theories. Thus, empiricist epistemology is the way to determine the true state of the world: it is the belief that the social world, like the natural one, has regularities, and that these can be 'discovered' by our theories in much the same way as a scientist does in looking for the regularities in nature. Thus, knowledge of the social world and its rules can reliably be derived from empirical testing of propositions or hypotheses against the evidence of facts.

In contrast, sociological approaches are generally considered reflectivist. A theory is not external to the things it is trying to explain, and instead may construct how humans actually think about the world. Thus, the very concepts theorists use to think about the world help to make that world what it is. Also it defines what humans see in the external world. This approach rejects the idea that the social world is amenable to some essential research process of the natural world. Simply put, it cannot be studied like a particle in physics.

Epistemological battles are nothing new. The actor and sociological approaches to theory resemble similar debates between the British empiricists and the continental rationalists of the 18th century. The question of how humans acquire knowledge of the world was the focus in this great battle of ideas. Does it come through the senses or through reason? Today it is widely acknowledged that a blending of both theories

provides us with the answer. Knowledge of how the world operates comes to us through our senses by observing its operations and then through reflection of the same.

The problem with this debate is that neither can claim to have an exclusive "pipeline" to the true existence of the social world. Whether evidence about the social world is derived from experimentation or reflection, the theories either approach attempts to support generally become valid or invalid *over time*. The positivist must perform experiments over and over again in order to verify a theory. Similarly, the reflectivist must engage in discourse over and over again in order to verify. The point here is that, whatever method is used, the researcher must first acquire some knowledge on *how* the social world works in order to reason *why* it is or is not working properly so he can understand if it *ought* to be fixed.

Thus, there are inaccuracies in the actor and sociological approaches of international relations, which conveniently negate or enhance the argument about the nature and extent of globalization. Any theoretical perspective must make some assumptions about the nature of the world: that is, about the units that are the subjects of study. This study attempts to address some of the inaccuracies in both approaches by making the following assumptions. The first assumption is that states, as the starting points, are not useful because the ultimate aim is to determine whether certain attributes associated with statehood have actually changed in the past decade. The second assumption is that institutions as the starting points are not useful because their impact on the behavior of actors has been uneven; the rules are followed only under certain circumstances. This study, consequently, takes rulers--political leaders who make policy decisions -- as the ontological givens. I assume that rulers want to remain in office, whatever that office

might be, and that they want to promote the security, prosperity, and values of their supporters, whether they are a national electorate or the presidential guard. Political leaders are assiduous calculators, not just ingénues executing indeterminate institutional norms. Understanding how these political leaders or rulers relate -- or fail to relate -- to their constituencies is the starting point for describing and determining the significance of globalization.¹² Thus, the circumstances -- not principles or norms themselves -- are more important in understanding the responses of rulers engaged in world politics.

1.2 The Globalization Debate Falls Down a Slippery Slope

Like the next act of a dramatic play, the debate continues. But instead of heightening and reaching the pinnacle of revelation, it falls down a slippery slope into nothing. The viewer, no matter what pair of theoretical glasses he has on, can no longer see globalization, let alone understand it. This is what happens when scholars attempt to describe globalization's aspects or its effects on world politics. For example, a discussion of globalization usually contains qualifying precepts. One article begins by stating, "*While we agree that globalization is having a profound impact on politics and society, we do not accept the proposition that the processes of globalization are*

¹² The terms *rulers* and the *ruled* are used throughout this dissertation for the following reasons: First, any ranked human society whether it be a tribe, chiefdom, city-state, or a state has one very important factor in common ----- the mass of humans transfer the products of their labor to a leader or leaders of that society in exchange for maintaining public order and violence. Second, the leaders of these human societies want to maintain their status, and therefore, disarm the populace, arm the elite, and make the masses happy by redistributing much of "products of their labor" in popular ways. The point is this: Whether the leader is a monarch, emperor, dictator, chief, etc. they are the 'ruler'-----they are the ones in charge of the human society. If the ruler keeps a large percentage of the products of populace, he or she is a kleptocrat. President Mobutu of Zaire, for example, keeps too much (billions) and redistributes very little (no functioning public phone system). George Washington, for example, is a statesman because he spent tax money on widely admired programs and did not enrich himself.

inevitable." A textbook on globalization, further makes the case, when it asserts, "*having said which, we want to point out that globalization is not some entirely new phenomenon in world history; indeed we argue that it is merely a new name for a long-term feature.*" Statements such as these do not adequately define globalization, and more importantly, obfuscate its meaning by steering the focus of the debate down that ghastly pathway known as the "slippery slope".

The dialogue about globalization, consequently, begins with two intertwining primary propositions. The first is how new globalization really is, and the second is the *extent or nature of change* occurring because of globalization. If it is claimed not to be *new*, all one has to do is go far back on the evolutionary chain of events and exploit borderline cases. Such arguments inch their way through the borderline area in order to show that there is no real difference between things at opposite ends of a scale. The argument goes like this. If A is not significantly different from B, and B is not significantly different from C, then A is not significantly different from C. Emma Rothschild engages in this type of reasoning and argues that globalization is not significantly new. For example, she writes:

The idea of a history of globalization is at first sight a contradiction in terms. Globalization or internationalization has been depicted, for much of the last 20 years, as a condition of the present and the future -- a phenomenon without a past. For both its admirers and its opponents, it is associated with new and unprecedented technologies: the Internet, international capital markets, and supersonic travel... But there is indeed a history of globalization -- there is even a history of the idea of globalization as a phenomenon without a history -- and this history is of some

consequence for present politics.¹³

According to her thesis, globalization is not new because it has a past related to previous technological revolutions. For example, French writer and diplomat Chateaubriand wrote about the communications and transport revolutions in 1841. He asked what the world would be like and tried to envision it after it was shaped by science and the new technologies of transport and communications. Similarly, Rothschild notes that Johann Gottfried questioned how commerce affects the world when he wrote: "When has the earth ever been so closely joined together by so few threads?" Condorcet, a French mathematician, pointed out that the banking system of the late 18th century was, "shrinking the world." All of these observations are concerned in one way or another with the relationships between distant peoples. Thus, she concludes that, because a discourse of globalization is present in history, it is, therefore, not new.

In order to arrive at such a conclusion, she adheres to the principle that we should not draw a distinction between things that are not significantly different. In this case, such reasoning amounts to denying the difference between primitive and modern communications (a modern type of communication is a type of communication that works faster with respect to other, "primitive," types). In the same way, there is no difference between a raft and a cargo ship (which just holds a few more goods and travels a bit farther.) However, her argument is flawed because a series of insignificant differences *can* and *do* add up to significant differences. In order to arrive at the

¹³ Rothschild, Emma. *Globalization and the Return of History* adapted from a presentation to the Democracy commission in Stockholm Sweden 1999.

conclusion that globalization is not new, she depends on the conceptual slippery slope argument, which is a logical fallacy.

Eugene Skolnikoff also engages in this approach. Skolnikoff, like Rothschild, admits to the presence of change, but quickly negates the admission by claiming the change is not so thoroughgoing. For example, he writes:

There is no doubt that international politics is quite different, in almost all dimensions, than it has been, or than it will be. It is evolving under the influence of technological advance... altering the relationships between government and nongovernmental actors but not the basic authority of governments, raising wholly new issues and altering traditional issues that must be dealt with internationally but thereby making foreign policy more complex, not fundamentally different.¹⁴

This approach is cautious. By arguing that for every example of change cited one can find a historical equivalent, the effect and extent of globalization can be written off as a mere extension of the past and not a transformation. Skolnikoff outlines a series of cases forming a continuum with endpoints that are clearly different. But he argues, however, that the cases are *not* fundamentally different because it is “just a matter of degree”. What is wrong with this is the emphasis on the “just,” which suggests that differences in degree do not count. Of course the difference between things being described is a matter of degree, but if the difference in degree is great enough, then it is fundamentally distinct and discernable. Skolnikoff is not arguing that there is no difference between technological advancements of the past and present. The claim Skolnikoff attempts to

¹⁴ Eugene B. Skolnikoff. *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.7.

make is this: the differences that do exist do *not* justify the proposition that authority of governments is undergoing a fundamental change.

Thus, questions about where to draw the line between cases, or to justify drawing a line at one point rather than at a different point, is challenging. But it does not automatically offer a logical refutation to an argument. As one colleague of mine put it, “if I say that Babe Ruth was a superstar, I will not be refuted even if I cannot draw a sharp dividing line between athletes who are superstars and those who are not. Nor will I be impressed if someone tells me that the difference between Babe Ruth and the thousands of players who never made it to the major leagues is “just a matter of degree.”

There are scholars, however, such as David Held, Steven Koblin, and James Rosenau who maintain that, when compared to earlier times, globalization has led to differences in *kind*, and not just in *degree*. According to David Held, “there is a fundamental difference between, on the one hand, the development of particular trade routes, and the global reach of nineteenth century empires, and, on the other hand an international order involving the conjuncture of a global system of production and exchange which is beyond the control of any single nation-state.”¹⁵ Koblin argues that, “we are in the midst of a qualitative transformation of the international world economy.... dramatic increases in the scale of information technology have rendered even the largest national markets too small to be meaningful economic units. National

¹⁵ Held, David. Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 101.

markets are fused transnational rather than linked across borders."¹⁶

The conventional wisdom suggests that globalization does not consist of a single dynamic. Although globalization comprises various threads of human activity, an additional difficulty to conceptual slippery slope arguments is that the term has come to mean vastly different things to different people. For example as Hillary French writes:

As the controversy swirling around the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999 made clear, "globalization" has become a contentious process. Part of the conflict stems from the fact that it has come to have various meanings. To some, globalization is synonymous with the growth of global corporations whose far-flung operations transcend national borders and allegiances. To others, it signals a broader cultural and social integration, spurred by mass communications and the Internet. The term can also refer to the growing permeability of international borders to pollution, microbes, refugees, and other forces.¹⁷

In the political realm, it means horizontal pressures on governmental structures and their responsibilities. In the economic realm, it encompasses the expansion and integration of trade, production, and investments. Between 1950 and 1998, world exports of goods have increased 17-fold---from \$311 billion to \$5.4 trillion. Global foreign direct investment increased from \$44 billion to \$644 billion between 1970 and 1998.¹⁸ In the social realm, it encompasses people's needs to enlarge the scope of goods, services, and ideas for well being. The proliferation of non-governmental organizations

¹⁶ Kobrin, Stephen. "The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global Economy", **Globalization, Governments, and Competition** (UK: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp.3-4.

¹⁷ French, Hillary. **Vanishing Borders**. (NY: W.W. Norton Company,, 2000) p.4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

and transnational corporations the extension of markets, and the spread of social movements, and are the aspects of globalization. But what is the driving force behind such changes in the world?

To begin, it is important to note that what is consistent among almost all scholars attempting to describe the world in the context of globalization and whether or not it is a new and/or significant phenomenon is the repeated reference to *the revolution of information and transportation technology*. James Roseneau, for example, suggests that it is commonplace to stress the large degree to which powerful communication and transportation technologies are rendering the world evermore interdependent and the boundaries that divide local, national, and international communities ever more porous. Similarly, as Richard Langhorne notes, "globalization has happened because technological advances have broken down many physical barriers to worldwide communications which used to limit how much connected cooperative activity of any kind could happen over long distances."¹⁹

With the advance of the Internet, people are learning skills at a much faster rate. They have become better able to assess, compare, and contrast large amounts of data, and have become more sophisticated in analyzing the information provided. As Maryann Cusimano writes, "people who are plugged in are people empowered to bring about change, to end apartheid in South Africa, to tear down the Berlin Wall and the Communist Empire, and to challenge the dictatorship in Tiananmen Square." Advances in information technology vary in different parts of the world; therefore, the sum is ever

¹⁹ Langhorne, Richard. *The Coming of Globalization*. (NY: Palgrave, 2001) p.xi.

changing. But it is information technology that has given human beings the ability to conduct affairs, whether politically, economically, or socially, across the globe without reference to the authority of governments within nation-states. The relationship between the size and number of transnational firms, on the one hand, and the power and numbers of states, on the other, is obvious in problems of antitrust that arise in cross-border business. Cross-border relations are not bound only to private sector businesses but rather to a whole range of religious, cultural, social, and political activities. Communications technology has made this possible. Put simply, globalization seems to be a function of information technology.

Thus, observation more than alludes to the idea that a different global environment in which international affairs are practiced has been gestating for over 25 years. Nevertheless, it is not enough to state that fundamental change has occurred. From the review of the existing literature on world politics, one might be tempted to conclude that globalization is an obstinate, vague concept. Constant references are made to a new international environment that has or has not emerged through opposing worldview approaches, the use of historical equivalents, or assumptions about change.²⁰ The result and combined effect is the obfuscation of exactly *how* world politics is currently operating. The relationship between globalization and change remains unclear, and we are left with the following question. Is globalization new and significantly different from the past and, if so, what is the source of change? If the recent proliferation of

²⁰ See (Carr, 1964; Greico, 1990; Morgenthau, 1978; and Waltz, 1979) These authors (classified as realists and neo-realists) reject the idea that the processes of globalization are weakening the nation-state and that the constant pursuit of gains relative to other states diminishes the chances for lasting cooperation.

references to globalization signals that an important change is taking place in world affairs, what is the nature of this change more precisely? It is at this juncture that change must be identified in order to refine a precise definition of globalization.

1.3 The Internet as a Source of Change: What do smoke signals and e-mails have to do with globalization?

As previously stated, there is a misleading tendency among scholars to contend that significant change is not present in the post-modern world. By arguing that for every example of change cited one can find a historical equivalent, the extent of change can then be written off as a mere extension of the past and not significant. Of course, globalization has a history, and so does technology. Furthermore, the literature about globalization is full of oversimplified accounts of the history of telecommunications. For example, Hillary French's observations about the aspects of globalization are detailed, but her examination of the source is terse as she writes:

Globalization is used here to refer to a broad process of societal transformation including growth in trade, investment, travel, computer networking, and transboundary pollution. Today's integrated world is the result of a process that can be traced back 1 million years, when early humans first migrated out of Africa throughout Eurasia. It was not until the 1500s, however, that people living several continents apart came into contact as a result of the European Age of Exploration. The late nineteenth century brought the development of steam-powered ships and railroads, which dramatically expanded international commerce and exchange. Two World Wars and the Great Depression slowed globalization dramatically in the first half of the twentieth century. But the second half brought globalization back again, as trade rebounded and widespread international air travel and the use

of personal computers revolutionized links between countries and cultures.²¹

Cursory references to past historical events do not rule out or establish that significant change has occurred in the modern world. Moreover, analyses of technological development usually encompass the traditional principles of classification and evolution seen in the natural sciences. For example, just as morphological or genetic characteristics can be used to catalog animals into species, so too can traits of technology be used to catalog different classes of the same. Furthermore, rates of change among a classification of x can be either gradual or punctuated. Put simply, a given degree of change can occur over a long or a small period of time. In both instances, the problem is the same. *That* change is, is evident, but *what* change is, is neither evident nor easy to define. How then are we to assign attributes to x ?

The difficulty exists because there is confusion about alteration and mutation. For example, bronze is still bronze whether it is angular or spherical. Thus, that which persists throughout an alteration as the same kind of substance is *not* a significant change. From this, however, it is incorrect to assume that *everything*, which comes to be because of something else, is the same. The person reading this dissertation is not “the same” as the paper it is written on just because both are ultimately composed of the same subatomic particles. It also does not follow that, because smoke signals and e-mails are communication, they are the same, with one falling under the other. Are we to assume that just because in 1200 BC Homer talked about signal fires in the *Iliad* or that in 1588 the arrival of the Spanish Armada was announced by smoke signals that 20th

²¹ French, Hillary. **Vanishing Borders.** (NY: WW Norton., 2000) pp. 6-7.

century e-mails informing the people of Iraq or Kuwait that U.S aircraft carriers had entered the Persian Gulf are not significantly different? The task of determining how they are *not* the same might begin by examining the advantages between the two as compared to others. But if the two subjects look very much like one another and we cannot see any superiority over one or the other of them, then we should look at them from the standpoint of effects and consequences in their environment.

In this respect, questions about determining change in communications technology can begin with the following: What is it about information technology that makes it significantly different from its communication predecessors? How is a telegram, for example, different from an e-mail? In order to answer these questions, we then compare the effects and consequences of each technology in order to refine the differences to establish if significant change has occurred. Obviously, if information technology is the source of globalization, and significant change has occurred in telecommunications, then globalization is significantly different from the past. This concept, in turn, has serious implications for the authoritative role of states because the control of information has historically been the anchoring tool of state power. The faster velocity of information and the diversification of information sources have changed the nature of telecommunications and therefore, have produced serious challenges to administration of state governments.

By dividing the technological developments of the past 150 years into three parts, the relationship between globalization and information technology becomes clearer. The first, an industrial revolution lasting from about 1810 until the late nineteenth century, was marked by the application of the steam engine and telegraph. The second industrial

revolution, which ran from the late nineteenth century until the 1970's, saw the development of electricity, the telephone, and the combustion engine. The third is the information revolution that came with electronics, communication earth satellites, and the refinement of the computer. By comparing the effects of these technological advances on the relationship between rulers and the ruled, one can see each era's importance to the functioning of government. America is a case in point.

America's three technological revolutions are similar in that they have all affected the increase of communication capability to individual households; that is, the time it took to reach 70% of US households decreased. For example, it took 63 years for the telephone, 10 years for AM radio, 5 years for FM radio, 10 years for black and white television, 20 years for color television, 12 years for the answering machine, 13 years for the mobile phone, and 7 years for the Web to reach just less than three quarters of American homes.²² Each era also produced communications and transport technology that had an impact on the distribution of power among nations. The circumstances in which each technological revolution occurred, however, were individually unique. But the effects of the information technology produced in the last three decades on America's governmental vertical structure have been significantly different from the effects of the previous two eras. Why?

The formation, vertical organization, and power of the American state and government were *enhanced* by the technological growth of the first era. Expansionism

²² History of US Communications Statistics. <http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2004/DianeEnnefils.shtml> (accessed August 2004).

was accelerated by the combination of rails, steam, and cables. It accelerated the development of the West and railroad travel, and aided business in its operations for profit. Industrialization completed the geographical birth of America. The machinery of American government progressed and grew in power because the industrial revolution was nationalizing and centralizing the nation. For example, the federal government departed from laissez-faire principles when it gave land grants to railroads: indeed, only one transcontinental railroad was built entirely by private enterprise.²³ Also, the Supreme Court, in the *Wabash* case of 1886, granted Congress interstate commerce powers that resulted in the first federal regulatory laws and agencies.²⁴ The electric telegraph, acting as an administrative agent and tactical factor in military operations of the Civil War, is another example. Technology, consequently, increased the internal development of America and the need to maintain, "an ear," and report the events occurring in other nations. From the beginning, the US was part of a world economic system, and the communications revolution that came with the telegraph increased the need for specialists who could encode and decode messages. The chief beneficiary was *government*, for unlike the home computer and the Internet, the telegraph was not user-

²³ See the following documents:

U.S government data (1968), Total U.S. Land Grants to Railroads

Resolution of National Agricultural, Congress May 28, 1873

Congressional Record (1876 and 1878)

Note: These documents demonstrate the US Government's increased involvement in subsidizing the railroad in particular.

²⁴ See the following documents:

Adams, Charles. Railroads: Their Origin and Problems (1878)

US Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Report (4-18-1886)

Congressman William Oates, speech in the House of Representative given on January 20, 1887.

Note: These documents present a clear increase in the US government's regulatory power during this era.

friendly to the common layperson or present in every household. Thus, rulers -- not the ruled--were the beneficiaries.

By the second era, American power increased even more because of technology's effect on the great land mass states. Although states the size of Japan and Germany also increased in power because of technological growth, they were superseded by the increase in power of the United States and the USSR. Electricity, telephones, and engines, combined with an abundance of resources in larger masses of land, were potent.²⁵ Surplus of capital was created beyond internal development. Foreign markets and foreign investments were necessary for the abundance of US manufactured goods and capital. American expansionism was different because non-contiguous territories were acquired without the assumption that they would become states and only with the objective of securing access to Asian and Latin American markets.

The second industrial revolution, consequently, produced centralizing effects on the role of American government. In 1825, one hundred states existed; by 1914, this number was cut in half. A few nations attempted to consolidate and centralize world power while their governments expanded in size and influence. The enormous increase in productive capability altered the distribution of power in the world and produced the bloodiest of international wars. The United States and Russia emerged as the successors. As Alfred Thayer Mahan has suggested, the new industrial technologies created surplus products that in turn created the need for militaries -- shaped by the new technologies --

²⁵ Langhorne, Richard. **The Coming of Globalization**. (NY: Palgrave, 2001) See chapter 2 for a complete description of how technology transferred the distribution of power and ultimately conferred it upon the two land mass states (US & USSR).

to expand and protect potential markets.²⁶ Thus, the Defense Department's role increased, especially after WWII, and American government was solely involved with decision-making with regards to the protective tariff, shielding the, "American invasion" of European markets, and redefining US relations with Latin America and Asia via traditional open-door policies.²⁷ Elihu Root put it exactly when he stated: "We live in a world not of natural competition but of subsidized competition."

The effects of the first two industrial revolutions were no less in other nations. The essence of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, for example, was based on a substitution of medieval regulations, which controlled the production and distribution of wealth, for competition. Although the emphasis of free trade was on the idea of individualism, government and business forged England into one of the most powerful nations in the world. For as Arnold Toynbee lectured in 1884, "The production of wealth, not the welfare of man, was what Adam Smith had primarily before his mind's eye; in his own words, 'the great object of the Political Economy of every country is to increase the riches and power of that country.'"²⁸

The British government did just that. Between 1810 and the late 19th century the British government realized the connection between technological advancements of the period and its need for communicating at long distances in order to control its geographic periphery. The possible threat of revolt still existed in the minds of

²⁶ LeFeber Walter. "Technology and US Foreign Relations", *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Blackwell Publishers USA, Winter 2000) p.8

²⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 8-10

²⁸ Toynbee, Arnold. *Lectures on the Industrial Revolution*. 1884.

statesmen, but the technical advancements of the industrial revolution made peacekeeping easier. The army was the main peacekeeping force, and railways enabled speedy concentration of troops. Concurrently, the transmission of official messages by electric telegraph enabled government to more effectively control the action of the magistrates and ensure the observation of a more uniform code of action in the repression of disorder.²⁹ Between 1825 and 1835, Parliament agreed to the building of 54 new rail lines. From 1836 to 1837, 39 new lines were agreed to with 1,800 miles of telegraph running alongside the railways. By 1900, Britain had 22,000 miles of rail track and dominated world telegraphy networks. Although individuals traveled on trains, telegraphs were not, as in the US, household appliances. Government power was enhanced by the significant telecommunication progress of the first era.

As stated previously, the US and Russia – two great landmass nations – were the primary beneficiaries of the second technological revolution. But even with the redistribution of power, telecommunication technology was still a primary tool of the government in Great Britain. Telephones, for example, enabled rulers to control others at a distance: Britain oversaw the colonies, regulated trade, and managed commerce. Although telephones were used for personal use, it was not until 1970 that the International Direct Distance Dialing (IDDD) began operating between London and New York City and enabling people to dial overseas directly. In 1927 AT&T did inaugurate commercial transatlantic service to London using two-way radio, but initially

²⁹ Sir Charles Napier in a letter to his brother Colonel William Napier, January, 19, 1840. The letter describes the effort to put down the Chartist movement.
<http://dSPACE.dial.pipex.com/town/terrace/adw03/peel/chartism/napier> (accessed 2004).

calls cost seventy-five dollars each for three minutes. Service did spread to other countries, both via London and through direct radio links, but it was far too expensive and crude for individual use. Telephone service via radio technology was subject to fading and interference and had strictly limited capacity.

In the last three decades, information technology has decreased the power of the state because it has empowered human activities outside the borders of the nation-state. The combination of electronics, satellites, and computers has connected people, enabling them to create organizations that operate in a, "cyber-space" rather than a geographical one. The telegraph was not available to individual households, but the telephone was. Each phone, however, connected people *intra*-nationally rather than *internationally*. Only governments were connected internationally in the first two eras. Telegraphs were perfect nation-builders. Radiotelephones were perfect superpower builders. The Internet, unlike the telegraph and the telephone, has connected households internationally:

It is the telephone, which, does most to link together cottage and skyscraper and mansion and factory and farm. It is not limited to experts or college graduates. It reaches the man with a nickel as well as the man with a million. It speaks all languages and serves all trades. It helps to prevent sectionalism and race feuds. It gives a common meeting place to capitalists and wageworkers. It is so essentially the instrument of all the people, in fact, that we might almost point to it as a national emblem, as the trademark of democracy and the American spirit.³⁰

The Internet is a perfect transnational builder. By comparing the effects of

³⁰ Casson, Herbert, History of the Telephone *On-line Chapter VII: The Telephone and National Efficiency*. <http://casson.thefreelibrary.com/History-of-the-Telephone/1-7> (accessed 2004).

telecommunication technology on the relationship between American leaders and their constituents, change has been identified. Information technology is *new in kind* and subsequently has turned the relationship between rulers and the ruled upside down.

1.4 The Nexus between Globalization and the Recent Telecommunications Revolution

As previously stated, globalization is generally perceived as being composed of a set of aspects that first connect and then integrate societies, fragmenting and transcending the traditional structures they confront. Consequently, it is described as a layered process composed of various threads, which individually may thicken or thin out at different rates with an irregular pace and uneven intensity. After comparing and demonstrating significant variation in America's technological revolutions, how is the technology of the last three decades related to the other aspects of globalization despite its current uncertain pace and trajectory. Can we further establish that the Internet is new in kind and degree and that it is the medium through which the other threads of globalization flow? In other words can we further establish a nexus between the recent telecommunications revolution and globalization?

One of the primary aspects, if not considered the only serious aspect of globalization, is the world economy. Overall there exists a sense that the integration of national economies and the development of international markets has gone further than ever before. But it is also formidably argued that the extent of current economic integration is not unprecedented because there exists a recognizable previous period in history of a globally integrated market. By this argument, economic integration peaked in the first decade of this century, and then reversed itself dramatically in the context of world war

and depression. Throughout most of this century there has been a marked retreat from economic integration: only in the last 25 years has there been a return to the levels reached more than a hundred years ago. The connection of national economies to a global marketplace from this contemporary view is that a hundred years ago markets were every bit as integrated as today. The reasoning is that, if one goes back prior to the disruptions of two world wars--and the collapse of commodity and financial markets that led to a global depression--and simply matches the degree of economic integration, globalization is not new.³¹ In a Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Presidential Address on technology and US foreign relations delivered at Princeton, 24, June 1999, Walter Lafeber stated the following:

In the late twentieth century, we are entranced by the omnipresent term globalization. In 1875, however, when Baron Carl Meyer von Rothschild declared that "The world is a city," he spoke in a world actually more "globalized" than ours. A greater portion of the world's wealth was invested in foreign countries than now, largely because that wealth was concentrated in the hands of the British, French, and later American investors who, with the aid of new communications and transportation networks moved abroad more easily.³²

The above is once again an informative example of finding an historical equivalent to explain a present condition in the world. Such a method is useful in attempting to describe, compare, and analyze events. But cursory references must be avoided. A complete comparison must be made in order to arrive at the conclusion that

³¹ Collins, Susan and Lawrence, Robert. Comment on Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irsin: 'Is Globalization Today Really Different Than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?' (Brookings Trade Forum 1999, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C)

³² LaFeber, Walter. *Diplomatic History*, Vol: 24, No. 1 (Winter 2000)

globalization is in fact not new or, in this case, that the economic aspect of globalization during the late 19th century supersedes the economic integration of the present.

Economic vitality in the 19th century depended on information just as much as it does today. The individual trader, financier, or merchant depended on information in order to participate in this thing called an economy. Information barriers to exchange can limit the extent of market integration.³³ Nineteenth century consumers had knowledge about the quality of goods produced locally, while producers had information about local tastes and demands. Obviously, transmitting and receiving information of this type across large geographic distances was much more difficult.³⁴ Italian workers, for example, who traveled to the New World for a few years, or even just for planting and harvest seasons before returning to their hometown in Italy, formed an observable network for information about supplies and demands in the Americas. But the extent to which these network mechanisms overcame information barriers was limited. They can be understood in terms of sheer physical and cultural distance. Business abroad was risky, returns were unpredictable, and adequate and reliable information about distant lands was hard to obtain.

The high level of migration, including reverse and seasonal migration that

³³ Bordo, Michael. *Is Globalization Today Really Different Than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?* May 1999 NBER Working Paper No. w7195 <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/Brooking.pdf> (accessed May 2004) This paper pursues the comparison of economic integration today and pre 1914 for trade as well as finance, primarily for the US but also with reference to the wider world. It establishes the outlines of international integration a century ago and analyzes the institutional and informational impediments that prevented the late nineteenth century world from achieving the same degree of integration as today. The authors conclude that one of the three main impediments was and is information barriers that separate the two.

³⁴ Bordo, Michael. *Is Globalization Today Really Different Than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?* May 1999. Internet source: <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dirwin/Brooking.pdf> (accessed May 2004).

characterized the late 19th century, was an important channel for the flow of such information, but pales in comparison to the accessibility of information today via the recent telecommunications revolution.

The Internet extends the impact of telecommunications through data transmission and visual information. It enables fast and efficient communication anywhere on earth, in any language, and to anyone who has access to a network. As scholar Michael Bordo writes, “The anecdote about the dinner in London at which a British investor, encountering an American guest, inquired whether Cincinnati or Ohio was the larger city may be apocryphal but the story has a point: lack of familiarity with the regions that the railways were penetrating was an impediment to capital flows.”³⁵ Information problems are a key, and often overlooked, explanation of why the economic integration of the 19th century was far different from today.

Another important aspect of globalization is the intensification of social relations. Although there is certainly an overlap between the political and economic aspects of globalization with the social aspect, the latter tends to encompass ideas rather than services or goods. People are aware of the world as a single place to an extent that earlier generations were not. For example, in 1993, Michael Hauben described the research that he did which revealed the emergence of Netizens³⁶. He writes:

Net.citizen was used in Usenet... and this really represented what people were telling me—they were really net citizens—which Netizen captures. To be a ‘Netizen’ is different from being a ‘citizen’. This is because to be on the Net is to be part of

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Hauben, Michael. *Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet and the Internet*. (Columbia University Press, NY, 1993).

a global community To be a citizen restricts someone to a more local or geographical location. People came to understand that it is possible to physically live in one country but be in contact with much of the world via a global computer network. Virtually people live next door to every other Netizen in the world. Put simply, geographical separation is replaced by existence in the same virtual space.

The Internet has usually been painted as an “information superhighway” or “information infrastructure to which people could connect, download some data or purchase some goods, and then disconnect.” At one level the Internet is just like its technological ancestors because it is composed of independent hardware that interoperates. The Internet is just computers, wires, and software. But there are no central offices that switch e-mails off like telegraph, or voice traffic. Many legal systems, for example, have had difficulty devising laws for use of the Internet. Existing precedents, which include the telegraph, telephone, or post office, are incompatible media that do not apply. The Internet frustrates these traditional analogies because it is a meta-medium. It is quite true that there is nowhere one can go to see “The Internet”.

This image of a superhighway network is accurate to a point, but the transfer of information is secondary in contrast to the reality that the Internet provides a meta medium where people can share ideas, observations, and questions The computer plays a helpful role in human communication. It enables humans to interact with living information not merely in the passive way that one would use books and libraries, but as active participants in a continuous process. People bring something to it through their interaction with it, and do not receive from it simply by their connection to it.³⁷ This

³⁷ Rosenschein, Stanley. **The Internet and Public Discourse** (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

example points to a process of social discovery that goes far beyond the one-way or two-way connections of previous telecommunication technology.³⁸ It enables humans not just to access information, but also to access a virtual place for knowing facts that only one knew. It is a hermeneutic process: as the technology is used in new ways, we gain a deeper understanding of the difference between it and its predecessors.

The characteristic of this type of communication that transcends its predecessors is its speed. The speed of global connection and integration in the last three decades have provoked serious debate about its the political, economic, and social consequences in the modern world. Nevertheless, no matter how much credit is afforded the Internet for unhindered individual participation free of supervision and outside the scope of local authority, it is subordinated. Whether dealing with the political, economic, or social threads of globalization, the Internet is viewed as a meta medium that reaches out across borders to connect with like-minded others. Hence, the Internet is viewed as other media are in that it connects people whether it is a one-way, two-way, or multiple party transmission. From this analysis, it should be apparent that there exists opposition to the idea that globalization is an unprecedented or new phenomenon in the modern world. The idea that significant change is not occurring is based not solely on the use of historical equivalents and but also by extrapolating similarities in the characteristics and effects of other technological advancements over time.

Imagine, however, those arguments that the Internet, a specific telecommunications

³⁸ Agre, Philip. **Computation and Human Experience** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

technology of the Information Revolution is *not* fundamentally different from the Telegraph or other telecommunication technology of the Industrial Revolution are correct. Let us accept the following assumption that because both have communications capability that enhanced the integration of the world politically, economically, and socially that fundamental change has not occurred. Hence, the first notion is that the political power of the state has not been significantly affected. The second is that the economic integration of the late nineteenth century as a consequence of the communications revolution of the time was actually not that different from today's global markets. The third notion is that the social aspect of globalization---- the forging of identities, common interests, or organized action---- is not different from national identities, common national interests, or organized national action that were forged by previous communications mediums such as the radio. Finally, there is the idea that the only difference between the Internet and the characteristics of previous communications technologies is that one is just *faster* than the other and therefore the consequences are *minimal*. These contemporary arguments seem plausible, quantifiable, and accurate, but there is a problem with them.

Suppose, for example, the effects of the Internet are like the speed of the wind and imagine a pencil that has just been tossed into a tree by a breeze. Of course, the pencil hits the tree, bounces off, does nothing to the tree, and lands on the ground. Now the pencil is propelled into the tree by a gust of wind. Obviously, the pencil gains momentum from the increase in wind speed, hits the tree, may even scratch it, and then lands on the ground. Thus far the speed of the wind on the pencil in both cases has affected the tree minimally. But imagine that the same pencil lying on the ground is

picked up by the winds of a tornado. As if it were a spear, the sheer speed of the wind thrusts the pencil into the tree piercing it. At a perfectly perpendicular angle, the tree is now deeply embedded by a pencil that previously barely scratched it. Photographs of such events not only verify the truth of this analogy but also astonish.

The fundamental underpinning of globalization is the Internet. Born in the current telecommunications revolution, the Internet emerged with properties and consequences not foreseen by its inventors. Technology is viewed as an autocatalytic process: that is, one that speeds up at a rate that increases with time because the process catalyzes itself. The Internet differs from its predecessors not only because of its increase in speed but also because it has not stabilized. It has emerged with the property of perpetually accelerating its own development. That is, the products of the Internet's own processes enable it to develop even faster-----thus increasing the rate of change in a short interval of time.³⁹ The term globalization does capture, elements of a widespread perception that there is a broadening, deepening and speeding up of world-wide interconnectedness in all aspects of life, from the political to the economic, to the social. But there is a detectable intensification, or growing magnitude, of this world-wide interconnectedness and its source is the Internet.⁴⁰ Therefore, this study adopts an operational definition of

³⁹ Rogerson, Ken. *International Relations and the Internet*. (Duke University, Sanford Institute of Public Policy, March, 8 2002) In Rogerson's paper he lists numerous sources for the monitoring of global Internet Usage. Sources include: "ISI Country Ranking" www.worldpaper.com/ISI/country.html; www.headcount.com; www.computereconomics.com/new4pr/pr990610.html; www.euromktg.com/globstats; all accessed in September and October of 2000.

⁴⁰ Held, David; McGrew, Anthony; Goldblatt; Perraton, Johnathan. *Global Transformations* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA 2000) These scholars argue that for any satisfactory account of globalization has to offer: "a coherent conceptualization; a justified account of causal logic; some clear propositions about historical periodization; a robust specification of impacts. They reason that this is necessary to confront these tasks in order to devise and construct fresh ways of thinking about globalization. Although these scholars attempt to clarify the meaning of globalization, their account lacks any sort of primary source or correlation, let alone causation, for globalization.

globalization as a worldwide connectivity caused by a specific type of communications technology that is putting pressure on government functions of the state and thereby changing its power.

1.5 The Immediate Effect of the IT-Globalization Nexus: New Actors Crowd the State-based International Political Block

The evolution of the international system is mired in complexity. A specific formula does not exist for the creation of international machinery that can organize the interests of dissimilar peoples. An idea remains, however, that despite the shortcomings of the modern international system, this system has produced “ a combination of the yet discovered order in the whole, and freedom for the subordinate parts.” The Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, for example, were institutions thought to embody the notion of the whole, while states were the essential sovereign parts. At present the order of the international system is significantly blurred because the global political system is not longer purely states based. They are not its only constituent parts. New circumstances have affected the development of international machinery as they always have. For example, The Concert of Europe, the international machinery utilized for diplomatic discourse prior to WWI, collapsed because power in the world was shifting and made its confined geographical bases insufficiently. The present system is rubbing similarly away as a new system emerges. Interestingly, the crises the Concert of Europe faced prior to its collapse reflected its difficulty in dealing with issues that were occurring outside the previous defined area in which it functioned. Power was shifting as the defined area expanded, producing pressures beyond the

ability of the Concert of Europe to halt or control. The lesson about these past attempts to organize the international system is to pay close attention to change. The point being that identifying change and the magnitude of that change, which of course may or may not exist, is necessary in order to enhance human security and impede events that may lead to the potential disaster of war. The logic that transformation occurs out of destruction needs to be, and moreover, should be challenged

Thus, the immediate effect of the recent communications revolution has been the increase of new participants in the international system with new competencies in foreign policy making. For at least the last 200 years, international politics has involved countries divided from each other by both clearly marked frontiers and the substantial time generally required to cover the distance between respective territories. International politics, principles, practices, and organizations developed within a patchwork of bordered states, reflecting the structure and needs of its basic participants. The state international system was an historical phenomenon, and it is important to note that politics operated without this organizing principle prior to the seventeenth century. Sovereign states formed a particular framework of governance that arose at a specific time owing to a specific set of circumstances. The conduct of external relations was among the first fully organized activities of sovereign states to appear as such states emerged and rapidly made themselves the only legal participants in it. The state system apparatus survives, but the international political system is noticeably crowded with new entities. The leaders of state governments are not the exclusive proprietors of foreign relations. These unanticipated participants have evolved to join states, and their increase has produced an additional layer, albeit a nascent and confusing one, of

political organization in the world. The web of relations among highly dissimilar participants does not fit neatly into the patchwork of bordered states. The management of relationships with other entities is the primary means by which human societies try to maintain security, -- personal, economic, political -- and such societies have developed highly organized systems for achieving it. There are two particular broad categories of participants that have demonstrated an increased influence, albeit at times a messy one, on foreign policy outcomes. It is important, therefore, to describe these “new players on the block” as well as the “block” in which they occupy.

1.5.1 Intergovernmental Organizations

The first category of participants includes Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). In the last three decades, permanent international organizations have proliferated rapidly into every part of the world.⁴¹ These organizations can be global or regional, and their functions are general or specific. Whatever their characteristics however, they share the fact that their memberships consist of state governments or associations of states. These rapidly expanding IGOs are thus the saplings of cooperation and integration among states. Using what one source considers the 110 most important IGOs, one can calculate the average age of these IGOs in 1997, which works out to be approximately 30 years.⁴²

The recent communications revolution has brought the states of the world into much closer contact, and remains the primary reason for their expansion. These interchanges

⁴¹ Diehl, Paul. **The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World**, (Rienner Publishing, US, 1997) pp.1-67. A detailed account of the evolution and growth of Intergovernmental Organizations. IGO's .

⁴² Rourke, John. **World Politics: International Politics on the World Stage**. (McGraw-Hill Publishing, US, 2000) pp. 48-50.

between states require organizational structures in order to become routine and regulated. Increased international contact and the world's increased interdependence have fostered a variety of IGOs designed to deal with problems that affect the world. Many of the world problems IGOs deal with are mirrored thematically in the various departments of an individual state government. Although there is an obvious overlap, states have found that they increasingly need IGOs to achieve foreign policy goals that they cannot accomplish alone. The United Nations system, for example, reflects this situation through its structure and activities. At one level, the UN operates with a central administrative structure comprised of representatives from the member states. At a second level, the UN oversees programs, funds,⁴³ and agencies,⁴⁴ which include the World Food Program, the Children's Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, International Labor Organization, that handle the world problems of famine, human trafficking of children, disease, and slave labor respectively. Consequently, as much as states have shaped international organizations, states have also been shaped by them. In light of their increased initiative and influence, what used to be called an, 'international organization' might now suitably be designated a 'global regulation agency.' In other words, far more now occurs in these areas than in the intergovernmental consultation and co-ordination sectors for which the older organizations were originally established.

Intergovernmental organizations that are expanding the roles they play in regulating

⁴³ Taylor, Paul. **The United Nations and International Order**, (Oxford Press, NY 2001) Table 16.1: *The Structure of the United Nations System*. The funds and programs depend mainly on voluntary contributions, and are more closely supervised by the central system of the U.N.

⁴⁴ Ibid. The agencies are constitutionally independent of the central system---they report to the Economic and Social Council, (ECOSOC), but cannot be instructed by it or by the General Assembly. They also have separate assessed budgets and their own assemblies and executives.

economic activity around the globe are quite. The growth of IGO global economic regulation covers a very wide spectrum. Since 1979, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have supplemented their already significant stabilization and development functions with far-reaching structural adjustment programs in almost 100 countries. The IMF has also conducted detailed annual policy surveillance of all its member states. The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, covers a much wider agenda today, covering services, intellectual property, and investment issues as well as merchandise trade. The WTO also has greater powers of enforcement than in the past through its dispute settlement mechanism and the organization's Trade Policy Review Body, which also conducts surveillance of members' commercial measures. Although IGOs are creatures of state, they are becoming increasingly engaging as independent actors in the international system and less like the shadows of state governments.

1.5.2 NGOs Nongovernmental Organizations

The Internet has greatly lowered the costs of transmitting information, enabling companies and people to bypass the traditional intermediaries whose power revolved around the control of information: namely, national governments. With increasingly greater processing power and bandwidth, unprecedented volumes of information can be accessed from anywhere at any time (e.g., the World Wide Web) at Communication networks that now entwine the entire globe and have drawn businesses and people into the foreign policy decision-making process. One of the main assumptions of this study is that the Internet is the source of globalization and has enabled groups of people as well as companies to link together in ways not seen in world politics before. Many

diverse types of bodies are now described as being NGOs. No generally accepted definition of an NGO currently exists and the term carries different connotations in different circumstances.⁴⁵ As Peter Willetts points out, “the point of this debate about terminology is to emphasize that NGOs are not just well-meaning, uncontroversial, non-political groups.”⁴⁶ The roles and values advocated by different NGOs are so diverse that they inevitably oppose each other as well as put pressure on governments to get issues on the international agenda. Current literature reveals that scholars and researchers are in the process of defining these new actors, as are the actors themselves. Nevertheless, two general types of NGOs have emerged: transnational companies (TNCs) and Transnational Social Movement Organizations (TSMOs).

The first involves companies that have expanded beyond their home country. All companies that import or export are engaging in transnational economic activities. The most obvious consequences of transnationalism lie in the control of financial flows. In the case of currency, for example, the successive crises since the early 1980s for the dollar, the pound, the French franc, and the yen have established that even governments with the greatest financial resources are helpless against the transnational banks and other speculators. The effects of trade on domestic and international finance are less obvious. Companies that import or export are engaging in transnational economic activities. Goods moving physically across frontiers are usually seen as “trade” between the relevant states. But when changes in the health and safety standard, regulation of

⁴⁵ Willetts, Peter. *What is a Non-Governmental Organization?* Output from the Research Project on Civil Society Networks in Global Governance. (City University, London, 2002) <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NTWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Glossary>. (accessed July 2003).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

communication facilities, or general economic policies of foreign governments affect their ability to trade, these TNCs become directly involved. Of course, if the situation is beneficial, they will not necessarily respond. If they expect to lose financially, however, they directly lobby the foreign government in question. Various methods are used, but the relevant point is that the companies' home government is not always included.

Market organizations have played a new and noticeable role in regulating economic activity especially in instances where the agencies of state governments have left gaps. With regard to global securities trading, for example, standard procedures and codes of conduct have emanated mainly from industry bodies like the International Federation of Stock Exchanges and the International Securities Market Association. Global policy initiatives by the private sector have ranged beyond the financial markets, too. For example, the World Economic Forum (WEF), founded in 1971 now unites some 900 major companies under the motto of 'entrepreneurship in the global public interest'.⁴⁷ Among its many initiatives, the WEF was instrumental in launching the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations at the time that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the World Trade Organization (WTO). Scores of corporate endowments have also become active in foreign affairs. Two prominent examples are the Ford and the Soros Foundations which have been major promoters of liberal democracy in the former Soviet bloc. Set up in 1991, a World Business Council for Sustainable Development has also injected a corporate input into environmental

⁴⁷ Baylis, John and Smith, Steve. **The Globalization of World Politics**. (NY: Oxford University Press: 2001), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Chapter 1 written by Jan Aart Scholte.

management. There have even been proposals to create a permanent Chamber of Companies' in the United Nations alongside the General Assembly of states. Clearly, the current international political environment is not the domain of states alone.

The second type of nongovernmental organization is comprised of people who share common interests and concerns. The advent of e-mail and the web in the 1990s has meant that the costs of running a network have dropped substantially, and individual people can afford to take part in sophisticated instantaneous global communication. People across the globe are today able to interact, transact, and mobilize without regard to physical locations, and are connected in ways not possible prior to the recent communications revolution. They are able to cut across state structures. The groups they form are numerous, growingly powerful, and broadly unaccountable. More importantly, they are independent voluntary associations of people acting together for some common purpose. A primary feature of these actors is that they clearly operate without and are independent from any direct control of government.

The number of these networks has increased dramatically. For example, once a lead organization or even a lead individual establishes technical and political communication skills, a coalition of thousands of NGOs can be formed rapidly and their influence focused on specific targets. Organizations like Oxfam, Greenpeace, Amnesty International and thousands of others serve the public on a national and international scale. Known variously as, "private voluntary organizations," "civil society organizations," and, "citizen associations," they are increasingly associated with the acronym NGO more than transnational companies are. Leaving the actual title aside, approximately 46,000 of these new actors exist independently today inscribing world

politics.⁴⁸ It is often assumed that they operate solely for the general public good and not as advocates. Recently, however, new demands for accountability have arisen because of a dearth of transparency in providing adequate financial disclosure and objective assessments.⁴⁹ The immediate observable effect of the IT-Globalization nexus, therefore, is the growing number of these participants. Peter Willetts captures the state of the contemporary world in the following description. He writes:

While there are less than 200 governments in the global system there are approximately 60,000 major transnational companies (TNCs), such as Shell, Barclays Bank, Coca Cola, Ford Microsoft or Nestle, with these parent companies having more than 500,00 foreign affiliates; 10,000 single-country non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Freedom House (USA), Medecins sans Frontieres (France), Population Concern (UK), Sierra Club (USA), or the Women's Environmental Network (UK), who have significant international activities; 250 Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN, NATO, the European Union, or the International Coffee Organization; and 5,800 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) such as Amnesty International, the Baptist World Alliance, The International Chamber of Shipping, or the International Red Cross, plus a similar number of less-well-established international caucuses and networks of NGOs.⁵⁰

Although the increase of participants is important, the range of areas in which they interact and the frequency and intensity of those interactions is key to understanding how the system is currently functioning. Preparation for the Kyoto Conference on Global Warming illustrates the complex environment in which diplomacy now operates.

⁴⁸ H.Lovach, C. Neligan, S. Burall. *Global Accountability Report 1: Power without Accountability?* (The One World Trust, 2003) <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/intro/general/2003/0120account.pdf>. (accessed July 2003).

⁴⁹ Willetts, Peter. *What is a Non-Governmental Organization?* Output from the Research Project on Civil Society Networks in Global Governance. (City University, London, 2002) <http://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/CS-NWKS/NGO-ART.HTM#Glossary>. (accessed July 2003).

⁵⁰ Baylis, John. *The Globalization of World Politics*, (Oxford University Press: NY 2001) *Transnational Actors and International Organization in Global Politics*, Chapter 12 by Peter Willetts.

Led by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, the U.S. delegation began negotiations with a compromise that satisfied neither the business nor environmental NGOs. The United States was viewed as either selling out to corporate interests or to the developing states of the world. Critics charged the United States with abdicating its leadership role, the US Senate warned the treaty would be dead on arrival, and the compromise received no support among US allies. The world witnessed the conflicting claims of the transnational corporations and environmental organizations as the media amplified the differences. The US Vice President flew to Kyoto to unsnarl the tangle and returned with a compromise that satisfied practically no one and the realization that the international political block that states once exclusively occupied was now crowded and complicated.

Another example of how the US was overshadowed by the intensification of interactions between state governments, international organizations, and non governmental organizations is the Land Mine Treaty. The NGO community is no longer without the means to marshal its resources. The connectivity of the Internet has opened up a level of participation on a scale never seen before. In this case, Canada's membership in international organizations and the mobilization of NGOs produced an interaction between new and traditional participants concerning a global issue. The US, once again, was viewed as insensitive to the concerns of the international community.

Greater clarity can be obtained by analyzing state governments, intergovernmental, and inter-society relations, with no presumption that one participant is more important than the other. Nobody can deny the number of these organizations and the range of their activities. The controversial question are whether the non-state world has

significance in its own right and whether it makes any difference to the analysis of interstate relations. This thesis looks for the answer by observing how three different foreign ministries are currently functioning in this new environment as compared to the past.

The initial purpose of Part I, entitled *Globalization: What is it?*, in summation, has been to clarify the major theoretical debates about globalization, point to the weaknesses in their analytical frameworks for studying world politics, and refine the ontological givens necessary for this particular study. The second purpose of this section has been to reduce the notion that, “Globalization---the ‘big idea of the late twentieth century,’” lacks precise definition. This has been achieved by exposing logical flaws about, “change” in arguments maintaining that globalization is by no means a novel phenomenon. The third purpose, then, has been to establish the Internet as the prime mover of change and establish a clear nexus between information technology and globalization in order to establish an operational definition of globalization. The final and most important purpose of Part I has been to describe the immediate observable effects of globalization on the international system. Connections, webs of relationships, and patterns of interactions are made possible through information technology. They are intensifying and transcend state governments and their constituent societies.

Part I has shown that the immediate effect of globalization has been a sharp increase in the number of global non-state actors that have added another layer of activity within the international system. Part II explores whether the immediate effects of globalization on the state-based international system have any particular consequences on the role of states in foreign policy making and the character of state governance systems in general. Although the foreign ministry is a manageable unit of analysis for

this purpose, it is also an important one because the ministry has been a special piece of state machinery dedicated to the conduct of foreign relations and diplomacy. The objective, therefore, of Part II is to find out if evidence exists that changes, if any, in national foreign ministries are a response to the effects of globalization.

Part II The Foreign Ministry as the Site of Investigation

2.1 Approach for Identifying Changes in the Foreign Ministries of the U.S., Canada, and Slovenia

A diplomatic organization, consisting of a foreign ministry and a diplomatic-consular network carries out processes aimed at the realization of a foreign policy. With its activities it also guarantees the supply of information needed by the subjects responsible for making foreign policy decisions. Hence, it is a diplomatic and information gathering machinery, and its organization is a reflection of this complexity, as well as, the environment in which it functions. Although the U.S., Canada, and Slovenia are very different states, the main bodies in dealing with foreign policy in practically all well organized states has been the state leader, the government, and the foreign ministry and the diplomatic service. This is why these three cases have been selected for this study. In short, I have deliberately selected cases with an important similarity on one variable, but that differ with respect to as many other significant variables as possible. If a consistent relationship about the diplomatic organizations of these different cases is discovered, then logic suggests that a general pattern has been

identified.⁵¹

In the last decade, all three nations have generated structural rearrangement in their diplomatic networks albeit arising within apparently very different systems.⁵² The first step, consequently, will be to describe the primary differences among the three nations. The second step will be to demonstrate that their foreign ministries, as a sub-unit of analysis, are *the* primary similarity among these nations. The third and substantive part of this study will be to investigate all three foreign ministries over a 150-year time span and then compare them within the last thirty years. Has there been a significant structural rearrangement of these three foreign ministries within the last thirty years as compared to the past? If there has been, what assessment can be made with regards to anything sufficiently common among the structural rearrangement of these foreign ministries that operate within three different nations?

America, Canada and Slovenia are three very different nations. Thus, how do we assess the differences among three countries that lie at opposite and extreme geographic centers? We can efficiently deduce many of the answers to this question by comparing

⁵¹ Peters, Guy. Comparative Theory and Methods. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998) Guy Peters writes that *"it is difficult to attend any academic meeting on comparative politics without hearing at least once the phrase, 'But those cases really are not comparable. You are comparing apples and oranges'."* The objection is centered on the idea that the appropriate approach to comparative analysis should be based upon the most similar method. When using this method, the analyst selects cases that are similar in a large number of important characteristics, which one can treat as constants. By selecting cases which are essentially similar in as many important ways as possible, the probability that the independent variable is responsible for observed differences in the dependent variable increases. Peters, however, also points out that the researcher has the option of employing the inverse of this approach.

⁵² Three cases were chosen for this study in order to avoid certain comparative analytical problems. For instance, the individual case study is less capable of making generalizations or broad theoretical conclusions because the researcher may apply his/her own biased lens to the data. In contrast, a large study with many cases is capable of providing broader generalizations, but these cases lose their individuality and become simply a bundle of variables.

the main historical events of the last 180 years that have shaped the economic, sociological, and political systems of each country. The outcome will highlight power asymmetries as the significant difference.

Power is not a simple and stable phenomenon. In fact some scholars, such as Joseph Nye, argue that, "power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it."⁵³ He also warns that if we always dominate others with our strength, "we may be as mistaken about our power as was the fox who thought he was hurting Brer Rabbit when he threw him into the briar patch." The definition of power is often difficult because it is constantly changing. But the task of assessing the power of a state becomes easier among states that are different in many aspects. For example, a study that reviewed four attempts by various scholars to devise formulas to measure power illustrate this well. At the most general level, all four studies agreed that the United States, Russia, and China were among the world's most powerful countries. Beyond that consensus, however, there were numerous disagreements about which was the *most* powerful.⁵⁴ Does this mean that trying to estimate power is a fool's quest? No, it does not. The complexity and fluidity of power is less difficult in cases that are the least similar to one another. Hence, attempting to estimate the relative power among the U.S., Canada, and Slovenia cases is much easier than assessing the power between the U.S, Soviet Union and China.

All countries, of course, are unique. However, the United States, it has been claimed

⁵³ Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "The Changing Nature of World Power". *Political Science Quarterly*, pp. 172-192

⁵⁴ Stoll, Richard and Ward, Michael. Power in World Politics (Rienner, CO, 1989)

by academics, is so different from most other countries in so many ways that it is imperative to underscore the peculiarities of its historical life. It has been claimed that "scholars of US politics have always had to come to terms with the idea of American exceptionalism, the idea that the United States is unique and cannot easily be compared to other nations".⁵⁵ The US *could* be considered exceptional in one respect. Compared with the other countries, it has been largely free of outside constraints because of its geographic location, climate, and size. Oceans provide protective borders on almost three sides of the 9,158,960 square kilometer landmass of which 19.8% is arable. The US also sports a temperate climate that is far different from its neighbors to the north and south. As for its natural resources and experience with representative democracy, Eurasia and the United Kingdom provide two respective examples that far exceed the US. To suggest that the U.S. is exceptional in these two respects is the result of scholars who ignore the last 13,000 years of human history.⁵⁶

The U.S has faced its share of challenges, not all of which it met easily. Critical historical junctures include both external and internal threats. The revolution against England in 1776 left the new nation in economic peril. In 1861, North fought South in a civil war that was as bloody as any conflict ever fought in the world. The stock market crash of 1929 signaled the onset of the Great Depression and revealed the government's

⁵⁵ Several textbooks on comparative politics make the claim that the U.S. model is so different from any other nation that it is not comparable to other nations of the world because of its geographic location, resources, and its experience with representative democracy. See the following: Kesselman, Mark. Introduction to Comparative Politics, (Mifflin Co., N.Y., 2000); McCormick. Comparative Politics in Transition, (Wadsworth Co., CA, 2004), Hauss, Charles. Comparative Politics, (Wadsworth Co., CA, 2004).

⁵⁶ Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel. (Norton Co., NY 1999) Diamond's thesis is that Eurasia had more animal/plant progenitors available for domestication and better climate for food production. The American Continent lies on a longitudinal axis that in fact impeded its agricultural growth.

role in regulating the economy and providing services for its citizens. The right geographic location, the right climate, the right size, and the right government at the right time forged the U.S. into the superpower it is today.

With a GDP greater than a 10 trillion dollars, a per capita GDP of \$39,840, a labor force that is 2% agriculture, 18% industry, and 80% service, the U.S. is one of the wealthiest nations in the world.⁵⁷ The US also spends more on defense than any country in the world. The average amount spent on national defense between 1940 to 2003 is approximately 267 billion dollars, which is on average about 33.8% of total budget outlays.⁵⁸ These measures indicate that, at least for now, the U.S remains an economic and military giant in the international arena.

Many countries, but especially Canada, recognize the propinquity of America and its bastion of economic and military strength. Conspicuously ignored in numerous comparative politics books, Canada is far different from the United States despite its close geographic proximity. We all know that history has proceeded very differently for different peoples from different parts of the globe. Yet analyses of Canada are often truncated summaries incorporated into a study of the United Kingdom or compared prosaically to the US. Canada has faced its challenges too in the forging of a new nation. Nevertheless, its obstacles are quite different from the hyper-power of its southern neighbor.

⁵⁷ CIA World Fact book: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html> .
U.S Budget, Historical Tables: <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy1999/pdf/hist.pdf>.
Political Resources on the Net: <http://www.politicalresources.net>.
Library of Congress: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs>

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Although oceans surround it, like the US, Canada lies in a harsh latitudinal climate. The shapes and orientations of continents consist of an overlooked but important and obvious difference. The Americas span a much greater distance north-south (9,000 miles) than east-west: only 3,000 miles at the widest. The major axis of the Americas is north-south, in contrast to Eurasia which is east-west. The point here is that even though the US and Canada share the Rocky Mountains, the Interior Plains, four Great lakes, the Appalachian Highlands, and many rivers, differing climate zones contributed heavily to disparate population and economic patterns.

Comparative analyses of Canada are usually completed with reference to and within the context of US history. The critical historical junctures of Canada, however, are completely different. Although each nation had European roots with England and France, the path to independence was anything but similar. Revolution was not part of Canadian history, and independence was achieved by gradual constitutional change over time. In 1926 the British government acknowledged the equality of the dominions and itself but they remained economically and politically linked. In 1931, the British Statute of Westminster confirmed that Canada was a sovereign state sharing a common monarch with Britain. Complete Canadian nationhood, however, was not understood until after WWII. Canada had entered the war as part of the British Empire, but the huge commitment and terrible losses (60,000 Canadians died) strengthened its sense of unity and independence. Thus, Canada insisted on acting as a sovereign power in treaty negotiations after the war. External threat and the realization that Great Britain could not guarantee military protection forced Canada onto the international scene as an independent actor. While the U.S. had been forging a completely independent nation

since 1776, Canada in contrast did not even have a procedure for amending its own constitution (which was an act of the British parliament) until 1982. Put simply, Canada came into being as a viable nation approximately 150 years later than the United States.

Geographic and climatic variations prove crucial to understanding the development of Canada.⁵⁹ Canada is the second largest country in the world (after Russia) with a landmass of 9,976,140 square kilometers, but less than 5% of that is arable land. Approximately 85% of its 32,207,113 population is concentrated within 300 km of the US border. With a GDP of \$677 billion, a GDP per capita of \$29,400, a military budget of 7.8 billion, budget revenues of 178.6 billion, expenditures of 161.4 billion, and a labor force that is 2.3% agriculture, 26.5% industry, and 71.2% service, Canada's economic and military power pales in comparison to the United States.⁶⁰ The U.S. budget revenues alone are over \$1,946 trillion, with expenditures of \$2,052 trillion. Hence, Canada's limits on economic and military strength are an important reason why it focuses heavily on multilateral international relations as a means of promoting national interests and security. Canada claims it relies on, "human and intellectual capital" rather than guns.⁶¹ The more important result, however, is the middle power status of Canada that is due to its current economic and military capabilities.

⁵⁹ Diamond, Jared. **Guns, Germs, and Steel**. (Norton Co., NY 1999) Diamond's thesis is that Eurasia had more animal/plant progenitors available for domestication and better climate for food production. The American Continent lies on a longitudinal axis that in fact impeded its agricultural growth. Canada lies north in a sub-arctic climate zone.

⁶⁰ CIA World Fact book: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html> U.S Budget, Historical Tables: <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy1999/pdf/hist.pdf>, Political Resources on the Net: <http://www.politicalresources.net>. Library of Congress: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs> (accessed July 2004)

⁶¹ Cooper, Andrew, Higgot, Richard, Nossal, Kim. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993).

The birth of Slovenia as an independent and internationally recognized state occurred in 1991. Like the United States and Canada, it was tied to a European power (Austria), but its location was not halfway around the world or isolated. The making of the modern state of Slovenia, consequently, is related to Europe's geographic complexity. Europe has a highly indented coastline, with five large peninsulas that approach islands in their isolation. All of these peninsulas evolved independent languages, ethnic groups, and governments. Europe is thus carved up into independent linguistic, ethnic, and political units by high mountains: the Alps, Pyrenees, Carpathians, and Norwegian Border Mountains. In addition, Europe's two biggest rivers, the Rhine and Danube, are smaller and connect much less of Europe. Hence, the lack of geographic connectedness and modest internal barriers has led to Europe's chronic political disunity.⁶² One can easily understand, consequently, why Slovenes were once part of the Ottoman Empire, the Austrian Empire, the state of Yugoslavia, and presently independent. The following recap of Slovenia's fragmented past by one historian makes the point:

The early Slovenes settled in the river valleys of the Danube Basin and the eastern Alps

⁶² Diamond, Jared. **Guns, Germs, and Steel**. NY: Norton Co. 1999) Diamond gives an example of the effects of geography on the development or lack of development of human societies. In an attempt to explain why China lost its political and technological preeminence to Europe, he compares their geographic differences. China's geography has few internal barriers which resulted in connectedness and political unity. In contrast, Europe's geography has complicated internal barriers which resulted in chronic political disunity. He reasons that these comparisons suggest that geographic connectedness or lack of the same has exerted both positive and negative consequences on the evolution of technological development. For example, if Columbus had been born in China which was politically unified, only one decision would have stopped the sending of ships to the whole of China and the world. Contrast that with politically fragmented Europe in which Columbus was an Italian who switched his allegiance to the duke of Anjou in France, then to the king of Portugal. When the latter refused his request for ships in which to explore westward, Columbus turned to the duke of Medina-Sedona, who also refused, then to the count of Medina-Celi, who did likewise, and finally to the king and queen of Spain, who denied Columbus's first request but eventually granted his renewed appeal. He argues that had Europe been united under any one of the first three rulers, it colonization of the Americas might have been still born.

in the sixth century. In 748, Slovenia was brought under Germanic rule, first by the Frankish empire of the Carolingians, who converted the population to Christianity, and then as part of the Holy Roman Empire in the ninth century. The Austro-German monarchy took over in the early fourteenth century and continued to rule (as the Austrian Habsburg Empire from 1804) right up until 1918 - with only one brief interruption. In 1809, in a bid to isolate the Habsburg Empire from the Adriatic, Napoleon established the so-called Illyrian Provinces called Slovenia, Dalmatia and Croatia. After WWI and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovenia was included in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. During WWII, much of Slovenia was annexed by Germany, with Italy and Hungary taking smaller shares. Slovenia joined the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945 and remained behind the Iron Curtain for several decades. In the spring of 1990, Slovenia became the first Yugoslav republic to hold free elections and slough off 45 years of communist rule.⁶³

Naturally, other factors contributed to Europe's diverse courses, but the geography of Europe has exerted considerable balkanization and divisiveness. As one author describes it, "Europe has experienced 1,000 independent statelets in the 14th century, into 500 statelets in AD 1500, got down to a minimum of 25 states into the 1980s, and is now up again to nearly 40 at the moment."⁶⁴

Thus, the geographic complexity of Europe has, at least in the past, contributed in part to Slovenia's uneven historical development. Presently Slovenia consists of a 20,273 sq. kilometer landmass that is slightly smaller than New Jersey. In contrast to the United States and Canada, Slovenia's territory is contiguous with Austria, Croatia, Italy, and Hungary, which surround it, except for a 46.6 kilometer coastline along the Adriatic

⁶³ Spielvogel, Jackson, Western Civilization. (MN: West Publishing Company 1991) The maps in Spielvogel's text display the border changes of Slovenia going back to 748.

⁶⁴ Diamond, Jared. Guns, Germs, and Steel. (NY: Norton Co., 1999).

Sea. Despite its small size, the country controls some of Europe's major transit routes, has 11.5% arable land, lies in a Mediterranean climate zone, and is inhabited by a population of 1,935,677 million. With a GDP of \$36 billion, a GDP per capita of \$18,000, a military budget of 370 million, budget revenues of 8.11 billion, expenditures of 8.32 billion, and a labor force that is 3.2% agriculture, 36.3% industry, and 60.5% service, Slovenia's economic and military power pales in comparison to Canada and especially the United States.⁶⁵ Different economic and military capabilities exist between all three countries and point to the asymmetrical power differences among them. Hence, Slovenia, albeit an economic and military dwarf as compared to Canada and the United States, is an example of a new nation. Slovenian history has been anything but static. Nevertheless, the Slovenes have retained their identity, are administering a democratic government, and have been internationally recognized by other states as a new independent state.

Understanding the chain of events leading up to the positions of these three nations in the international system is essential to understanding not only their differences but also fundamental to the least similar method of comparative analysis. Therefore, we can now look to what makes these three examples similar in terms of the dependent variable. Remember we are still looking at the foreign ministry as the manageable unit of analysis to search for evidence that changes in foreign ministries are a response to the processes of globalization. The historical complexity of each nation over the last two

⁶⁵ CIA World Factbook: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html> .
US Budget, Historical Tables: <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy1999/pdf/hist.pdf> .
Political Resources on the Net: <http://www.politicalresources.net>.
Library of Congress: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs> (accessed January 2005).

hundred years establishes the hyper, middle, and new power statuses of the US, Canada, and Slovenia by using economic and military measures. As discussed previously, the characteristics of power are difficult to tease out. Economic and military measures may be too simple if one is attempting to locate power among three similar nations. But in these three cases economic and military capabilities clearly establish the raw power asymmetries. It is also important to note that these differences are related to the state system in general without reference to the relationships between their rulers and the ruled. This was done merely to establish and reaffirm the following: major geographic and climate variations have led to very different historical development paths among these three nations.

The way we speak of these three systems is in reference to the classification of a state system with differing power capabilities. But remember the ontological givens of this study are about the relationship between rulers and the ruled. What makes these three political systems similar is a series of records indicating how and to what extent rulers meet the basic needs of their people. Hence, records on human rights, the relationship between citizens and government, and the structures of their systems of government are the measures used to distinguish different political systems. Although the power statuses of the U.S, Canada, and Slovenia are different, all three nations have similar scores on the abovementioned measures that categorize them as liberal democracies.

One indicator is the *Human Rights Index* developed by Freedom House, an international nonprofit organization that categorizes countries according to their records on political rights (the ability of people to participate in the political process) and civil liberties (including freedom of expression, the independence of the judiciary, personal

autonomy, and economic rights). With a score of 1 in each category, the United States, Canada, and Slovenia are ranked as *free*.⁶⁶

Another reliable indicator of the relationship between citizens and their government is the *Human Development Ratings* by the United Nations Development Program. Life expectancy, infant mortality, and adult literacy are the measures used to assess the quality of life in different countries and to determine what kind of job rulers are doing in terms of meeting the basic needs of their people. The United States, Canada, and Slovenia are all ranked High.⁶⁷

The final indicator is the *Classification of Political Systems* by Political Resources. Features of a liberal democracy are primarily based on representative systems of government that have regular, fair, and secret elections; a variety of forms of political participation and representation; and postindustrial and free-market systems. The United States, Canada, and Slovenia not only meet all of the above criteria for classification as liberal democracies but also are political systems that work fundamentally in the same manner.

The quality of a country's government is important, and it reflects the relationship between rulers and the ruled. The issue is not what form of democratic system each state has. Instead, the issue is administrative competence: whether rulers of each state are running a well-organized and effective administrative structure in order to maximize the state's individual national resources and potential power capability. A key component is

⁶⁶ Source: Freedom House Web site, <http://freedomhouse.org> (accessed May 2003).

⁶⁷ Source: United Nations Development Program 2003, <http://hdr.undp.org> (accessed May 2003).

the impact rulers have in running and reorganizing government structures. Each of these three cases varies significantly economically and militarily, which reflects an unequal distribution of power. A similar political milieu, however, exists, and the foreign ministry is an integral part of that system.

The complexity and discussion of methods and techniques in any political inquiry are steeped in profound controversy. The positions scholars take in these debates are strongly shaped by their different paradigms. The similar systems design is the usual method that researchers undertake in comparative politics. I argue for the alternative strategy that begins with the assumption that the phenomenon being explained resides at a lower subsystem level. The foreign ministry is one of the oldest and most important – yet often overlooked – subsystem of liberal democratic government. The logic applied here is that if the foreign ministries of three very different cases have functioned differently in the past, but are presently functioning in a similar fashion, then some relationship is discernible. The intent of this study is not simply to enumerate facts about the foreign ministries of the United States, Canada, and Slovenia. Rather, its purpose is to *make sense* of those facts by showing their relationship to other facts. In the end, this is important when one is attempting to find evidence of the effects and consequences of globalization (the Internet) on the diplomatic organizations of states.

2.2 Survey of the Machinery and Functioning of the American, Canadian, and Slovenian Foreign Ministries

A diplomatic organization, as I understand and analyze it in this part, consists of the foreign ministry and diplomatic-consular missions, linked into a network. The basic

function of a diplomatic organization is the execution of all the tasks, which facilitate the implementation of the foreign policy of a certain state. The network is suppose to guarantee a constant and simultaneous presence of numerous representatives of the sending state in the numerous and various subjects of accreditation as well as guaranteeing information about these subjects. The foreign ministry is the central element of a diplomatic organization and is suppose to manage the overall network. Knowledge about the management of the diplomatic network, its organizational composition, and the activities of each constituent part, as well as, their mutual relations are the most fundamental challenge. The identification of any changes within the US, Canadian, and Slovenian diplomatic systems is accomplished by reviewing the foreign and domestic duties and responsibilities of its principal officers; the functioning of its diplomatic and consular missions abroad; the relations of its diplomatic organization with other government departments in terms of domestic and foreign relations tasks; its treaty-making; its participation in international conferences and organizations; and finally by analyzing the relationship of foreign affairs rulers to the ruled of each state. The following, consequently, is an analysis of the diplomatic machinery of the US, Canada, and Slovenia from their inception till present by using the above criteria to identify changes or patterns of similar responses to globalization that may exist among them.

2.2.1. History of the U.S State Department Up Until the Internet: An Organization of Congressional Clerks, Presidential Guardians of Peace, or the Post Office of the US Government?

As with Foreign Offices of other countries, the US State Department is fashioned by those who direct and participate in it during each successive epoch. An analysis of its machinery and functioning over the last 150 years, however, is necessary to determine whether current global conditions in the age of the Internet are affecting the institutional framework for the conduct of American foreign affairs. The first question is: does the growth and mutation of the US State Department over the last 180 years indicate any radical difference or significant change in its functioning? And the second question is: how does this growth and mutation compare to the last 30 years of State Department functioning?

A definitive history covering more than two centuries, from the commencement of American diplomatic relations antedating the Constitution to the present, is explored in order to answer these questions. The development of the US State Department may be segmented into three periods. The first -- the origins and germination of the American diplomatic machinery -- ran from 1774 till 1861. The second -- the budding of an American Foreign Ministry from 1861 till 1945 -- was marked by the rise of nationalism. And the third period -- the expansion of the U.S State Department from 1945 till 1975 -- involved the collapse of a bi-polar world and the beginning of a technological revolution in communications. This is neither a traditional American diplomatic history nor an analysis of American foreign policy. Rather it focuses on the organization and functioning of the State Department in each of these periods.

2.2.1.1 1774-1861 Origins and Germination of American Diplomatic Machinery

As with any institution, the origins of American diplomatic machinery can and should be traced back far before its formal inception. Prior to there being a nation known as the United States of America, the precursors of American diplomacy were already appearing. Before 1774, the British government managed the extra-continental affairs of the colonies. This applied to both relations among the individual colonies and their collective interests. As a result, they neither dispatched nor received foreign diplomatic emissaries, nor did they create foreign offices, establish official communications with foreign governments, or sign treaties with them. But what did develop were established inter-colonial agencies and committees of correspondence to handle both intra-colonial communication and exchanges with the British government.⁶⁸ In 1775, the Continental Congress elected the first Committee of Correspondence, which became the Department of Foreign Affairs -- the precursor of the Department of State. The point here is that even though there was no formal machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs in America till 1789, the British blueprint for a diplomatic system was familiar to and utilized by the American colonists.

Although the U.S. State Department grew both quantitatively and geographically from 1789 till 1861, changes in its functions and operations were minimal. The notable difference during this period in the functioning and organization of the department was that the U.S. Congress initially dealt with all areas of activity in administering relations

⁶⁸ For a comprehensive study of American Colonial agents, see Kammen, *A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution*. (NY: Cornell University Press, 1968).

with foreign governments. From the outset, Congress enacted a series of fundamental laws that created an administrative machinery and formed policies, practices, and techniques for managing and conducting the foreign affairs of the US. The essences of these determinations, agencies, instruments, and procedures, as later incrementally refined for the conduct of relations with other nations, not only provided the rudiments of the American system, but also have endured for more than two centuries.

Building on the precedents, traditions, and practices of other countries, and concretely on the interests and needs of the embryonic Federal Government, the Continental Congress framed the basic machinery of the U.S. State Department. It created the Department of Foreign Affairs and elected a Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This Secretary was to manage correspondence with American envoys abroad, receive foreign representatives to the US, maintain foreign relations records, report to Congress, and attend Congressional sessions.⁶⁹ Although Congress systematized the structuring of the Department of Foreign Affairs during this period, the domestic and foreign responsibilities of the principal officers were cumbersome. For example, both Robert Livingston and John Jay, the first Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, found the office of the Secretary to be frustrating because its functions were severely circumscribed by Congress to the point where the Secretary was regarded as little more than a

⁶⁹ Although popularly this office has been called the “Secretary *of* Foreign Affairs,” the *Journals* of the Continental Congress refer to it as the “Secretary *for* Foreign Affairs.” Presumably, this reflected the fact that the Secretary was elected and instructed by, and responsible to, Congress and that it was not an independent or discretionary administrative office. In this respect it differed substantially from its successor, the Secretary of State.

congressional clerk.⁷⁰

Even after the U.S. Constitution went into effect and established the legal principle that the Secretary is the President's chief administrative officer for the conduct of foreign relations and responsible to the President, the principal officers of the U.S. State Department were saddled with clerical duties. The Secretary was entrusted with specific functions as an administrative agent serving under the direction of the Chief Executive. From the onset it was manifest that the President was the primary foreign relations officer, and the Secretary was his principal deputy. But Congress passed legislation that ordered the Secretary of State and staff to handle various internal government functions, such as correlating communications and other relations with the States, maintaining the Great Seal of the US, and servicing various records, which had previously been the responsibility of the Secretary of the Continental Congress. Normally these functions were cared for by a separate department, and prior to enacting this legislation, Congress debated over whether to create a Home Department, headed by a Home Secretary, to handle such domestic functions.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Plischke, Elmer. **U.S. Department of State: A Reference History**, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press., 1999). Chapter 1, pp. 1-30. Even though Congress endeavored to mold diplomatic relations to accord with "the established policy of modern civilized nations"; passed a resolution to redefine the nature of the Department of Foreign Affairs, making the Secretary "the head of the Diplomatic Corps of the US, " who was directed to present plans for conducting foreign political and commercial relations; dealt with protocol respecting the reception ceremonial for foreign emissaries to the US; discussed the 'secret manner' in which American Ministers negotiated with foreign governments; introduced the systematic establishment of consular relations with foreign nations; and devised the system of documentation for the ratifications of treaties, Plischke documents that in 1782 Livingston and Jay both sent letters of protest to the President of Congress criticizing the enormous clerical scope of the office.

⁷¹ Examples of contemporary governments that have Home Affairs Ministries include Great Britain, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Africa. Most of them are headed by Ministers of Home Affairs, whereas in Great Britain it is titled Secretary of State for the Home Department. In other governments domestic functions are ascribed to other agencies.

The proposal suggested that Home Department duties would embrace correspondence with the several States, monitor “the execution of the laws of the Union,” maintain and apply “the great seal,” prepare commissions, affix the seal to commissions and other official documents, maintain “authentic copies of all public acts” and other documents and transmit them to the States, procure enactments of the States and report when they were “contrary to the laws of the US,” maintain “the archives of the late Congress” of the Confederation, record the census,” maintain proposals for patents (keeping records of those granted), and other functions as directed by the President. During the debate it was argued that a separate administrative Department was unnecessary, that other agencies could handle some of these functions, that it was doubtful the funding of a separate Department was justifiable, and that the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, “was not so much over charged” with the functions of his office that he might attend to these duties.⁷² The proposal, consequently, was rejected.⁷³

Hence, between 1800 until about 1860, U.S. State Department officers were charged with burgeoning domestic functions that encompassed the clerical duties of Congress. These domestic functions included the printing, publishing, distribution, and transmission of the bills and resolutions of Congress; the process of action to approve constitutional amendments; the handling of electoral college returns; the maintenance of the custody of the Great Seal; the issuance of appointment commissions; the handling of

⁷² See *Annals of Congress*, 1st Congress (1789-91), 1:473-613. For a detailed account of the House of Representatives debate on creating the Department and Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

⁷³ See *Annals of Congress*, 1st Cong. (1789-91), 2:2187. On June 2, 1789, a House of Representative committee presented the proposal to establish an executive “Department of Foreign Affairs,” which was passed on June 24 and passed by the Senate on July 27.

executive appointments, executive pardons, and letters of patents; the implementation of copyright laws; the preparation, printing, and preservation of the census; and all responsibilities over the depository of copyrighted books and materials, the repository of valuable American historical documents, and the mint. Additional clerical duties included the preparation of an annual reports to Congress on returns from collectors of customs at American ports, filing of reports on the impressments of American seamen by foreign powers, issuance of letters of marque and reprisal, exequaturs to foreign consuls in the US, issuance of passports to Americans for travel abroad, and handling of all immigration records.⁷⁴ The magnitude of the domestic and clerical responsibility of the Department, for example, was evident during the War of 1812. When British forces invaded Washington and burned the Capitol, White House, and other public buildings including the headquarters of the Department Of State, it was Chief Clerk Graham who salvaged many important records. These included the originals of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the papers of the Confederation, which he stored in a gristmill several miles up the Potomac River and later moved to Leesburg, Virginia, until after the war.⁷⁵

The disposition and preservation of the confederation seal and documents, moreover, fortuitously instituted the practice of assigning domestic functions to the Department of State which resulted in the *combining* of foreign relations and home office functions within a single executive agency. Prior to the Civil War, consequently, the US State

⁷⁴ For a comprehensive account of the domestic duties and functions of the US State Department between 1800 and 1860 see: Elmer Plischke's , **US Department of State: A Reference History**, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999). pp. 1-183.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 74-75.

Department was also the prime residual administrative agency for carrying out foreign relations duties. In addition to their domestic duties, key principal officers of the Department were responsible for the issuing, publishing, indexing, and maintaining of records pertaining to diplomats, foreign commissioners, consuls, and commercial agents abroad, including departmental instructions, credentials, correspondence, and the texts and documents concerning the negotiation of treaties and agreements. The Secretary of State dealt with other governments in cases of international extradition. Hence, key principal officers were the *guardians of documents* more than they were *guardians of the peace*.

Diplomatic and consular missions, however, did exist, even though the United States did not sign the historic Diplomatic Convention at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that systematized two important aspects of subsequent diplomacy. It both addressed the matter of the acceptability of individual diplomatic officers to receiving governments and prescribed their international ranking, precedence, and treatment. But in order to observe the traditional proprieties of diplomatic representation, the U.S. found it prudent, if not necessary, in dealing with foreign governments to act cooperatively on the matter of commissioning acceptable individuals at mutually agreeable ranks.

The President had the authority to commission American diplomats and consular officers and their primary duties were initially not that much different from the American colonial agents. For example, Dumas, a Swiss by birth, residing in The Hague, Netherlands, and a friend of Benjamin Franklin, was charged by the Continental Congress to report on the disposition of foreign powers toward the United States. Records of the Continental Congress reveal he transmitted dozens of messages to

America conveying intelligence and other information during the critical 1780's.⁷⁶ In addition to transmitting information, diplomats were utilized to expand the American treaty relationship with foreign governments.⁷⁷ Although the President and Congress have the authority to determine and sign treaties, either resident emissaries or those on special missions implemented negotiations. Hence, most treaties and agreements were concluded abroad.

responsible for extensive domestic and clerical duties for the US Congress. The second aspect of major significance pertained to the clear distinction between the diplomatic corps, which was responsible for servicing political relations with foreign governments, During the period between 1774- 1861, there emerged important aspects of the aggregate functions of the US State Department. First, the agency created to deal with foreign affairs was almost immediately converted into the Department of State and was responsible for extensive domestic and clerical duties for the US Congress. The second aspect of major significance pertained to the clear distinction between the diplomatic corps, which was responsible for servicing political relations with foreign governments, and the consular officers, who dealt primarily with commercial matters. This also was reflected in the lack of interchange between diplomatic and consular officials and between those who served abroad in the Department of State. As a result, little attempt was made to develop a professional foreign relations establishment, and this continued for many years. The third aspect pertained to the legislative-executive struggle over the

⁷⁶ *Journals of the Continental Congress*, vol. 24 pp. 390-92.

⁷⁷ *Journals of the Continental Congress*, vol. 26 pp.28-30; vol. 27, pp.615-24, 719.

conduct of negotiating and implementing treaties.⁷⁸ Early judicial decisions regarding the conduct American diplomacy reflect this divergence of views on the matter of responsibility for conducting foreign affairs⁷⁹ Notwithstanding the evidence in the U.S. Constitution about the shared role of the president and the Senate in making treaties, the practicalities of treaty negotiating have conceded the dominant role to the president. John Jay, writing in No. 64 of the Federalist Papers, observed that the changed words of the treaty clause in Article II were a recognition that only the president could, in fact, “manage the business of intelligence” in a prudent and timely manner. This fixed a firm precedent in American diplomatic practice that communications, negotiations, and settlements were not transparent to the public, even with the advent of the printing press or the telegraph. US diplomats were clerks, but were also officials that were the exclusive eyes and ears of the US President. who alone has the sole power to speak, listen, and represent the US to the heads of other governments.⁸⁰

The technological setting by 1860, consequently, influenced the functions of the State Department and empowered the US government as a whole. National markets were protected, but access to foreign markets was necessary for the economic health of

⁷⁸ Hamilton, Alexander, “Letter of Pacificus, #1”; Madison, James., “Letter of Helvidius, #1, published in the *Gazette of the United States*, 1793.

The strict issue in the 1793 debate was the question of neutrality. In 1794, Congress passed a Neutrality Act and thus took the initiative from the executive on this particular issue. However, the general points of view expressed in the Hamilton-Madison debate remain useful, since similar division on related questions has continued about the extent of executive powers in foreign affairs and in particular about treaty making.

⁷⁹ See *Missouri v. Holland*, 1920; *Barry Goldwater et al. v. James Earl Carter et al.* (1979): Both cases established that treaties take precedence over conflicting state laws and second, because the Constitution is silent on the procedure for terminating a treaty

⁸⁰ *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1936).

the new nation as industrial goods increased. The channel through which all action relating to the rest of world flowed was the newly-formed State Department.⁸¹ Despite the clerical burdens imposed on officials by Congress, its primary function was to maintain US economic interests by cultivating friendships with other sovereigns and maintaining vital alliances. The State Department, at least in theory, was viewed as an extension of presidential and American diplomacy (albeit just germinating) conducted government-to-government and nation-to-nation.

Assessment of the US system for the conduct of foreign affairs from 1774 –1860, and specifically the functions of the US State Department during that time, is two-fold. Congress defined the officials at the US State Department as domestic record keepers, and they functioned as Guardians of Documents. The secondary -- albeit nascent -- roles of officials were, as charged by the President, negotiators of treaties, and they served as Guardians of Peace. But most importantly, they were human messengers and Guardians of Information: they were the point of entry among world rulers -- the ruled had little influence.

2.2.1.2 1861 till 1945: The Budding of the American Foreign Office

Did any of these duties and responsibilities change from 1861 till 1945? Some changes in the internal and external development of the United States affected the management and functioning of the State Department. Internal developments included

⁸¹ Hunt, Gaillard. **The US State Department** (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1914) The function of the US State Department in commerce was evident as Hunt points out in the numerous volumes known as the Commercial Relations of the United States that were compiled by the American consuls.

the territorial expansion of the US with the addition of fourteen new states, bringing the total up to forty-eight. Hence, the contiguous continental territory of the United States was complete. Simultaneously, the country's population nearly tripled, increasing from 31.4 million in 1861, to 92.2 million in 1910, and 132.1 million in 1945.⁸² By WWI, the US population exceeded that of all European countries except Russia. Formal diplomatic relations, previously maintained within thirty-five governments, was extended by the addition of seventeen foreign countries, making the total fifty-two by 1910 and sixty-eight by 1945.⁸³

External developments, of course, included major shifts in the relative distribution of power among nations in the world. The result was two world wars and the emergence of a nuclear age. During this period, the Department of State underwent material modifications in its organizational and administrative structure. However, even as the US emerged as a major world power the changes in the duties and functions of the State Department were minimal. Departmental modulation reflected both volitional innovation and shifts due to foreign permutation and influence. These produced modifications in the Department by way of increases in diplomatic and consular staffing and functions, an extension of American foreign relations, and negotiations of new treaties and agreements. But the most significant change was the increasing involvement in multilateral international conferencing and the joining of international organizations.

The only modifications relevant to the duties and functions of the principal officers

⁸²U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/urpp0090.txt>, (accessed March 2004).

⁸³Plischke, Elmer. **US Department of State A Reference History** (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999).

between 1861 and 1913 were in the structure of their staffs.⁸⁴ Although the Corps Of Secretaries were all trained in law (except for one), only six had prior foreign relations experience. But the Secretaries of State that served during this period began to move from being primarily clerks of the US Congress to representatives of the President. Their overall responsibilities were a heady mixture of domestic and foreign affairs duties.

The organization of the Department of State reflects the dual responsibilities of the Secretary of State and the principal officers between 1861 through 1913. A senior staff of four officials, which included three assistant secretaries and a chief clerk, assisted the secretary of state. The assistant secretaries were the Secretary of State's immediate deputies in charge of each of the nine bureaus.⁸⁵ Initially, there existed four principal units consisting of two Diplomatic and two Consular Bureaus. The First Diplomatic Bureau was responsible for 11 European countries, China, and Japan. The Second Diplomatic Bureau handled relations with seventeen Latin American countries, as well as Egypt, the Hawaiian Islands, Liberia, and Turkey. The First and Second Consular Bureaus were responsible for relations with the same countries as the respective Diplomatic Bureaus. The Bureaus of Clerk, Law, Passport, Statistics, and Accounts, however, were the other five. The Bureau of the Clerk was largest, in charge of archives, rolls, receipt and distribution of correspondence and the indexing of records. Along

⁸⁴ See Appendix A, Part I. *Principal Officers of the US State Department from 1774-2004*.

⁸⁵ Hunt, Gaillard. **The Department of State of the United States: Its History and Functions**. (CT: Yale University Press, 1914) pp. 245-47. Hunt summarizes the structure of the Department as provided in appropriations acts preceding WWI.

with two other agencies, consequently, principal officers were responsible for the recording of commissions, federal appointments, pardons, passports, commercial reports, tax reports, the custody and disbursement of all State Department funds. In addition, it handled all correspondence and communication that did not relate to diplomatic and consular affairs.⁸⁶ There was one Translator and one Telegrapher, both of whom served the Secretary of State, the assistant Secretaries, and the Chief Clerk. Only by 1913 were principal officers gradually relieved of their extraneous domestic and non-foreign relations duties as some of these responsibilities were transferred to other federal departments.⁸⁷ Furthermore, it was not until 1945 that internal structure of the State Department was comprehensively organized on a geographic basis by combining the diplomatic and consular departmental components and elevating them to division status.⁸⁸

In general, while other administrative departments and agencies for the Federal Government were gradually created for the purpose of carrying out the enactments of

⁸⁶ Plischke, Elmer. US Department of State A Reference History (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) pp.206-208.

⁸⁷ Hunt Gaillard. The Department of State: Its History and Functions (CT: Yale University, 1914) Hunt groups these extraneous duties into four general categories---constant or continuing domestic functions, occasional domestic obligations, servicing domestic activities concerned with external ramifications, and domestic responsibility for compiling and publishing foreign affairs documentation. Hunt compiles a comprehensive list of when these duties were transferred to other federal departments as Congress created them. By 1913, the Department of State was only partially relieved of the burden of the domestic functions proscribed by Congress.

⁸⁸ When the Diplomatic and Consular Bureaus were consolidated into single departmental units, the new Diplomatic Bureau was divided into three geographic segments, each dealing with specific sets of foreign countries based on the subdivisions previously established and subsequently modified to embrace additional countries. The same geographic breakdown applied to the unified Consular Bureau. Whereas the geographic principle had been introduced in the 1830s by Secretary Louis McLane, and experimented with under the administration of Secretary Knox in 1909, it did not begin to dominate diplomatic and consular segmentation in State Department organization until 1945.

Congress, the State Department's function was supposed to entail the implementation of the President's will in dealing with foreign governments. This involved not only what should be done in foreign affairs but also how it should be accomplished. Nevertheless, Congress continued to control the establishment of new positions, the number of departmental clerks, and other staff members, budgets, and salaries. Hence, the structure of the Department of State was subject to review and modification by the Secretary of State. Notable examples of such modification include the Secretary Fish reorganization, 1869-1877; the reforms of Secretary Root, 1905-1909; and reorganization conducted by Secretary Knox, 1909-1913. The only notable organizational change, however, was instituted by Secretary Knox: the State Department was to be restructured on a geographic basis of the combined diplomatic and consular departmental components, elevating them to division status.

Secretary Knox, however, soon found out that Congress controlled reform and impeded the US State Department's development as a full-fledged foreign office through appropriations, other enactments, and legislative procedures. For a century and a quarter Congress was remiss, for example, in providing funding for the offices and residences of American diplomats and consular officers stationed in foreign countries. The Foreign Missions Building program did not even begin until 1926 when Congress authorized Secretary of State Knox to acquire sites and purchase or erect buildings abroad. At that time the US possessed diplomatic office buildings in only four capitals.⁸⁹ In addition to the lack of infrastructure, the route to major diplomatic and consular

⁸⁹ Stuart, Graham. **The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel.** (NY: Macmillan, 1949)

personnel reform prior to 1914 was tentative. The Treasury Department, for example, which was responsible for the accounts of consular officers, began to send agents abroad to inspect consular financial operations. They uncovered serious abuses and recognized that, with some exception, that average level of efficiency and honesty was questionable. Upon comprehensive review of the situation, it reported that the principal cause was the spoils system employed for appointment, tenure, and transfer of consular officials and their inadequate compensation.⁹⁰ But the movement toward merit and professionalism among American diplomats and consuls would not go into effect until 1946, when the passage of legislation created the American Foreign Service.⁹¹

Changes in overseas diplomatic and consular representation between 1860 and 1945 were also surprisingly minimal. From 1774-1860, a period of 86 years, US permanent missions in foreign countries grew from 24 to 35 in which 211 diplomats served out their respective appointments. This amounts to about a 45 % increase in US permanent missions in other countries between 1774-1860. From 1860-1945, a period of 85 years,

⁹⁰ See respectively, Williams, Benjamin. **American Diplomacy: Policies and Practice**. (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1936) pp. 422-23. Stuart, Graham. **American Diplomatic and Consular Practice** (NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952) 2d ed., p.138.

⁹¹ The torturous road to adoption of the merit system took several decades. Congress attempted to deal with the matter, beginning in 1853, when legislation was introduced to require candidates for certain Federal positions to be selected by examination, but it was foredoomed to failure. Two decades later, Congress passed a bill, in 1871, directing the President to take remedial action, and that same year President Grant appointed the Civil Service Commission to draft a code for Federal hiring procedures, but Congress withdrew its financial support in 1873, before the commission completed its program. Not until 1883 did Congress adopt the Pendleton Act (22Stat. 403), creating the foundation of the American Civil Service system. From time to time Congress enacted supplementary legislation to expand and improve the system. These included the Lloyd-LaFollette Act (1912), The Civil Service Retirement Act (1920), the Hatch Act (1939), the Veterans' Preference Act (1944), and others. For additional analysis and commentary on diplomatic relations and transition to the merit system, see Barnes, William and Morgan, John. **The Foreign Service of the United States** (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1961), Chapter 16.

the United States had 71 permanent missions, a 94 % increase, in which over 1,000 diplomats served. Between these two periods (totaling 171 years) it is interesting to point out that these data work out to a 190% increase in US diplomatic representation in foreign countries. On its surface, it appears that this would amount to a substantial change in the diplomatic representation of the US State Department. However, it pales in comparison to the 120 permanent missions in foreign countries it was represented in through 1945 –1975. In just three decades, this amounted to a 69% increase. More importantly, during the period 1975-2004, the number of diplomatic missions increased to 202, a 73% increase in just 30 years. To summarize, between 1774-1945, a total of 171 years there was an average growth of 1.1% per year of US permanent missions abroad. In contrast, between 1945-1975, a period of 30 years there was an average growth of 2.3% in US permanent missions abroad. The point here is that quantitatively, at least, diplomatic representation abroad did not substantially change from 1774 –1945, a span of 171 years, when compared to just the last 60 years. ⁹²

Despite the slow progress in the structure, organization, and representation of the US State Department, the duties of US diplomats leaned increasingly towards fact-finding, investigating, and reporting. The internal development of America expanded, and the need for an administrative arm to conduct its foreign relations, maintain "an ear," and report events occurring in other nations that might have affected the new

⁹² See Appendix A, Part II. Graphs contain the actual numbers of US diplomatic representation abroad. Also it is important to note that there is a .93 correlation between the data points (diplomatic missions abroad) and the trend line (exponential curve). Mathematically, this means that this at the very least that there was no decrease in diplomatic representation in the last three decades. If the circumstances were to remain constant (high unlikely and why I am unwilling to make such a conclusion) the exponential curve is suppose to predict another exponential increase in the next 30 years.

American expansionism was required. Out of economic necessity, the State Department was charged with the duties of maintaining channels of communication, forming alliances, making treaties, and compiling commercial records. Consuls were formally ordered, "to devote attention to the methods by which trade with the US can be most judiciously fostered.... and to advise the Department as to the demand for different kinds of manufactured articles." ⁹³ Foreign relations from 1860 till WWI and WWII were largely economic in nature, and it was the role of the State Department to engage in a diplomacy that fulfilled that objective. From the beginning, the US was part of a world economic system, and the communications revolution that came with the telegraph was used by the State Department to transmit information quickly. Unlike the information technology today that is, "user friendly" to the common lay person, the telegraph increased the need for specialists in the State Department who could encode and decode messages.

The existing communications technologies allowed ambassadors, for instance, great leeway and discretion in the representation and negotiation functions of the diplomatic relationship with the host country to which they were accredited. Simultaneously, they enabled a small cadre of principal officials at home to play a gatekeeper role on foreign contacts and information; they were also able to control foreign policy issues within the government and the nation as a whole. Telegraphy and transoceanic cables allowed near real-time communication of negotiating instructions and diplomatic reports. But the use of telegraphy and especially submarine cabling was

⁹³ Hunt Gaillard. **The US State Department** (CT: Yale University Press, 1914) p. 146.

expensive and cryptic in several ways. The messages were brief and were encoded at two levels: Morse followed by some sort of encryption to disguise the message so that the gatekeeper function was preserved. Amid a myriad of technological developments between 1860 and 1945, the US State Department's principal officers, diplomats, and consuls still maintained a monopoly on information about foreign affairs. The U.S. State Department was the point of entry for information about other nations and their governments' economic, political, social, and military interests.

During this period, consequently, US State Department principal officers and diplomats serving abroad, in conjunction with the executive, had a monopoly on the free flow of information. Due to the broadening of U.S. international interests and involvements, its evolution as a leading world power, the pressing exigencies of World Wars I and II, and the establishment of the United Nations, the officials of the US State Department at home and abroad translated and embodied this information in the conclusion of a variety of treaties and agreements. During this period, US State Department principal officers and diplomats, working with the executive branch, negotiated bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. By comparison with earlier times, however, the repertoire of U.S. bilateral treaty and agreement subjects confirmed earlier American interests, such as traditional diplomatic and consular relations, commerce, pacific settlement of disputes, the maintenance of peace, claims arrangements, extradition, territorial issues, national boundaries, customs, and taxes. The circumstances of World War I and World War II naturally introduced variations of these types of treaties. Lend-Lease, foreign assistance, and the promotion of institutionalized peacekeeping were introduced and serve as primary examples. The

latter involved several attempts to fabricate bilateral treaties in order to produce advance commitments for the resolution of international disputes by the pacific means of arbitration and conciliation.

Whereas the subject matter of US treaties and agreements mirrored the national interests of the previous period, there was a growth in multilateral treaties. For example, the United States signed only two multilateral agreements prior to 1861 and four during the 1860s. This number increased as growth continued to accelerate through the 1890s and into the first part of the twentieth century -- especially in the years from 1900 to 1913, during which time the United States concluded nearly ninety such treaties and agreements. The relative ratio of multilateral to bilateral treaties and agreements remained fairly constant, amounting to between 17 and 18 percent.⁹⁴ However, the ratio of executive agreements to formal treaties changed dramatically, increasing from less than 33 percent to more than 70 percent.⁹⁵ By 1945 the presiding president of the US and a corps of overseas diplomats were exclusively in charge of foreign affairs. The Department of State, consequently, became responsible for a greatly expanded role in treaty making with an enlarged number of foreign governments on an expanded number and enriched variety of issues. The State Department was negotiating far more executive agreements -- including exchanges of notes -- than formal treaties, blanketing the globe not only with those that dealt with traditional treaty subjects but also with a host of others, including an increasing number in Washington itself. This enabled the presiding

⁹⁴ See Appendix A Data for Part II *US Bi-lateral and Multi-lateral Treaties from 1790-Present*.

⁹⁵ Plischke, Elmer. *US Department of State A Reference History* (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) pp.343-344. See also: *Congressional Quarterly* (August 2, 1975), p. 1714.

Secretary of State to engage in more personal diplomacy, which in turn enabled him and his Under and Assistant Secretaries to manage the treaty process more intimately and effectively at the ministerial level.

At this juncture of comparative analysis, how do we assess this period? Major comprehensive histories of the US State Department tend to emphasize specific changes or define them as either “major” or “significant”. They are not, of course, inaccurate, given the circumstances and the time period in which these histories were compiled and authored. Where they are deficient is in reviewing the State Department over long periods of time and comparing those changes in order to analyze whether significant change had occurred. Hence, flashes of insight about a particular phenomenon are more likely to be revealed when a historical account is completed over a longer stretch of time. By compiling and surveying not only the numbers of principal officers in the State Department from 1774-1945, but also by assessing the amount of domestic versus foreign related duties of the same, it can be shown that changes in its functions were somber and woefully slow. Changes in diplomatic representation were also minimal, again, not only in actual numbers but also in primary duties abroad.

Obviously, the advent of two World Wars produced circumstances that would modify the US Foreign Office. But epochal change by the standards outlined in this research did not occur by 1945. Shifts in global power had occurred among nations, but the rulers of the nation states between 1860 through 1945 were empowered, as is reflected in the negotiating of bi-lateral, multilateral, and moreover, executive agreements. One might conclude that this increase of executive authority was itself a revolutionary change in the conduct of diplomacy. But early judicial decisions regarding

the conduct of American diplomacy suggest that it was not. In 1795, the Supreme Court, for example, in *Penhallow v. Doane*, broached the issue that has persisted in one form or another to the present day and that will probably continue to characterize congressional-executive competition over the conduct of foreign relations.⁹⁶ Contrasting views of limited and broad executive powers in foreign relations existed early in US history. This has been the case, not so much because of any intrinsic ‘truth’, but because it has been more consistent with governmental needs in an increasingly internationalized world. The critical point here, however, is that the alternate cooperation and tension between the President and Congress in the diplomatic field was between *rulers*. In theory, the division of sovereignty into external and internal compartments conflicts with the basic constitutional postulate that *all* governmental power is derived from the “sovereign people” and subject to the limits imposed by them. During this period *the ruled* had little, if any, access to information about diplomatic activity and as a result, very little control over the limits that could be imposed upon diplomatic rulers -- whether they were in Congress, the US Foreign Office, or the Executive.

Major improvements in communications, transportation, the refinement of magnetic and later wireless telegraphy, the Morse code, and the laying of the transatlantic cable enabled the US executive and State Department officials to communicate with special

⁹⁶ *Penhallow v. Doane* 3 US 54. During the Revolutionary War, a British ship was seized by a vessel owned by a citizen of New Hampshire but commissioned by the Continental Congress. The question was who was going to decide during wartime what to do with the ship and its cargo. Did it belong to the citizen of New Hampshire (state), was it the right of the US Congress (legislative) to grant it back to the British owners, or was it to be dealt with by the US president (executive). The thrust of the judicial opinions was that the conduct of war was a matter of national sovereignty and not specifically dependent upon affirmative provisions in the US Constitution. The implications of the case were used to determine and settle the ongoing question of which organ of US government (Congress or the Executive) was granted power to conduct international affairs especially during times of international crisis.

envoys and resident diplomats with greater facility. This kind of interaction was available to leaders of individual states. Hence, the technological advancements in communications did not change the US State Department's conduct of diplomacy between nations. The use of special envoys by US presidents make the point. For example, Secretary Seward, with the approval of President Lincoln, sent Archbishop Hughes and Bishop McIlwaine as confidential agents to Europe in 1861 to report on the opinions and actions respecting the American Civil War. Ten years later President Grant commissioned B.F. Wade Andrew D. White, and S.G. Howe to go to Santo Domingo to make inquiries concerning local conditions and assess possible annexation by the US. In 1881, President Garfield appointed William Henry Trescot, former Assistant Secretary of State as his minister plenipotentiary on a special mission to Bolivia, Chile, and Peru to investigate relations between them. Until 1901, William Rockhill, former assistant Secretary of State and Minister Plenipotentiary to Greece, Romania, and Serbia remained in Peking to examine and report on the Boxer Rebellion in China. Rockhill was commissioned by presidential telegraphic instructions to continue negotiations directly with the representatives of China.⁹⁷

By the end of this period the government and administration of the US and the USSR, emerged as the greatest beneficiaries because technology enhanced their control over the large geographical areas of their individual states. The result, whether intended or not, was a military competition between the two and moreover, the increase of power to and between their respective rulers. Although it was between two major powers, this

⁹⁷ Plischke, Elmer. **US Department of State A Reference History** (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) see pp. 224-230 on the "use of special envoys".

optimized the exclusivity of the relative authority of states as the only legal participants in world politics.

2.2.1.3 1945-1975 The Blossoming of the US State Department Hierarchy

Between 1945 and 1975 the United States emerged from WWII as a super power and acquired the advantages and responsibilities of world leadership, and it possessed the world's leading international industrial and trading systems. Although the world has been spared a third world war, during these years the community of nations underwent a good many regional and local military conflicts and international crises. In addition to the half-century Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States was engaged in hostilities in Korea, Indochina (especially the eleven-year war with Vietnam--- America's largest military encounter). It also endured mistreatment of American diplomatic hostages by Iran, the bombing of the American Embassy in Lebanon, the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union, and the Cuban missile and other international crises. Hence, some historians mark the post WWII era as the dividing line between the old Department of State and the present agency. Their conclusions are that the State Department had emerged better prepared to play a leading role in the foreign policy process and fully aware that the looming tasks ahead were more difficult than any encountered in earlier years. By reviewing the compilation of reference materials on the evolution of the US foreign office, it becomes evident that the authors almost always describe incredible changes in the conduct of foreign relations, *in every period*, by the

US State Department.⁹⁸ Once again, how accurate is this assessment?

The first issue about the accuracy of previous assessments concerns the increase of the foreign relations duties of secretaries of state during this period. As previously reviewed, the increase was primarily a reflection of the increase of power being wielded by the American presidents of the period. But it was also related to the fact that US statesmen came to understand, after their experience with World I and II, that the traditional isolationist/noninvolvement policy America had engaged in simply did not work. The power of leaders of states in the world had generally increased and inevitably so did America's involvement in world affairs. Hence, this launched the coining of new terms such as "the American Century" and the era of "the new diplomacy" to describe the period and the kind of American diplomatic exchanges that were being practiced. This new diplomacy encompassed two types, Summit⁹⁹ and Ministerial¹⁰⁰, and was viewed as the modern method for the conduct of American foreign affairs. But how really new was this new diplomacy, or American method as it is sometimes referred to?

The volatile circumstances, of the post WWII world are instructive. In America, the trend has almost always been that during a war, or the potential for war, a greater

⁹⁸ See the following authors for major comprehensive histories of the Department of State: Michael, William. *History of the Department of State of the United States*. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901) Hunt, Galliard. **The Department of State of the United States: Its History and Functions**. (CT: Yale University Press, 1914). Stuart, Graham **The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel**. (NY: Macmillan, 1949)

⁹⁹ According to literature on the US State Department, the term "Summit Diplomacy" refers to a personal diplomacy that is engaged by Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. Personal Diplomacy, respectively, is a term used to describe the conduct of direct representation, meetings, at the highest levels, by Chiefs of State, Heads of Government, and Foreign Ministers.

¹⁰⁰ The term "Ministerial Diplomacy" refers to the diplomacy conducted personally by the Secretary of State or by the Foreign Minister.

amount of authority and latitude flows to the President. As a result, between 1945 and 1975, it is not surprising that there was an increase in the participation of the US President and the Secretary of State in actual diplomatic exchanges. Influenced by their individual personal persuasions, their interpretations of their constitutional powers, the counsel of their staffs, and the events of their times, Presidents differ in their *degree* of use of this form of summit and ministerial diplomacy. For example, some historians point out that the first president of the U.S., George Washington, warrants induction into the Summit Hall of Fame because of his use of the available techniques of summitry and the perspicacious manner in which he employed it.

Although these exchanges were coined Summit and Ministerial diplomacy respectively, they were not really anything revolutionary in the practice of diplomacy. The following examples are not just historical equivalents used to point out that something is not new. They demonstrate that diplomacy around the world was conducted among the highest ranking officials of a state. The US President, for example, appoints diplomatic representatives as his personal surrogates to supplement regular resident emissaries in order to keep the White House informed, negotiate on its behalf, and extend the President's vicarious influence and responsibility abroad. In the early 19th century, they were called special envoys, emissaries, or secret agents. In the 20th century, they bear such generic titles as executive agents, special representatives, extraordinary personal emissaries, and presidential envoys. Those appointed, however, may include the Secretary of State and other senior Department of State officers, the National Security Adviser and other Cabinet members, and occasionally even such sub-summit emissaries as former Presidents and the Vice President. President Eisenhower

made the point when he confessed that for centuries personal correspondence between government leaders “has been an extremely valuable channel of communication when the normal diplomatic channels seemed unable to carry the full burden.”

The position of the Secretary of State, consequently, was enhanced because the power of the executive increased substantially from 1945 –1975 and because the United States could no longer isolate itself from world affairs. It should be stressed, however, that the increase in official foreign overseas ventures was time consuming and supplemented the traditional stateside duties of the Secretary of State---reporting to Congress, managing the Department of State and Foreign Service, supervising the activities of American diplomatic and consular missions, directing participation in treaty making, international conferencing, and representation and negotiation in international conferences and organizations.¹⁰¹ Of those who achieved the most active records during this period, Secretary Rusk averaged approximately 15 foreign visits per year, Dulles increased to 18, Rogers to 25, Vance to 33 and the largest annual visits by Secretary Kissinger with 59 and Shultz with 73.¹⁰²

Hence, presidents selected their Secretaries of State, and together they appointed

¹⁰¹ This analysis is based on Office of the Historian, Department of State, *Foreign Travels of the Secretaries of State, 1866-1990* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990) Also see Plischke, *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, pp. 493-94, 510-513, and Henry M. Wriston, “The Secretary of State Abroad,” *Foreign Affairs*, 34 (July 1956): pp. 523-40.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* On these trips, Secretaries visited 109 foreign countries and other territories. They undertook sixty-six visits to immediate neighbors Canada and Mexico. They paid 565 visits to twenty-five European countries and Vatican City, 206 to fourteen Middle East countries, 178 to twenty-six Far East and Pacific countries (including the two Chinas), eighty-nine to eighteen Latin American countries and eleven to five Caribbean islands, and fifty one to eighteen African countries. Thus, nearly two-thirds of their foreign visits was devoted to Europe and the Middle East. The largest number of visits was made to Great Britain (102), France (91), Germany (sixty-eight ---which included the Federal Republic, the Democratic Republic, and the Republic of Germany), and Belgium (fifty nine).. Others with high numbers were Israel (forty-five), Egypt (forty-two), Canada (thirty-four), Mexico (thirty two).

departmental Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and certain other top-level officers. Selection of new appointees, therefore, were to be expected when shifts in domestic and international developments induced an increase in the exercise of executive authority. In short, the period produced war-time circumstances that allowed the US executive to acquire power that was not explicitly stated in the US Constitution. The language of the US Constitution is broad enough to allow for the general administrative control of the President by virtue of the general grant to him of the executive power so that he may properly supervise and guide a unitary and uniform execution of national policy. But, more importantly, the language is broad enough to allow for the ability and judgment manifested by the acting executive official, thus empowered, to consider and supervise in his administrative control on the energy and stimulation of his subordinate officials. What controls did the Constitution actually impose over the conduct of foreign policy? Political life in this country would be simpler were the answer clear; but the range of intended controls, even if now relevant is not easily discovered under the gloss of interpretation made by successive generations when facing different problems. Hence, once again it is more the circumstances of the world that dictate the actions of rulers rather than their individual constitutions.

In addition to the Secretary of State, high-level US State Department principal officers operating from the US increased from only 41 in 1945 to 50 by 1975.¹⁰³ This is not a striking increase or investment in foreign policy experts or intellectual human capital. Prior to 1945, the Bureau of Indexes and Archives was still the largest

¹⁰³ See Appendix A for Part II: *Principal Officers of the US State Department*.

departmental agency, with a staff of 143 and the Bureau of Citizenship followed with a staff of sixty, and supplementary passport agencies were established. During WWII, however, administrative and functional reorganization began to occur. High ranking principal officers completed assignments and duties within four broad areas of activity: Geographic, Administration, Economic Affairs, and Public Affairs. As indicated in Table 1, these four areas of activity were then further divided internally into sub-offices and divisions in which the majority were structured on a geographical basis. At the beginning of this period, the US State Department consisted of some twenty offices and more than fifty divisions, run by Directors and Deputy Directors under the authority of the Assistant Secretary.¹⁰⁴ The criteria for the division of organizational units of the US State Department would not be substantially modified until the early 1970's. The offices of these principal officers, consequently, would no longer be mainly organized on a geographic basis but according to particular subjects and international themes that will be described at length in the next chapter.

Until the early 1970's, consequently, principal officers continued to be in charge of a heady mixture of domestic and foreign relations duties. The Assistant Secretary for the Geographic Department was in charge of the largest part of the US State Department organization, which consisted of four sub-offices and over 21 divisions. Its duties continued to be representing, observing, reporting, negotiating, and assessing states within four primary geographic regions: Europe, the Far East, the Near East and Africa, and the American Republics. The Assistant Secretary for Administration was

¹⁰⁴ Plischke, Elmer. US Department of State A Reference History (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) See Table 6.2, p. 305 for a list of the Principal Agencies of the State Department from 1945 to about 1970.

in charge of the next largest department, which consisted of three offices and sixteen divisions. Its duties were primarily domestic in the sense that they dealt with the management, personnel, budget, finance, coordination, review, protocol, and cryptography of the State Department. And its duties were related to foreign affairs in the sense that this department also managed the property, personnel, planning and training services of the Foreign Service. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was in charge of a department consisting of two offices and nine divisions. Its duties primarily included investigating and reporting on the economic conditions of war areas, as well as observing foreign economic development as policies were implemented. The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs was in charge of one office, which consisted of 5 divisions. The office was primarily involved in the dissemination of information about US foreign policy, and acted as a liaison to the US public and other nations of the world. As the titles of its divisions indicate, the office acted as a public relations agent for high officials of the US government by controlling information about US foreign affairs.¹⁰⁵

To summarize, the number of principal officers in the US State Department did not increase substantially; moreover, these officers continued to perform many of the same diplomatic duties as in the past. The reorganization of the US State Department by 1945 did not transform it into a new, modernized piece of diplomatic machinery that was prepared to play a leading role in the foreign policy process because the operation of the US State Department by its high officials was still organized vertically, with

¹⁰⁵ Plischke, Elmer. US Department of State A Reference History (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) See Table 6.2 continued on page 306 for the complete organizational structure of the US State Department from 1945 to about 1970.

almost no internal horizontal organization, and based primarily on geography.

TABLE 1 :US State Department Organization 1945

Geographic Dept. (Head Office) Assistant Secretary	Economic Affairs Dept. (Head Office) Assistant Secretary	Administration Dept. (Head Office) Assistant Secretary	Public Affairs Dept. (Head Office) Assistant Secretary
EUROPE (office)	COMMERCIAL POLICY (office)	CONTROLS (office)	PUBLIC AFFAIRS (office)
Divisions:	Divisions:	Divisions:	Divisions:
British Commonwealth	Commercial Policy	Foreign Activity Coordination	Cultural Cooperation
Eastern Europe	Commodities	Passports	International Information
Northern Europe	Labor, Social, Health Affairs	Special War Problems	Motion Pictures/Radio
Western Europe	Petroleum	Visas	Public Liaison
FAR EAST (office)	War Areas	Departmental Administration (office)	Telecommunications
Divisions:	FINANCIAL & DEV. (office)	Divisions:	
China	Divisions:	Budget & Finance	
East Indies	Economic Security Control	Central Services	
French Indochina	Financial Affairs	Coordination/Review	
India	Foreign Economic Development	Cryptology	
Japan	Lend-Lease/Surplus Property	Departmental Personnel	
Philippines		International Conferences	
Siam		Management Planning	
Siberia		Protocol	
AMERICAN REPUBLICS (office)		FOREIGN SERVICES (office)	
Divisions:		Divisions:	
Bolivia		Foreign Property Services	
Brazil		Foreign Service Personnel	
Caribbean		Foreign Service Planning	
Mexico		Training Services	
River Plate			
West Coast			
Central America			
NEAR EAST & AFRICA (Office)			
Divisions:			
Africa			
Near East			
Totals: 22	9	16	5

The second issue about the accuracy of past assessments concerns diplomatic and consular representation. Since 1945, the Department of State has maintained regular diplomatic missions accredited to 189 individual countries. The embassy, headed by an ambassador, was created by law in 1893, and in 1945 some forty (71 percent) of the fifty-six American missions were of this rank. Since then, as the US achieved superpower status, it became common to maintain Embassies in foreign countries regardless of their location, size, or population and to accredit its emissaries at the Ambassadorial rank.

As the US became a world superpower, however, the problem of coordinating the functions, responsibilities, and authority of diplomatic missions with those of other American government agencies abroad challenged the White House and Department of State. From 1774 until about 1945, the US State Department remained responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, but was also burdened with many domestic functions, most of which were eventually transferred to other executive departments and agencies. During WWII, however, most federal departments and a good many other agencies not only handled the domestic functions that had previously been assigned to the US State Department, but they became involved in various aspects of external affairs.¹⁰⁶ These external affair involvements ranged from those concerned largely with policy formulation and program management (some functioning primarily abroad), to those that dealt with the foreign affairs aspects of domestic functions and those that possess

¹⁰⁶ See Appendix A, Data for Part II: *Independent and Other Federal Foreign Affairs Agencies*

only limited responsibilities that impinge on external issues. Some scholars today argue that this development has diminished the US State Department as the central authority and hub of foreign relations. But how accurate is the claim? At present, there *are* dozens of federal departments and agencies involved in the conduct of diplomacy. Since the Cold War, "a foreign policy community," has developed in the American system of government. Every department (defense, agriculture, commerce, justice, energy, labor, transportation, treasury), has had a sizeable stateside and overseas presence. The question is, who is in charge?

Presidents have stipulated the preeminence of American ambassadors within the countries of their assignment. For example, President Kennedy in 1961 felt compelled to clarify and restate the role of the ambassador as the supreme US authority in overseas missions.¹⁰⁷ Ever since the post WWII period, there has been an extension of the State Department's role in world affairs marked by growth in the complexity of operations and US mission staffs.¹⁰⁸ Within the US State Department organization, consequently, various systems were created ad hoc for the sole purpose of integrating and coordinating US foreign affairs activity. As the geographic divisions were established and standardized, for example, a system of "country desk officers", headed by "country directors" were created. Established for the management of State Department relations with American diplomats abroad, the system of "country desk officers and directors" specialized in dealing with individual countries and, consequently, provided

¹⁰⁷ See Appendix A, Data for Part II: *Independent and Other Federal Foreign Affairs Agencies*

¹⁰⁸ Esterline & Black, *Inside Foreign Policy* (CA: Mayfield Co. 1975) p. 77.

concentrated interagency coordination respecting them. Overseas, the concept of the “country team” under the direction of an ambassador, was simultaneously launched to meet the need for cooperation, coordination, and unified overall direction for the miscellany of American agencies functioning abroad. Particularly at the beginning of the period, the activities of the Department of State had cut across the functions of most other government departments and many independent administrative agencies that deal with matters transcending the national frontiers. Conversely, it should be noted that periodically presidents have transferred the activities and personnel of other federal departments to the State Department on the assumption that overseas representation and reporting in those field should be part of a single integrated mechanism.¹⁰⁹ Because the US State Department served as a channel of communication with foreign governments for other Executive Departments agencies it was denominated “the Post Office” of the Government. The term might lack prestige, but the State Department’s role as the channel of communication for all foreign affairs activity stateside and abroad is a complex and prominent one.

From 1945 to 1975, consequently, the ambassador coordinated all diplomatic activity in the country of his assignment, while, in Washington, the President exercised his responsibility and authority through a host of federal departments and agencies. The presidential subsystem of American government was a web of personal relationships among the new actors with each new president. The US State Department was no different, and functioned successfully as a primary actor, albeit in competition, "for the

¹⁰⁹ Examples, include former President Franklin Roosevelt, who integrated the Department of Agriculture and Department of Commerce into the US State Department. President Eisenhower, returned the Agricultural attach’es to the Department of Agriculture.

presidents ear," with the rest of the federal departments and agencies. For example, Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy's performance during the US involvement in Vietnam offers a striking case of role-playing. US Ambassadors along the route to Saigon provided information and negotiated support for the US effort. Bundy weaved the information into position papers approved by President Johnson in 1964 that reflected the subsequent course of action of State, Defense, and the White House.¹¹⁰ The US State Department was also a key architect of the defining features of the Cold War world. Under Dean Acheson, the department had helped to create the Truman Doctrine to contain communism and the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe.

Although the evidence thus far points to the primacy of the US State Department in external affairs during this period, scholars have also postulated that the US Defense Department, in particular, not only sapped the primacy of the US State Department in foreign affairs but is the actual cause of recent changes within it. They further put forward that the growth of the US Defense Department, particularly in this period, was and is the cause of the recent changes in the US State Department -- not the processes of globalization. The first problem with this assessment is that the US Defense budget has always been proportionately greater than the US foreign office budget. The second, is that an increase in executive departments does not in and of itself translate into a

¹¹⁰ Esterline & Black, Inside Foreign Policy (CA: Mayfield Co.1975) The authors argue that characterization of the State Department as "in decline" after WWII is an inaccurate assessment. They argue that even though the US produced a proliferation of bureaucratic subsystems in the Executive Department, the State Department was still an equally functioning subsystem for the conduct of foreign affairs. They give numerous examples. I have only mentioned three. See Chapters 1 &2 for more detail.

¹¹⁰ Cusimano, Maryann. Beyond Sovereignty (NY: St Martin's, 2000) Chapter 1, *The Rise of Transsovereign Problems*

decrease in the power of the State Department in foreign affairs. And the third problem is that there has not been a diminished capacity of the principal officers of the US State Department to vie for the president's ear or authority to act on his behalf, as the examples above suggest. Furthermore, between 1945-1975, there was an increase in the participation of the current Secretary of State and the US President in dealing with the most pressing and critical issues of contemporary foreign relations.

Consequently, even though by 1975 the domestic role of the principal officials of the State Department as, "Guardians of Documents" had waned because those duties were delegated to a growing American bureaucracy, the officers functioned simultaneously as the, "Messengers of Rulers," "Guardians of Peace," and "Secretaries of State." The means they employed ranged from written messages -- the most common -- to the telegraph, telephone, telecom, and the hotline initiated with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. By 1975, however, it should be noted that the presiding executive of the United States -- whomever he was -- had exclusive and easy access to the most recent technological advancements in travel and communications which, ultimately, enabled the government to engage in a massive increase in diplomatic exchanges of the White House, Department of State, and other public agencies with foreign governments and field missions. Particularly in this period, the US State Department supervised the whole of diplomacy with foreign governments by coordinating its diplomatic-consular network, and directing other US federal departments and agencies involved in international relations.

The third issue about past assessments concerns the treaty making process. The enormous extension of the United States as a superpower and the increase in executive

agreements has produced arguments that the treaty making process during 1945 to 1975 evidences considerable and significant change. Review of the American treaty-making process does reflect an increase in broad executive powers in foreign relations. Inevitably, this observation has produced considerable discussion of the President and Congress' relations in the diplomatic field and has, first and last, presented a varied picture of alternating cooperation and tension of overwhelming importance. But, as discussed previously, this does not constitute a fundamental change in the functioning of the US State Department. The division of executive and legislative power in the US Constitution allows for a concurrent authority in the cases to which it relates. Simply, an inevitable tug of war exists between Congress and the President with respect to the formalization of treaties. This divergence of views on the matter of responsibility for conducting foreign affairs, whether it be the sole responsibility of the executive embodied in an agreement or the joint responsibility of the executive and legislative branches embodied in a formal treaty, obscures two important points.

First, the data reveals that the American treaty-making process -- involving treaties formally sanctioned by Congress, executive agreements, and postal and other conventions -- not only developed incrementally but, more importantly, served the international interests and constitutional requirements of the United States for nearly a century and a half. For example, up until 1945, the largest number of treaties by far submitted to the US Senate was approved without change (72 percent).¹¹¹ Most treaties or executive agreements were still being negotiated, concluded, and signed by resident

¹¹¹ Plischke, Elmer. US Department of State A Reference History (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) See page 563, "Treaties Rejected and Deferred by the United States".

American diplomats, emissaries, and occasionally consular officers at the national capitals of other governments.¹¹²

By the time of World War II, however, it was difficult to determine the distinction between the titles, “treaty” and, “agreement” in international usage. However, usually those concerned with basic friendship and commerce, extraterritorial rights, naturalization, and advance arrangements for arbitration and conciliation were titled treaties. Similarly, those that focused on certain aspects of wartime military cooperation and impressive series of reciprocal trade arrangements were internationally known as agreements, or, as in the case of Lend-Lease commitments, simply, “exchanges of notes.” Hence, the second point that has been obscured about the number of executive agreements versus formal treaties negotiated between 1945 and 1975 is the fact that a formidable growth occurred in the participation by the US in international conferencing and international organizations

Whereas the United States had participated in only 100 international conferences before 1900 (averaging one per year), the rate of participation in terms of such international conferences increased to nearly 180 during the next quarter-century from

¹¹² *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States in Force on December 31, 1941.* Washington Printing Office, 1944.

Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, --. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, annual since 1956

My note: Specific examples include the following: United Nations Charter signed by Secretary Stettinius at San Francisco in 1945; Charter of the Organization of American States was signed by Secretary Marshall at Bogota in 1948; North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Secretary Acheson at Washington in 1949; Austrian State Treaty was signed by Secretary Dulles at Vienna in 1955, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by Secretary Rusk at Moscow in 1963; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed by Secretary Rusk at Washington in 1963, Vietnam Peace Agreement was signed by Secretary Rogers at Paris in 1973, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military Hostile Use of Environmental Techniques was signed by Secretary Vance at Geneva in 1977, and the Treaty on the Final Settlement of the German issue was signed by Secretary Baker at Moscow in 1990.

1901 to 1925 (or averaging 7.2 per year), to 818 from 1926 to 1945 (averaging almost 41 per year), and by the late 1930s to 100 per year, or nearly two a week. During World War II they increased even more. Following the war, from 1946 to 1955, the number of conferences and meetings jumped to 2,643 (averaging more than 260 per year), and by the 1960s representation amounted to well over 300 a year, or approximately more than one new conference each for working day. In 1965, the Department of State reported attendance at nearly 650 conferences, with American involvement in some fifteen to twenty each day. By the 1980s the number advanced to U.S. representation at approximately 1,000 conferences and sessions of international organizations each year.¹¹³

International conferencing, therefore, became a major, full-time, yearlong responsibility of the Department of State. In the early 1960s, of the nearly 2,800 persons involved in a single year, roughly 40 percent represented the Department and Foreign Service, and most of the others were agents to other Federal Departments, agencies, and members of Congress that were serviced by the State Department. Currently, the annual cost of conference attendance is on the order of millions of dollars.¹¹⁴ The sites of these conferences and meetings are determined by host governments, by preliminary conferences or agencies -- including the United Nations --

¹¹³ *Preliminary Inventory of the General Records of the Department of State* (National Archives, Records Group 59, 1963)

Records of US Participation in International Conferences 1825-1961, (National Archives, Group 43.2) *Foreign Travels of the Secretaries of State, 1866-1990*, consists of separate lists by secretaries and by individual countries visited. (Office of the Historian, US State Department, 2005)
Plischke, Elmer. **US Department of State A Reference History** (Greenwood Press, Conn., 1999) See Table 7.11 *International Conferences and Meetings since 1945* p. 569-580.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

that initiate the conferences by agreement among participants, by participating governments (if they are to meet periodically), or by contesting governments or victorious powers seeking a neutral negotiating site. The location is also determined by several other, more generalized factors: ideal convening sites are felicitous, healthful, safe from danger and international terrorism, and conveniently positioned equidistant from participants.

The early American conference administration was entirely ad hoc, dealing with the problems of each gathering as they arose.¹¹⁵ In the course of time, certainly by 1945, common procedures were developed, and eventually many aspects of conference management became standardized. The Department of State played a key administrative role in managing the organization and procedures of all conferences and meetings that are both hosted by the United States and attended by American delegations abroad. This responsibility embraced such matters as officiating leaders, establishing the precedence of principal delegates, organizing American delegations and staffing, instructing delegates, managing decision-making and voting processes, and determining American policy positions issues raised.¹¹⁶ During the 1950s, departmental responsibility was assigned to its Office of International Administration and Conferences, which was converted into a separate Bureau of Internal Organization Affairs, that has since continued as the US State Department's primary administrative unit for managing American relations with international organizations. It provides guidance and support

¹¹⁵ Hill, Norman L. **The Public International Conference: Its Function, Organization and Procedure** (CA: Stanford University Press, 1929). Hill gives a reasonable account of how the US State Department actually participated and organized international conferences .

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

for American participation in such organizations and for the development, coordination and implementation of multilateral policy. Even in cases where other departments of the US government have a more direct and cogent interest, the responsibility for selecting American delegates to a particular international conference is entrusted to the Department of State.¹¹⁷ At times the Department of State, also sends “observer missions” to those international agencies conducting conferences in which it has no formal membership but is concerned with their activities. These representatives have been branded as “an ear without a mouth” because they do not participate in the conference and their primary function is to report to the State Department. Regardless of whether the US State Department has a direct interest in the substantive affairs of an international conference or if another department in the US government has a more direct interest involving a particular conference, it is the State Department that usually exercises supervisory control over the relations and communications. The point is that the responsibility of conference planning, representation, and administration of international conferences and organizations was almost an exclusive foreign affairs function of the US State Department during this period.¹¹⁸

The system of conferences represents a noteworthy change in diplomatic history not only because of the forum but also because of the numerous international organizations that were formed. Contrary to earlier popular belief, despite its failure to join the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice following World War I, the

¹¹⁷ Hill, Norman L. **The Public International Conference: Its Function, Organization and Procedure** (CA: Stanford University Press, 1929).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

United States has been not only a joiner but also a major initiator of public international organizations and various other agencies. During the period from 1860 to 1945, the US was a member of only fifty public international organizations. Of these fifty, approximately thirty-five of these were established after World War I and remained in existence following World War II. Since 1945, however, the US has increased its participation in scores of new international organizations.¹¹⁹ During the half century following World War II the United States was a member of nearly 250 international organizations and other agencies, of which more than 190 were newly established. Of those listed in Appendix III, the US was affiliated with nearly 30 percent during the 1940s. Only eight of these antedated the twentieth century, and ten were added between 1900 and 1918. Thereafter, the rate of affiliation increased, especially during the four decades from 1940 through 1979. On balance, the formal treaty versus executive agreement data suggests that there is a trend toward increased US affiliation by instruments other than formal treaties, a finding that is both comprehensible and ultimately inevitable.¹²⁰ Historically, the executive was given greater latitude in the exercise of authority in foreign relations. But the role of the executive and congress in foreign relations has also resulted because of circumstances that made it much more necessary for the United States to join a wider spectrum of international organizations promoting international cooperation in world affairs. The *nature* of those circumstances as well as their *source* is explored at length in the next section. Both the system of

¹¹⁹ See Appendix A for Part II, *Multilateral Organizations and Agencies Since World War II*.

¹²⁰ See Appendix A for Part II, *Multilateral Organizations and Agencies Since World War II*. The compiled list notes whether they were formed by a treaty or executive agreement.

conferences and formation of international organizations, consequently, were the underpinnings for contemporary diplomatic activity. By 1975, however, they became a key place for investigating the evidence of any particular changes the Department of State has undergone in the last decade.

Most assessments about the functioning of the US foreign ministry between 1945 through 1975 overflow with conclusions of, "remarkable, revolutionary, expansion, growth, and change," that marked the end of the, "old, antiquated Department of Foreign Affairs," into the contemporary Department of State. The image is understandable given that the United States was perceived as a great world power and a force in international affairs. American participation in world affairs, the authority of the American president, the number of executive agreements, and the participation in international conferences and organizations did increase during this period. But just like the foreign ministries of other countries, the US State Department is fashioned by those who direct and participate in it during each successive epoch, and clearly the participants in world affairs were the rulers -- high officials of the American state -- and not the ruled -- namely, the American people. The critical point here, however, is that the alternate cooperation and tension between the President and Congress in the diplomatic field was between *rulers*. Categorically, diplomatic participation, negotiation, administration, conduct, reporting, and analysis, were all exercised by and in the exclusive control of principal officers of the US State Department at home or abroad under the direction of the Executive or Congress. Ultimately, the power over US foreign affairs, whether dominated by the President or Congress, was discharged by *rulers* of the American state because their control of information remained unchanged

for almost 180 years.

2.2.2 History of Canada's Department of External Affairs up until Internet: An association of imperial clerks or a one man foreign post office?

Just like the U.S. State Department and other foreign offices around the world, Canada's Department of External Affairs is fashioned by those who direct, participate, and respond to a given set of circumstances. The analysis of its machinery and functioning occurs over a shorter period of time not only because of Britain's jurisdiction over the colonies, but also because of a practical and often loyal willingness among Canadian officials to remain connected to the British Crown. However, the shorter history in the Canadian case does not make this inquiry any less viable primarily because the US, Canada, and Slovenia all have *histories that are intricately connected to other nations of the world*. Why those connections followed differing paths over differing periods of time is not the focus of this dissertation. The focus here will be to find out if these three nations with very different historical paths have been responding similarly in terms of foreign affairs within the last thirty years. Hence, this study goes back far enough in history to take snapshots of each country's progress in developing the machinery for diplomacy and to see if any changes have occurred. The questions concerning Canada's Department of External Affairs are the same as those posed regarding the U.S State Department. The first question is: has the Department of External Affairs been formed by slow, incremental growth and mutation over the last

108 years?¹²¹ And the second question is: how does this growth and mutation compare to the last 30 years of External Affairs functioning?

A definitive history covering about 108 years, from the passage of the British North American Act of 1867 establishing Canada's federal system of government to the present, is ascertained in order to answer these questions. The development of Canada's Department of External Affairs may be segmented into three, albeit shorter, periods. The first period ran from 1867 till 1909 and was the foundation of Canada's diplomatic machinery. The second period ran from 1910 till 1945 and concentrated on creating the framework of the Department of External Affairs. The third period ran from 1946 till 1975, encapsulating the completion of the architecture of the Canadian Foreign Office and International Trade. This, once again, is neither a traditional Canadian diplomatic history nor an analysis of Canadian foreign policy. This analysis focuses on the organization and functioning of the Department of External Affairs in each of these three periods by using the same measures as for the US State Department. They include reviews of its foreign and domestic duties and responsibilities of its principal officers; diplomatic and consular missions abroad; treaty making; participation in international conferences and organizations; relations with other government departments that possess foreign relations responsibilities; and finally the relationship of foreign affairs rulers to the ruled.

¹²¹ The answer to this question is not obvious for two reasons. First, incremental growth over a lengthy period of time might not amount to any significant change whatsoever. Second, rapid growth over a short period of time may or may not amount to a significant change either. The point is that growth does not automatically translate into significant change.

2.2.2.1 1867-1909 Foundation of Canada's Diplomatic Machinery

Canada's diplomatic machinery from 1867 till 1909 was literally limited to Great Britain's Foreign Office in London and the diplomatic and consular services of the United Kingdom. Hence, external relations by the colonial governments of Canada until 1909 were limited and quite circumscribed. During these early years, for example, the United Kingdom steadfastly refused to accept the colonies' contention that they had a right to participate in commercial negotiations or enjoy plenipotentiary powers.¹²² Even after the passage of the British North American Act of 1867, which forged Canada into a confederation, there was no suggestion that Canada should act as an independent entity in external affairs. The emphasis remained, rather, on upholding obligations to which it was committed as part of the British Empire. The new dominion might have autonomy at home, but in its relations with other countries it was still a colony, with the conduct of its external affairs firmly in the hands of the British Foreign Office. For example the law stated:

“The Parliament and Government of Canada,” section 132 of the act stated, “shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries arising un Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries.”¹²³

Although the principal officers of a Canadian Foreign Office were non-existent, it

¹²² H. Gordon Skilling. Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Canada: Ryerson Co.,1945) p. 107; “Colonial Self-Government and the Colonial Agency: Changing Concepts on Permanent Canadian Representation in London, 1848-1880,” PHD thesis, Duke University, 1971, pp 2-14, 44-49.

¹²³ Note: The British Act of 1867 is presently referred to as the Constitution Act , 1867.

was the Governor General, appointed by the United Kingdom, who was responsible for the decision-making, administration of, representation of, and correspondence with the Canadian colonies. The point of entry for handling external affairs affecting the Canadian colonies and correspondence with the United Kingdom, consequently, was the Governor General's office. The position of Governor General has been called the, "human link in the imperial chain."¹²⁴ Messages were coded, sent, received, and decoded through his office. At one end of the chain was Whitehall, where the Colonial Office received communications, referred them if necessary to other departments such as the Foreign Office (which might in turn involve an embassy abroad), the Board of Trade, or the Admiralty, and sought to compose a reply that would be acceptable in both London and Ottawa. At the other end of the chain was the Canadian government. This office was the point of entry and moreover the governor general remained a central figure in the conduct of foreign policy even after confederation in 1867. The reason was Canada's geographical position, which gave the governor general, in conjunction with the British minister in Washington, a special role to play in Canada's diplomatic relationship with the United States. The proximity of the United States to Canada, for example, presented the colonial governments with issues that needed to be resolved in matters affecting the legal status of residents: extradition, naturalization, passports, and border disputes.

By 1867, a civil secretary was considered to be a permanent part of the governor general's personal staff. This position was *not* that of the senior civil servant in the

¹²⁴ Stevens P., Lord Minto's Canadian Papers, vol.1 (Canada: Champlain Society, 1981), p. vii.

colony with powers of direction and co-ordination over the departments of government. This was performed in a rudimentary fashion by a provincial secretary, a position that would later develop into a department of government run by the secretary of state. The civil secretary served as the formal contact between the governor general and the colonial governments in matters concerning the external interests of the colony. The secretary of state was responsible to the governor general's office for the transmission of petitions from Canada to London. Through the governor general's office the secretary of state had limited access to British information on a variety of international issues about which the governor general received copies of Foreign and Colonial Office correspondence. With the assistance of these two secretaries, the governor general, at least formally, handled *all* foreign relations duties, which included everything from the traditional issuance of passports to the negotiations of trade and commerce. In addition, he had the final authority to decide which matters should be dealt with locally or in London. The principal officers of Canada's external affairs, thus, were the governor general, his civil secretary, and the secretary of state, and the role these officials played would not even begin to change until 1909.

The British diplomatic machinery had been convenient and instrumental to the birth and creation of Canada. Useful as these British services might be, the Confederation had given the government of Canada a range of external interests that could no longer be fully served within the limitations of colonial status. Politicians came to understand that the domestic needs of Canada were connected to external relations with other countries and could not be fully handled by the British system. As a consequence, the acting prime minister of Canada became more involved in foreign affairs. The governor

general, the civil secretary, and the secretary of state remained central parts of the system, but the prime minister's participation created the underpinnings of what would become Canada's future machinery for foreign affairs.

Prime Minister MacDonald (1869), Mackenzie (1878), and Laurier (1896) all contributed substantially to the establishment of the prime minister's dominant position in the conduct of external relations. The two key relationships that these executive administrations sought to influence were those with the United States and the United Kingdom. MacDonald, for instance, in dealing with the former, wanted Canada to have a distinct personality. But in light of the disparity in power, he recognized that Canada also needed the support of Britain. For practical as well as sentimental reasons, therefore, he favored the imperial tie. But he wanted something better than colonial status: not subordination, but partnership, as an autonomous nation within the British Empire, lined to the United Kingdom by ties of interest, as well as, by a common crown."¹²⁵

To further these objectives, consequently, representatives of the prime minister were sent to the United Kingdom and fully developed into a High Commissioners Office.¹²⁶ The British were willing to accept a representative of the Canadian government, "with

¹²⁵ Creighton, Donald. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain, (Canada: Macmillan, 1955) pp. 82-105

¹²⁶ Prime Minister, MacDonald's friend, John Rose, was sent to Great Britain as his representative on emigration but especially on matters concerning trade in 1869. He held a high position in banking in London and was respected among the officials of the Colonial Office. Prime Minister Mackenzie also sent John Rose during his administration. When MacDonald became prime minister again in 1878 the post of High Commissioner was created, and John Rose headed the office until he retired. Prime Minister Laurier sent Joseph Pope to head the high commissioners office in 1896.

whom Her Majesty's Government may properly communicate on Canadian Affairs."¹²⁷ They objected, however, to the diplomatic status of a resident minister as initially proposed. The high commissioner's staff was small, consisting in 1895 of only a secretary, and assistant secretary, and four clerks, but it produced enough work to require expansion the secretary of state's department in Ottawa. Their primary duties were to settle issues about emigration, trans-boundary water flows, and commercial interests. The high commissioner eventually became the effective channel of communication between the governments of Canada and Britain and was referred to as a "sort of" Canadian Ambassador to Great Britain.¹²⁸

The flow of communication was, however, complicated. The prime minister of Canada conducted external affairs through his representative, the high commissioner residing in Great Britain, who interacted with the British Colonial Office and its ministers. Hence, Canadian interests were being heard in Great Britain. In turn, the high commissioner relayed important information to the prime minister via the secretary of state who was inextricably linked to the governor general's office. It easy to see that even if the prime minister, secretary of state, high commissioner, and governor general were all friends that the transmission of messages, the jurisdiction and allocation of duties, and the recording of important documentation would be confusing at times. The prime minister and his high commissioner and secretary of state, for example, did not have plenipotentiary powers or, more importantly, the means for producing messages in

¹²⁷ Skilling, H. Gordon. Canadian Representation Abroad from Agency to Embassy (Canada: Ryerson Co., 1945) pp.86-88.

¹²⁸ "Colonial Self-Government and the Colonial Agency: Changing Concepts on Permanent Canadian Representation in London, 1848-1880," PHD thesis, Duke University, 1971

cipher. All communication passed through the governor general's office, and he decided where and whom it was to be passed on to.¹²⁹ Thus, the control of external policy by the prime minister of Canada was changing, but limited. Canada was to remain dependent on the British for the tools of diplomacy as well as for representational status.

Hence, the diplomatic and consular services of the United Kingdom served as representation of the external interests of the colonial governments of Canada. Although recent scholarship of the machinery of Canadian foreign affairs points out that the local governments of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island sponsored a trade commission that visited the Caribbean and Brazil to represent their individual commercial interests and has concluded that an embryonic system of diplomacy was under way, their powers were severely circumscribed because they lacked the authority and power to negotiate treaties. They were barred from making tentative agreements or negotiations involving the commercial interests of their provinces even though instructions of their individual legislative bodies had the authority to inquire, to furnish information, to report and to make recommendations to

¹²⁹ Stacey, C.P. **Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Relations**, vol. I 1867-1911. *Note:* Stacey gives a complete account of Prime Minister Macdonald's appointment by Lord Monck as one of the commissioners on the British side to resolve the major cross-border disputes with the U.S. MacDonald attended the joint high commission held in Washington D.C. in 1871. He was not pleased with the results because part of the problem was that he had to send two sets of messages to Ottawa. One, which he discussed with the British commissioners and the other dispatched in secret, indicated the instructions that he wanted to receive from the cabinet. The effort failed because the messages were secret from the Americans but not the British because they were available to the governor general in Ottawa, Lord Lisgar, who freely communicated their contents both to London and to the British side in Washington. The result was that Canada could not negotiate or get the results it wanted.

their respective governments.”¹³⁰ Dominion trade officials and emigration agents were sent abroad to represent the provinces on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, the high commissioners office asserted its own authority as the official representative on the basis that it was an extension of the prime minister’s power in the control of foreign affairs. The problem with this arrangement is that consulates were set up in Canada but Canada as a nation did not set up its own consulates in foreign countries. Furthermore, the prime minister had no authority to represent Canada in treaty negotiations, international conferences, to appoint ambassadors, diplomats, or consuls. Canada did not have its own foreign office or own any embassies anywhere in the world.

Although Canada did not have complete autonomy in international affairs, it operated within a skeletal system that was necessary for both administrative efficiency within the British system and moreover, for securing the domestic interests of the provinces as they inevitably became linked to external affairs. The point is that during this period the prime minister of Canada and other high officials conducted foreign affairs within a diplomatic system, even though it was not entirely their own. Lord Grey, the British governor general in 1906, for example, suspected that representatives from Canada were in Washington DC on missions that were informal, outside the scope of British authority, and indeed clandestine in nature. The practice, he observed in 1906, was undesirable:

Laurier, not feeling in touch with the British machinery entrusted with the duty

¹³⁰ *Report of the Commissioners from British North America Appointed to Inquire into the trade of the West Indies, Mexico and Brazil* (Ottawa: G.E.Desbarats, 1866), p. v, also pp. 2n, 4-5. Note: This report is often used as evidence to support these Canadian agents fulfilled a nascent diplomatic role. In comparison, to the U.K., which was the diplomatic model Canada eventually fashioned their diplomatic system by, these representatives had very little if no role at all.

of fighting his battle for him, sometimes has secret agents of his own at Washington and is always suspected by our Embassy at Washington of working behind their backs. Now this is obviously an evil state of things, and you will, I feel, be sure to agree with me that it is desirable to bring my Ministers and the British Embassy into closer touch and to establish a feeling of mutual goodwill and confidence with the object of securing a good working relationship between Ottawa and our Embassy at Washington.¹³¹

As a consequence of this situation, Canada would eventually copy the British blueprint for the foundation, framework, and architecture of the Department of External Affairs. The bill establishing the Department of External Affairs received the royal assent on May 19 and took effect on June 1, 1909. Although the department was so closely linked to the secretary of state, the prime minister, and the governor general, it was assumed that its operations would be set up in the East Block offices of the Parliament Buildings, for here was the pivot of national government. The prime minister, the governor general, and several ministries had their offices there. The East Block was the meeting place for all official dignitaries from abroad. The literal hub for the rulers of both Great Britain and Canada did not, as it turned out, become the quarters of the new department. Instead, two principal officials and five clerks moved into offices in the Trafalgar Building above a barber shop. Whether diplomacy was conducted from the elegant offices of the East Block or from above a barber shop, however, *rulers* were in charge of the diplomatic affairs of Canada. Information was exclusively in the hands of those handling foreign affairs in government -- whether that government was British, Canadian, or American. In 1909, rulers had control of the

¹³¹ Hilliker, John. Canada's Department of External Affairs. Vol. I. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990) pp.27-28. Grey to Lord Elgin (colonial secretary), March 1 1906, Grey of Howick Papers, NA, vol. 13, no 83.

communications flow, and therefore, had almost complete autonomy in foreign affairs.

2.2.2.2 1910-1945 The Framework of the Department of External Affairs

The organization and functioning of the Department of External Affairs was realized by the passage of the External Affairs Act of 1912. The act affirmed that, “the Member of the King’s Privy Council for Canada holding the recognized position of First Minister shall be the Secretary of State for External Affairs.”¹³² The External Affairs Department was removed from the department that was headed by the secretary of state to the prime minister’s office. As a result, the Department of External Affairs was not vulnerable to treatment as an appendage of the Secretary of State’s Department; rather it was a branch of government similar and equal in standing to the other prestigious ministries. But like any form of machinery its principal officials would determine how it would function. External Affairs was on its way to assuming a distinct and specialized character similar to that possessed by other departments. Initially, however, it had to deal with so many of the prime minister’s domestic responsibilities, that it often did not have time for its own mandate. The prime minister, consequently, used External Affairs as a source of personnel, because at the time there existed little provision for his own personal staff. When a prime minister made heavy demands for assistance with his domestic responsibilities from External Affairs, a serious distraction and overlap in the

¹³² For the text of the act see DCER, vol. I: 1909-1918 (Queen’s Printer, Ottawa, 1967) p. 12.

use of resources for foreign affairs duties often resulted.¹³³

Despite these initial administrative problems, principal officers such as, Under Secretary Pope, envisioned External Affairs not as a producer of policy initiatives but as a repository of knowledge and an instrument for the implementation of ministerial directives. Consequently, passport issuance was transferred to External Affairs, the research for the production of dossiers of confidential documents consumed a good deal of time, and the department served as a channel of communication among the other departments involving their responsibilities in commercial relations, immigration, and defense. With a staff of two clerks and one translator, Under Secretary Pope made some of his first priorities to study how the British Foreign Office functioned and to compile as complete a set of records as possible. His objective was not merely to gather records, however, but to prepare a series of confidential collections, similar to dossiers in the British Foreign Office, for use by ministers and officials who had to make decisions bearing on international negotiations, .

Although External Affairs' identity, independent of the Secretary of State's Department, had been clearly established and its prestige enhanced through its association with the prime minister, it was by no means a sophisticated foreign office able to offer the government comprehensive advice on major and unexpected issues as Pope had envisioned. In fact, External Affairs functioned as a "post office" among the

¹³³ Skelton to King, July 5, 1929, King Papers, series J4, vol. 66, file 451. Note: At one point in 1927 King attempted to make a clearer distinction between the administration of domestic and that of external policy by asking Parliament to approve a new position of deputy ministerial rank in External Affairs to serve the needs of the prime minister. Although the House of Commons finally authorized the position, there was considerable opposition, and King, after weighing the arguments, decided not to hire anyone. Thus Skelton remained the prime minister's deputy for internal as well as external matters.

British government and the key Canadian departments of government. The effect of World War I was that External Affairs had more work to do, and more resources to do it with. But its range of responsibilities remained virtually the same as during the previous period. Pope's dissatisfaction with External Affairs' role was evident in his comments about the Paris Peace Conference. The Canada dominion attended the Paris Peace Conference and signed the resultant treaties as part of the British Empire, but had little influence on negotiations that remained dominated by representatives of the great powers. Pope observed, "I am one of those, who do not see in what way Canada's international status has varied in the last half century."¹³⁴

In 1930, External Affairs consisted only of four principal officers: the Secretary of External Affairs (the prime minister); the Under Secretary of External Affairs; the Assistant Under Secretary; and the Legal Advisor. The principal activities dealt with by the department were divided between those involving governmental policy and those related to the protection of individual Canadian interests. In the first category, in order of importance as measured by the amount of time spent on each, came international arbitration, defense and disarmament, trade and tariff matters involving other governments, immigration, extradition, territorial sovereignty, boundary waters disputes, wireless communication and international aspects of taxation. The major issues in the second category were claims against foreign governments, deportation and immigration difficulties, imprisonment of Canadians abroad, seizure of Canadian vessels and goods, settlement of discrimination complaints involving trade or taxation.

¹³⁴ Pope to Foster, January 20, 1923, Pope Papers, vol. 31, file 966.

In practice, duties were not so neatly defined or categorized, and much of the workload involved international law. Even so, a broad division of labor existed in External Affairs.¹³⁵

In 1940 there were only sixteen principal officers, and they were all assigned specific duties. This distribution ignored an essential problem in the work of a foreign office: the tension between geographical and functional responsibilities.¹³⁶ In 1940, all officers had some responsibilities of the latter, occasionally in combination with duties related to a particular region of the world. Relationships with particular countries tended to be treated according to subject, rather than being assigned to a single officer. Moreover, formal assignment of duties bore little relationship to tasks performed, since the Under Secretary, (Skelton) passed work to whichever officer was available. All principal officers in Ottawa and their administrative units were under the direction of Under Secretary Skelton, except for the Passport Office, which reported through the Assistant Under Secretary.

Not until after World War II would the Department of External Affairs expand by actively recruiting officers to meet Canada's new foreign affairs objective. The distribution of power among the rulers of the five great powers had shifted, and a new international order emerged. In Canada, External Affairs became organized into four divisions: the Economic and Information Division to which the Administrative branch reported; the Political Division, which was structured geographically and dealt with

¹³⁵ See Appendix B. Data for Part II. *Principal Officers of Canada's Department of External Affairs: 1867-2004*.

¹³⁶ Hilliker, John. Canada's Department of External Affairs. Vol. I. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990) pp 127-128.

international organizations; the Diplomatic Division which dealt with protocol, immigration, consular representation, and the Passport Office; and the Legal Division, which handled treaties. But even in 1945, problems remained in the coordination of activities that involved both area and functional divisions. Weekly meetings of division heads, consequently, were conducted for the purpose of exchanging information on work in progress rather than for collegial decision-making. In this framework, as in the previous period, the under-secretary remained the primary source of foreign policy advice for the prime minister. The overall strength in the operation of External Affairs did not depend so much on the modifications of its organizational structure into divisions as it did on the interests, abilities, and reputations of those in charge. The point is that the functioning of the External Affairs was almost exactly as it had been since 1909.

Diplomatic and consular representation abroad also remained virtually unchanged until 1945. For example, Under Secretary Skelton inherited 101 employees that could scarcely be called a foreign service from 1921 to 1926. Twenty-one were in the Passport Office, and another fifteen served the prime minister's requirements. There were thirty-eight employees in London, Paris, and Geneva, and three more that worked in Washington, although the funds appropriated by Parliament for full representation there had never been used. That left a total of only twenty-four at headquarters to handle matters connected with international affairs. Only three of the positions there were for officers, and that number included Skeleton's own as well as the one he had vacated. Canada still had a one-man foreign office with only five legations abroad that were closely related to the commercial and emigration concerns of Canada.

The most important mission was the high commissioner's office in London because many of Canada's principal external interests were still in the British capital. Briefings by British officials were major sources of information and served as a window on the international situation. The provinces, consequently, relied more heavily on the high commissioner's office for the representation of their interests in the United Kingdom. The bilateral trading relationship with Great Britain was the most important market for Canadian exports. The second most important legation, whose primary objective was to serve the requirements of the economy, was in Washington D.C., as the US was Canada's second most important bi-lateral trading partner. The legation was to serve as a medium of official intercourse between the Governments of Canada and the US. The second task, accounting for considerably more than half the correspondence with headquarters, was to supply Ottawa with information concerning the activities and policies of the United States Government. The third and fourth legations, in Tokyo and Paris, were responsible for the usual consular, representational, reporting, and economic functions. Each of the missions had a minister, counselor, and two secretaries with a staff that did not exceed twelve. An advisory officer of the Dominion of Canada was in charge of the fifth overseas mission, the League of Nations, in Geneva. This post was the smallest, but it took on a broad range of activities. The work was different in many ways from that of other Canadian posts since the setting was the world security organization and ancillary bodies, as opposed to a national capital. The representative's duties were to maintain close relations with the secretariat of the League and the International Labour Office; to communicate with the Canadian Government on all matters requiring its consideration; to act in an advisory capacity to the Government on

the League of Nations and ILO Conferences and to serve as substitute representative at such conferences and committees as directed.¹³⁷

By 1940 Canadian representation abroad had increased from five posts to seven, plus a commitment to open in Dublin. Five countries (the US, France, Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands) maintained legations in Ottawa, compared with three in 1935. External Affairs, consequently, still possessed slender resources for dealing with Canada's external interests within a tense international situation. Culminating with the fall of France in June 1940, Canadian posts in Europe began to take on new tasks as a result of the war. Before the conflict ensued, the posts had begun providing information, identity papers, and even gasmasks to expatriates. Also considered important to effective prosecution of the war effort were the newly created positions of high commissioner to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland. Canada's diplomatic and consular representation abroad, however, would remain at the status of legation until a discussion between US president, Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister King took place in the spring of 1943. This discussion resulted in the establishment of embassies rather than legations, as most countries by this time had already designated their offices abroad. Little doubt could arise about Canada's independence, since British embassies maintained officers (six in Washington) that held the title of minister, the same as that held by the heads of Commonwealth missions. Prime Minister King was also advised by Under Secretary Robertson that constitutional considerations need no longer be an inhibition. "I think," said the under-secretary "that

¹³⁷ Hilliker, John. Canada's Department of External Affairs. Vol. I. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990) pp 164-165.

events have destroyed any validity that there may have been in the argument that the King could only be represented by one Ambassador in any country. This argument rests on the ancient doctrine that an Ambassador represented the person of the Sovereign in a way which gave him readier access to the Head of the foreign state.”¹³⁸

Hence, the process of expanding Canadian diplomatic and consular representation abroad began with the elevation of the first legation in Washington to embassy level. The process was gradual, and expansion during and immediately after World War II incited numerous questions concerning the acquisition of property for chanceries and official residences. Clearly the government was not ready to confront all the administrative implications of a more assertive position in international affairs, because the Canadian machinery for external affairs was not only established as part of Great Britain’s system, but also operated and practiced diplomacy from within that system for nearly a century.

The functioning of the machinery for Canadian foreign affairs from 1909 and during World War I was contributing to the general welfare of the state’s interest in areas of commercial relations and emigration. But even after World War II, the foreign and domestic duties and responsibilities of the principal officers were limited and constrained because Canadian machinery operated within the sophisticated British system. Diplomatic and consular missions abroad were also minimal with only seven missions abroad. Both treaty making and participation in negotiations were practically non-existent. Participation in international conferences and organizations such as the

¹³⁸ Robertson to prime minister, October 17, 1943 King Papers, series j4, vol. 242, file f2454.

League of Nations and the United Nations was possible because such involvement was seen as a means of promoting collective security and, unlike wartime allied organizations, lending a voice to smaller states such as Canada. With the advent of WWI, External Affairs' communications with other Canadian government departments had substantially increased and as a result it was coined the "post office".¹³⁹ External Affairs was the channel through which all communication transpired between the head officials of the British Government and the Ministers of individual departments in the Canadian government. By the end of WWII, the machinery for diplomatic activity had not changed significantly even with the creation of the External Affairs Department. This structure may have been different from the U.S. State Department, but both had one significant and important characteristic in common: the senior government officials of diplomatic activity, no matter how nascent, were in control of the flow of information. Thus, the power relationships *among* these states differed but the power relationships *between* officials and the electorate of these states were consistent. The rulers of these nations were privy to information that crossed geographic boundaries -- the ruled were not. The question, therefore, is: did any of this change between 1946 and 1975 and significantly effect the functioning of the foreign ministry of Canada?

2.2.2.3 1946-1975 Architecture of the Canadian Foreign Office and Diplomatic Network

Governments around the globe have to pay close attention to external events

¹³⁹ Hilliker, John, Canada's Department of External Affairs. Vol. I. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990) p 160..

because such concerns -- like trade, for example -- may directly impact domestic security and prosperity. Generally, Canadian officials and academic writers claim that governments in Canada have always had to pay *extraordinarily* close attention to external relations because of two crucial changes in British imperial policies. These changes were the gradual withdrawal of British military forces from North America and the adoption of the principle of free trade. These changes, by this line of reasoning, required the colonies to become more self-reliant in their relations with the United States, assuming more responsibility for their defense while at the same time looking for reciprocal trading relationships to make up for the loss of privileged access to the British market. It was not only *natural*, therefore, for the colonies to want to extend responsible government, which was developing at the same time, into external relations, which were still considered to be under the jurisdiction of London, but also the primary reason for Canada's elevated status in the realm of diplomatic exchange. However, any foreign office--and Canada's Department of External Affairs is no exception--is fashioned by those who direct and participate in it during each successive epoch.

The claim of Canada's expertise in diplomacy seems to be an exaggeration given the development of the Canadian foreign office prior to 1867 until after WWII. Looking back, the fact is that the Canadian foreign office, External Affairs, operated with only 14 principal officers, which included the prime minister, seven official diplomatic missions abroad, which included the high commissioners office in London, and three delegates to the League of Nations and then the United Nations. Building on the precedents, traditions, and practices of other countries, mainly Great Britain, the External Affairs Department was viewed, like in the US and British systems, as an extension of the

prime minister in foreign affairs. This arrangement did help in the coordination of commercial and military tasks between Canada and Great Britain, but it dealt very little, if at all, with negotiations of any kind, whether with respect to treaties or conferences of any type. There was a point of entry, the External Affairs Department, into Canada but without the authority or power to fully negotiate and carry out diplomatic activity in foreign affairs that is all it was-----a gate without the power of a gatekeeper. Was Canadian diplomacy so different and extraordinary after WWII?

For most of its early years, 1909 through 1946, the Department of External Affairs was small in size and handled external affairs as they surfaced. After 1946, the department did grow in size and have a minister of its own. Parliament approved an amendment in 1946 that enabled the prime minister to appoint a secretary of state for external affairs as a member of his cabinet. Although there was considerable growth in personnel of the External Affairs department, its development continued to be expressed through the activities of its principal officers. From 1946 to 1975 the principal officers of the External Affairs Department grew from 13 to 25.¹⁴⁰ The senior official most exposed to the opportunities and challenges of his time was, of course, the under-secretary, Lester Pearson, who assumed the post on September 5, 1946. Lester Pearson's contributions and accomplishments were formidable, but the machinery for running foreign affairs was anything but an, "administrative" marvel. As Under-Secretary, Pearson benefited from the support of capable senior officers, seasoned by their experience in the war, but the department he headed was undergoing serious difficulty.

¹⁴⁰ See Appendix II. *Principle Officers of Canada's Foreign Ministry 1867 till 2004.*

Informal methods of management appropriate to earlier circumstances had to be revised in order to create and administer a more complex External Affairs Department. At the same time, the increasing range of foreign policy issues brought other branches of government into the policy process on a more sustained basis, so that new working relationships inevitably became established.

But it was the fast-changing policy demands of the day that had first claim on Pearson's attention, and little time was left over for administrative matters.¹⁴¹ Although he recognized that there was a need for improvement in the area of activity and took some steps to bring it into line with the requirements of the day, the institutional structure of the Department of External Affairs remained essentially the same as it had been at the end of the war. Now, however, it was subject to constant strain in keeping up with the pace set by the under-secretary and the international policy agenda. The result was a department striving to make the machinery work as smoothly as possible. Some have called this Canada's golden age in diplomacy. But as Charles Ritchie has observed, "there never really was a golden age. . . No one wakes up in bed and says here I am in the golden age." Rather, "there was this feeling that we could make this contribution. And there was this famous middle power idea that we could address ourselves to tasks that fitted our capacities and concentrate on them. So there seemed to be some shape to policy."¹⁴²

Despite the enthusiasm inspired by Lester Pearson, the domestic and foreign relations

¹⁴¹ Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, vol. 1: 1897-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 283.

¹⁴² Hilliker, John. Canada's Department of External Affairs. Vol. 2, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995) p. 31.

duties of the principal officers between 1946 and 1975 were based upon, and thus reflected, the department's operational needs. The department's administrative requirements were not met in accordance with a comprehensive plan or major reorganization. They were dealt with in response to problems as they arose in individual spheres of activity. Hence, the External Affairs Department was gradually organized into functional and geographical divisions that were wrought with a host of difficulties between 1945 and 1975.

In 1948, for example, the Information Division of External Affairs absorbed the Canadian Information Service. The Information Division's functions included the handling of press inquiries, the arrangements for the under-secretary's press conferences, and the distribution of press releases and reference material to the media. It summarized major Canadian news developments and more specialized information as required for foreign dissemination. The division dealt with a variety of Canadian subjects considered to be of interest abroad, as well as with some aspects of external relations. The Diplomatic Division was also divided into Protocol and Consular subdivisions. The former dealt with all questions of diplomatic protocol, including accreditation, precedence, privileges, and immunity. The Consular Division functions included the issuance of passports, visas, revision of passport regulations, citizenship, immigration, and the preparation of regulations to guide Canadian consular activities. A Personnel division took over the functions of the Administrative Branch, dealing with the training and positioning of staff at home and abroad together with the general administration of personnel affairs. It also was responsible for the management of the department's finances, including salaries and living allowances, for the purchase of

property, and for the administration of civil service regulations. Finally, the three Political Divisions became the UN Division, Commonwealth Division, European Division and the American and Far Eastern Division whose functions dealt with post-war issues that affected Canada's economic and national security. By 1955 the department consisted of six geographic divisions, six functional divisions, and one division devoted to the United Nations.¹⁴³

DEA was developing, but the process was painfully slow. Lester Pearson acknowledged that with experienced officers in short supply, and with headquarters staff and missions abroad in need of strengthening, the department could not, "even meet our minimum and immediate requirements." "Every time I decide to move anyone, and therefore to replace him," he wrote to Dana Wilgress in Switzerland, "the machine and the people who compose it groan in protest."¹⁴⁴ In short, the duties and responsibilities of principal officials, whether they were related to domestic or foreign relations, were beset by problems. It would not be until 1973 that DEA would become fully functional as a foreign ministry.

The growing pains experienced by the department at home were paralleled abroad, where conditions differed widely from one location to another. Canada's diplomatic representation abroad was quite rudimentary, with only forty-six overseas posts by 1950 and only thirty-seven countries with resident representatives in Ottawa. During this period, the Canadian diplomatic network that existed was greatly affected by shortages

¹⁴³ Source: DEA file 1086-40

¹⁴⁴ Lester Pearson to Wilgress (minister to Switzerland with the personal rank of ambassador), December 22, 1949, RDEA, vol. 660.

of staff, accommodations, property, and communications equipment. Posts, of course, were repositories as well as originators of information. Their security arrangements were therefore of major concern to the Department, along with the long-standing problem of keeping the posts informed of departmental activities and developments in Canadian domestic and foreign policy. The lack of response to reports from abroad was another well-established problem, not for lack of interest by diplomats overseas, but because, with staff shortages, the officers were left with only enough time to address the most urgent messages. An effort to remedy the situation serves as an example of the “roughness” with which Canada’s diplomatic machinery was functioning at that time. Escott Reid, head of a committee on reporting from missions abroad, reported, “a continuing need for guidance to missions on the requirements of the Department in the field of political and economic reporting,” and requested, “the Heads of the Geographical Divisions to arrange for a regular review of the reporting from each of the missions with which they are concerned to be followed by further letters to Heads of Mission.”¹⁴⁵

The architecture of diplomatic representation abroad was being formed with a capacity for new responsibilities. Post-war expansion, rather obviously, increased the number of missions abroad; progress, however, was uneven. A study carried out in 1952, for instance, determined that four posts, -- in Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, and New Delhi -- which exceeded an established level of cable traffic, required cipher equipment. Due to the limited number of machines available, however, only Bonn and Brussels

¹⁴⁵ “Guidance to Missions on Reporting” December 15, 1950, DEA file 9118-E-40; also Evan Potter interview, November 16, 2003.

could be accommodated. Potential problems that could occur as a result of a lack of modern transmission facilities actually manifested themselves during a Commonwealth conference held in Sydney in May 1950. Because Canada had no cipher capability there, the delegation's telegrams had to be sent by courier to the high commissioner's office in Canberra, where they were enciphered by hand and sent to Ottawa. Douglas LePan of the delegation had recounted that when he, "learned that, not only secretaries, but most of the diplomatic officers as well had been up night after night until the early hours of the morning enciphering our messages, I thought of all the long telegrams I had sent and saw them in a very different, and humbler light. And some of the words I had used -- 'epiphany,' 'rhodomontade,' 'transmigration,' 'adamantine' -- rose in my throat and almost choked me." (All these words had to be encoded one letter at a time, since they were not in the codebook.) At one point during the conference, when urgent instructions were needed from Ottawa, messages had to be sent via the British.¹⁴⁶

This communications problem continued up until the 1960s, because Canada's Treasury Board was reluctant to approve the funds necessary for the extension of machine cipher.¹⁴⁷ Other means therefore, were sought to relieve the burden on the communications facilities. The posts were informed that the availability of broadcast monitoring services had obviated the necessity for many such services to send the texts of major public statements by telegram. To encourage more efficient use of the system, the under-secretary in 1962 circulated a critique of telegrams by Day, one of the

¹⁴⁶ LePan, Douglas. **Bright Glass of Memory**, (McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto, 1979), p. 203.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 204-205.

department's master stylists. Departmental practice, he observed had many faults:

Our telegrams are too long; they are not drafted but dictated; they are inadequately edited, and never (or almost never) revised for telegraphic purposes; many of them, whether in urgency or in content, do not merit telegraphic dispatch but are sent as telegrams on the correct assumption that they will receive wider notice and circulation in Ottawa and abroad than as dispatches; in fact, they are hastily drafted dispatches, expensively transmitted. Our telegrams are also marred by space-consuming clichés, jargon, dubious or incorrect English, irrelevant detail and repetitions. Our telegrams, in short are verbose.¹⁴⁸

Information control was a problem that Canada's growing diplomatic network had to deal with and, it often impeded their communications capability. But even with the difficulties that DEA encountered during this period, the handling of cable traffic and deciphering equipment, as well as the flow of certain types of information never resided in the hands of the media, the electorate, or individuals. Despite the roughness of its diplomatic machinery, information resources remained completely within in the control of Canada's government officials.

Negotiations of agreements or treaties were also slow to progress for the apparent reason that Canada, for most of its diplomatic history, operated as a part of Great Britain's machinery. Individuals made this system, but it in turn "made" them. The international connections made possible by the monopoly on communications enhanced the prestige and authority of individuals involved. In turn, these individuals'

¹⁴⁸ Day's circular, which became something of a classic on the subject, was reissued in 1979. This is not surprising and demonstrates that the diplomatic personnel of the 1960's was in need of as much training, if not more today, in writing coherent and logical reports that were succinct and to the point. Telecommunications Division to directors general and directors, August 14, 1979, and enclosure, "Telegraphic Communications----Notes and Observations," May 31, 1962, DEA file 6-4-1-3.

participation in international relations enhanced their authority in domestic and bureaucratic politics. In other words, international connections were made possible via the monopoly on communications capability, which created a political space relatively insulated from partisan political activity and the more routine aspects of government. Consultations and bargaining among state elites was made possible because the Canadian electorate, constituents, people; the ruled -- however you define them -- did not have control or the advantage of information communications capability. Basic contradictions existed in the confrontation of sovereignty and interdependence, conflicts that required the ongoing negotiation and management evident in Canada's foreign affairs policy prescriptions. Although these policies lie directly outside the scope of this dissertation, they are important because they indirectly reflect how well-insulated the body of officials responsible for Canada's external affairs actually was from the interests of its domestic population.

2.2.3 Slovenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Emerges after the Internet

After the fall of the Iron Curtain more than a decade ago, new small states appeared on the wider European territory. An important observation for this study is how a foreign ministry is formed in a new state like Slovenia and more importantly how it currently functions. Slovenia's emergence shows the difficulty in assessing the current situation of the post-international modern world. On the one hand, Slovenia emerged out of a territorialized state and set up a rational foreign ministry and diplomatic-consular network to meet all the basic foreign policy ambitions and to ensure a permanent presence in the international community. This occurrence seems to suggest

that states and their foreign ministries have not fundamentally changed. On the other hand, the newly formed Slovenia entered a world where the dynamics of the exchange of information have increased the number of actors involved in world politics. This occurrence suggests that states and their foreign ministries have encountered the need for significant changes in the traditional state apparatus for the conduct of foreign relations. Slovenia, consequently, presents a case in which a foreign ministry and diplomatic-consular organization were not only formed as a part of a new state's apparatus but also one that developed within the last decade.

While this thesis is not about state formation, it is about Slovenia's exposure to state administrative structures and to the organizational composition of a diplomatic network. Tracing Slovenia's exposure is completed in this study for two important reasons. First, the sketch of the historical roots of Slovenia's diplomatic machinery establishes how different it is from the US and Canadian cases. Second, if the Slovenian foreign ministry and its diplomatic organization are functioning similarly to the foreign ministry and diplomatic organizations of the US State Department and Canada's Department of External Affairs, then there must be some relationship between them and the world in which they operate. The first question is: What kind of foreign ministry did Slovenia develop under these circumstances? The second question is: how do the formation and functioning of Slovenia's foreign ministry compare to the formation and functioning of the foreign ministries of the United States and Canada?

The answer to the first question begins with a review of the origins of Slovenia's diplomatic machinery. Because Slovenes were engaged in diplomacy long before the establishment of the new state, and their involvement with foreign sovereigns can be

divided into three eras. During the first era, which lasted until 1918, the Slovenes wholly served in Habsburg or Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. The second era covers the period between the two world wars and Slovene participation in the diplomacy of the first Yugoslavia. The third era relates to Slovene activities in the diplomacy of the second Yugoslavia.

The answer to the second question focuses on the current organization and functioning of the Slovenian foreign ministry based on the same criteria used to analyze the Canadian and US systems. These criteria include reviews of its foreign and domestic duties and the responsibilities of its principal officers; diplomatic and consular missions abroad; treaty making; participation in international conferences and organizations; relations with other internal government agencies. This thesis is not an analysis of the behavior of Slovenia regarding its foreign policies but an examination of the genesis of one of the basic state forming structures: the foreign ministry and the diplomatic-consular network that form the entire diplomatic organization.

2.2.3.1 1867 to 1990 Origins of Slovenia's Diplomatic Machinery

Knowledge of and experience with central state-administrative infrastructure are important in setting up a diplomatic organization; how a state like Slovenia acquired such an apparatus needs to be identified. To begin, if a new state was a territorial unit within a former empire, it was administered from the center without any responsibilities or any administration of its own. A state which has been ruled from distant centers of power usually lacks both an experienced political elite as well as an

associated administrative infrastructure. Consequently, creating an independent state administration is difficult as nothing has been inherited from the now-deficient empire. On the other hand, if a state is formed from a mutated former central region of the former empire, it is likely to keep most or all of the central administrative structure. If the ruling elite form the new state as a remnant of the former empire, it can produce serious consequences. Obviously, the serious obstacle is the considerable deficiency for the fulfillment of the need of the new state to set up and organize its own attributes.

Slovenia's exposure to knowledge and experience with central state administrative structure is broken down into three eras. The first era is the longest and can be traced back to the Habsburg dynasty. The Habsburg dynasty had provided a system of centralized autocracy until there was a full-blown clash between Austria and Hungary in 1867, resulting in the creation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the administrative experience and capacity for establishing a diplomatic network.¹⁴⁹ The point here is that Slovenia inherited their administrative knowledge because they were exposed to the core administration of the Hapsburg dynasty. . After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the political leaders of Slovenia, Croatia, and the Vojvodina Serbs, who had all previously lived within the ruined monarchy, formed the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. Simultaneously, the Kingdom of Serbia was

¹⁴⁹ This is an excerpt from *Treaty Concerning the Disposal of Property and Consular Jurisdiction Between Austria-Hungary and the U.S; May 8, 1848* The United States of America and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria having agreed to extend to all descriptions of property the exemption from dues, taxes or charges, which was secured to the personal goods of their respective citizens and subjects by the eleventh article of the treaty of commerce and navigation which was concluded between the parties on the 27th of August, 1829, and also for the purpose of increasing the powers granted to their respective Consuls by the tenth article of said treaty of commerce and navigation, have named for this purpose their respective Plenipotentiaries, namely: The President of the United States of America has conferred full powers on James Buchanan, Secretary of State of the United States; and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria upon his Charge d'Affaires to the United States, John George Hulsemann;

formed by the joining together of Serbia and Montenegro.

Although only about 20 Slovenes were active in diplomacy in this era, they acquired significant diplomatic and international experience. Mostly noblemen and landowners of note, they served at numerous European courts, and their diplomatic engagements were mostly limited to occasional missions. Slovenes are to be found in diplomatic missions particularly in the following countries and courts of the Europe of the time: Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Turkey, Russia, the Vatican, Germany (or Prussia and numerous German principalities), and Portugal; towards the end of this era, Slovenes were also in the USA, Canada, Egypt and South Africa¹⁵⁰. The Congress of the Holy Alliance was held in Lasbach in 1821, where a number of prominent European statesmen and diplomats resided and held sessions for almost half a year. Simultaneously, a series of meetings under Metternich's guidance was establishing a new, post-Napoleon European political order, and Slovenes were being exposed to their diplomatic practices.¹⁵¹

The second era, covering the period between the two world wars, begins on December 1, 1918, at which time the state of Yugoslavia was artificially created by joining the Slovene and Serbian Kingdoms. Yugoslavia as a federal state after the second world war consisted of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and two autonomous provinces Kosovo and

¹⁵⁰ Prunk, J. **A Brief History of Slovenia** (Ljubljana: Mihelac, 1994).

¹⁵¹ The text was written by Dr Dimitrij Rupel, Borut Trekman, Milan Jazbec and Ignac Golob, and the material was collected by the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister. <http://www.sigov.si/mzz/eng/> (accessed February 2005)

Vojvodina). Slovene exposure and participation in what is called the first Yugoslavia was limited. Approximately 30 Slovenes served as diplomats in the period between the two wars, and they were mostly active in the territory of the former monarchy, as well as in the USA, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Turkey, Germany, Romania, Egypt, and even in Iran and Argentina.¹⁵² The significance of this era is that a number of Slovene diplomats who had served in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy continued with diplomatic activity in the first Yugoslavia. By serving in the diplomacy of two successive countries, and these Slovenes acquired diplomatic competence and experience.

The third era relates to Slovene activities in the diplomacy of the what has been called the second Yugoslavia. Despite the low number of Slovenes in the diplomacy of the second Yugoslavia (3-5%), approximately 70 Slovenes performed ambassadorial functions, and about 50 were Consuls General for about four decades, while the number of Slovene professional diplomat-officials was at least twice as high.¹⁵³ In this era, Slovenes were engaged in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in all expert fields. In addition to the consulates in Europe, Slovenes were mostly to be found in non-European countries. Three important areas of diplomatic activity were: participating in

¹⁵² <http://www.sigov.si/mzz/eng/> The text was written by Dr Dimitrij Rupel, Borut Trekman, Milan Jazbec and Ignac Golob, and the material was collected by the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister. (2005) The following quote from the authors gives a good account of how Slovenes were exposed to diplomacy. They state, "In this era, Slovenes also functioned as heads of missions. Ivan Hribar, the first ambassador of the SCS (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) in Prague, and later Mayor of Ljubljana, and Dr Izidor . Cankar, who, following his academic career, first became the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Argentina in the thirties, and then also to Canada (after World War Two, he was the first Ambassador of the new Yugoslavia to Greece). During this era, Slovenia had but few professional diplomats; special attention, however, should be paid to the Military Attaché in Berlin on the eve of World War Two, Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, who belonged to the very top of the European military diplomacy of the time. In addition to bilateral missions, Slovene diplomats also won recognition at international peace conferences, in particular at the Conference in Paris."

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

the negotiations for boundary delineation after world war two, drawing up and concluding the Osimo Agreements,¹⁵⁴ and engaging in the activities of the UN. The latter is also linked to the occasional employment of Slovenes in secretariats of individual international organizations.

This era is also important because of the operation of the former National Secretariat for International Cooperation, which had, by 1991, laid decisive institutional foundations for the later foreign ministry of the independent Slovenian state. The ministry was based on a large group of nationally conscious Slovene diplomats who had worked in Yugoslav diplomacy until that time. The area of foreign affairs thus had to be built from scratch, since the Slovene National Committee for International Cooperation served only as a transmission between the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in Belgrade and the Executive Council of the Slovene Assembly. Its original activity was mostly concentrated on developing regional contacts and links between Slovenia and central Europe; therefore, this National Committee was responsible not only for all the sub-state contacts between Slovenia and other countries but also for its restructuring into a real ministry of foreign affairs.

After Yugoslavia broke up into five new states in the early 1990s, the question is

¹⁵⁴ The Osimo Agreements by which Italy and the then Socialist federal republic of Yugoslavia regulated international recognition of the state border and agreed to strengthen cooperation in economy and other fields. In this way the two states advocated the protection of ethnic minorities. The Agreements came into force in April 1977 and were taken over by Slovenia with the exchange of notes in July 1992. Although the signing took place 25 years ago, some of its stipulations have not yet been implemented.

On 10 November 1975, the former Yugoslavia and Italy signed in Osimo near Ancona a treaty which peacefully solved disputed issues originating in the WWII. The agreements were labeled by the international public as the first direct implementation of principles contained in the Helsinki Declaration on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The agreements were adopted by all Italian parties. Nevertheless the adoption triggered strong opposition of far-right and nationalist forces in Italy, which gathered 65,000 signatures in protest.

The Osimo Agreements consist of an agreement on the border and related issues, strengthening of economic cooperation and on a joint free zone in Karst and SW Slovenia. © Government Public Relations and Media Office, 1997-2005 <http://www.uvi.si/eng/slovenia/background-information/osimo/> (accessed April 2005).

whether the creation of the organizational aspects of diplomacy in Slovenia was influenced by the administrative infrastructure, knowledge, experience, and personnel of the former federal state. Between the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the (calendar) year in which the former multinational state broke up, the origins of Slovenia's diplomatic machinery become further apparent. When the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved, for example, the foundation of Slovenia's diplomatic organization was at least partially formed. The Slovene leaders in charge had at their disposal the embryonic beginnings of the basic machinery because they inherited a component. One of the most important matters that needs to be resolved at the inception of a diplomatic organization and for its subsequent function and success concern obtaining adequate personnel. Dislike of the elite of the central administration of the former state was highly likely, but Slovenia accepted these diplomats. Slovenia knew that knowledge of diplomatic tasks and practical experience, as well as personal acquaintances with diplomats of other states, were necessary for the success of her diplomatic organization. These diplomats represented the basic nucleus of the diplomatic structure of Slovenia. As Cacinovic states, "I maintain that it was a good thing that the diplomacy of independent Slovenia included good, experienced Slovenian diplomats who used to be employed by the Yugoslav foreign ministry and abroad."¹⁵⁵ All of these diplomats were invited by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Dimitrij Rupel to join the diplomatic service of the new state.

The new, first democratically elected Slovene Government came to power on May

¹⁵⁵ Cacinovic, R. **Diplomatic Evolution and Practice**, (Ljubljana: CAP Enotnost, 1994) p. 6.

16, 1990. The Foreign Ministry of this Government--or, as it was called at the time, the National Committee for International Cooperation--was headed by Dr Dimitrij Rupel. Immediately after Dr Dimitrij Rupel had assumed his position at the Ministry, Slovenia decided to open at least three independent Slovene missions in Vienna, Washington, and Brussels. Slovenes could spread the knowledge of their people and history around the world, and bring home a knowledge of the functioning of state institutions and have direct diplomatic experience. The National Committee for International Cooperation was a practical way for setting up a diplomatic organization. But an independent Slovene foreign ministry would not have been possible without the Austrian, Austro-Hungarian, and Yugoslav diplomatic and foreign policy tradition. This exposure is how Slovenia was able to develop a foreign ministry; but because it was created within undemocratic frameworks, it is also quite different from the origins of the US and Canadian systems. This difference is important because if the Slovenian foreign ministry is, experiencing similar problems, and responding to those problems in a way similar to its American and Canadian counterparts, then it is highly likely that it is a response to similar external circumstance. The remaining question, consequently, which is addressed in section 2.2.3, is: how does the current functioning of Slovenia's foreign ministry and diplomatic network compare to that of the United States and Canada?

2.3 Machinery and Functioning of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian Foreign Ministries in a Changed Environment

2.3.1 1975 to 2004 United States Department of State

Retracing the technological advances made from the late nineteenth century until roughly the late 1960s shows that governments continued to be the beneficiaries.¹⁵⁶ With the enormous and uneven growth in industrial production capability among individual states during this period, the distribution of power in the world shifted. By the end of the 19th century Russia and the US emerged as the two most powerful states in the world. Between 1945 and 1955 they were engaged in testing each other's power in the form of geo-politics because they did not accept the parity of power between them. Digital information transfers quickly materialized from the need to safeguard information and systems in the event of a nuclear war between the two powers. The rapid development of electronics, communication satellites, and the computer was directly related to the military imperatives of the Cold War.

A great deal of information technology was developed and employed as a means to offset the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional weapons. As former US Under Secretary for Defense, William Perry¹⁵⁷ explained, "All during the Cold War, the Soviet Union had about a three times advantage in conventional military forces. When

¹⁵⁶ Refer to Section 1.3 page 22: *The Internet As the Source of Change*

¹⁵⁷ In the late 1970s, as Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Perry was guiding the evolution of various military technologies, including the Internet. And as US Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997, he had to grapple with new strategic complications that these very technologies were creating. He is currently a professor at Stanford University, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute, and the co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at Stanford.

the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the US that led strategic thinkers to believe that deterrence might be at risk.”¹⁵⁸ At the time, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown decided to use technology to try to achieve parity on a conventional field. Perry has an arresting analogy to explain how effective the new technology of ARPANET and stealth was. He states:

Imagine that I’m going to form a basketball team, and the members of that team are going to be myself, Zoe Baird, Esther Dyson, Charlie Firestone, and Madeleine Albright. And we’re going down to the gym this afternoon to practice, and then we’re going to have an exhibition game with the L.A. Lakers. I’m taking bets now on who will win the game. But before you bet me, I need to tell you what the rules of the game are. The L.A. Lakers will have to play with blindfolds on, and we will not.¹⁵⁹

Inevitably, nations observed what was happening and wanted the benefits of the technology for themselves. There were, however, two obvious exceptions: Afghanistan and North Korea. They did not accept the Internet because they believed--quite accurately--that introducing the Internet would cause them to lose control over mass communications. That was an unacceptable risk for these nations. Two other countries, China and Iran, saw the same danger but decided to take the risk of losing at least some control over the information available to their populations. The civilian and commercial embrace of the Internet on such a rapid and large scale was not anticipated by its creators.

The effects of ARPANET--the first network to compress messages and data and put

¹⁵⁸ Bollier, David. *The Rise of Netpolitik: A Report of the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology*. (Aspen Institute: Washington, DC, 2003) pp. 12-13.

¹⁵⁹ Bollier, David. *The Rise of Netpolitik: A Report of the Eleventh Annual Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology*. (Aspen Institute: Washington, DC, 2003) pp. 12-13.

them over a phone line--are still not fully realized. Up until about 1970, the control of information, as in the past, remained an exclusive, anchoring tool of the state. In 1975, computer technology became available to the general population, and, by 1984, 8.2% of all US households had a personal computer. This number rose to more than 60% by 2000. Modern computer technology with access to the Internet creates a network that serves individual human beings and their activities rather than just military imperatives, and its full effects are just now being realized.

The specific type of information technology produced in the last three decades has caused a dilemma for governments because their populations have access and are able to organize in ways not previously possible. The dynamics of the emerging international system is being affected by the fact that states are no longer virtually the actors in the world drama. Just as governments can network at a multilateral level, so can the new participants. While figures vary, they all portray a veritable explosion the numbers and activities of these new entities. As discussed in Part I, the interactivity between nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and state governments has intensified but it has only been in recent years that its importance has become fully recognizable. Rare is the international issue that does not attract a transnational network of NGOs interacting with IGOs and state governments producing a transnational political activity that no longer fits neatly into state-based international political system. Heads of government were the essential participants in international relations but the development of information technology has increased the number of new participants, and seems to have decreased or at the very least complicated the primacy of the US foreign ministry and its diplomatic organization in foreign affairs.

Simultaneously, however, the US State Department had, by 1991, employed 15,900 employees abroad, the largest foreign service contingent in the world. One possible interpretation would be that the US foreign affairs bureaucracy continues to increase in size despite a simultaneous usurpation of diplomatic power by these new participants.

The motivating question of this dissertation, then, is: what evidence exists that changes in foreign ministries, if any, are a response to the processes of globalization? If, by documentation and examination, the five primary criteria used in this study--the review of the foreign and domestic duties and responsibilities of its principal officers, its diplomatic and consular missions abroad, its treaty-making, its participation in international conferences and organizations, its relations with other government departments that have foreign relations responsibilities, and the relationship of foreign affairs rulers to the ruled of each state--can be shown to remain constant across the three examples, then it may be concluded that the machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs has not significantly changed. The results of the evidence derived from documentation on the US State Department in this study thus far reasonably suggest that the range of variation was minimal between 1774 until approximately 1975. The evidence does not suggest that an idealized machinery for conducting US foreign affairs, able to repel a variety of real-world pressures or forces, existed in these years. It does suggest, however, that throughout this lengthy period of time the incremental changes did not amount to an alteration in the machinery for the conduct of US diplomacy. In fact, it suggests that merely a "fine tuning" of the established machinery had occurred. The question, however, remains: what changes have occurred, if any, to the US State Department since 1975? The answer is important because it is often simultaneously

argued that the modern state as the organizational unit of the international system has not been seriously modified, but the Department of State as the instrument for the conduct of foreign affairs has been seriously eroded.¹⁶⁰

The first notable observation about the functioning of the US State Department since 1975 is a 60 percent increase in the number of principal officials from 1980 to 2002.¹⁶¹ This is the largest increase *per unit time* in US State Department history. More important, however, is that during this period its organizational structure was no longer based solely on geography. For the first time, horizontal divisions of the US State Department appeared with the formation of thematically specific organizational units. Principal officials were in charge of departments that dealt with particular foreign policy and international themes. The staff of assistant secretaries increased substantially and became organized according to more nearly precise substantive functions and international themes. For example, in 1944, there were no assistant secretaries assigned to a particular function. In 1965 there were four, but by 1995 there were 14.¹⁶² By 1975, individual under secretaries were given charge of each of the following areas: Arms Control, Economic and Agricultural Affairs, Global Affairs, Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Management, and Political Affairs (the only area to be organized on a geographic basis). More important, there was an increase of only one geographic area in Political Affairs with a new assistant secretary in charge while simultaneously there

¹⁶⁰ Skolnikoff, Eugene. "Science and Technology: The Implications for International Institutions," *International Organization*, Vol. 25, NO. 4 (MIT Press, MA, Autumn, 1971), pp. 759-775.

¹⁶¹ See Appendix A *Data for Principal officers of the US State Department*.

¹⁶² Plischke, Elmer. US Department of State A Reference History (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) Table 7.2 p438.

was an addition of three assistant secretaries assigned to International Organizations.¹⁶³ Each of the Under Secretaries was put in charge of the Assistant Secretaries and coordinated their activities. Examples of the international themes assigned to individual Assistant Secretaries included: Democracy, Human Rights, Labor; Diplomatic Security; Economic and Business Affairs; Intelligence and Research; International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; International Organization Affairs; Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; Population, Refugee, and Migration Affairs; and Science and Technology.

The second observation of the current functioning of the US Department of State concerned one principal officer in particular: the Deputy Secretary of State. Initially it might seem odd that this position should be significant, but its absence and creation are impressive for two primary reasons: first, as in most foreign ministries, the US State Department was initially small and operated as a rigidly organized bureaucracy represented by the traditional pyramid, with the chief officer, who maintained rigid control, at its apex; hence, the Secretary of State, acting as the chief officer of the US State Department, was directed only by the President or by Congress. A Deputy Secretary did not exist as part of the organization until 1980. The hierarchy was clear, and there were no impulses coming from the external environment which would in their extent and complexity be so important that the “chief official” would have to consult the clerks or even the assistant secretaries about the necessary solutions.¹⁶⁴ Firm rules

¹⁶³ Plischke, Elmer. **US Department of State A Reference History** (CT: Greenwood Press, 1999) Table 7.2 p 438.

¹⁶⁴ Morgan, G. **Creative Organization Theory**, (US: Sage Publications, 1989) pp.65-67. Morgan outlines six models with which he encompasses the whole range from a rigidly organized bureaucracy to a loose organic network.

of work and conduct were under the rigorous control of the chief officer; in addition, the entire diplomatic organization was dedicated exclusively to the execution of the US President and Congress's instructions regarding the machinery, conduct, and implementation of foreign policy. Even during WWI and WWII, the geographical departmental divisions were rigid, roles and rules were clearly defined, and the US State Department overall was mobilized through a hierarchical chain of command. The purpose of the vertical configuration was to shape a suitable means for carrying out tasks and to create the most efficient organizational method for the small institution of the original and later more developed US State Department.

Principal officials, however, began to experience new difficulties with the State Department's conduct of foreign affairs and diplomatic exchanges. They came to understand the difficulties in the conduct of foreign affairs in terms of information technology. For example, Secretary of State Shultz, a former MIT professor, initially believed that the new information and communication technologies would lead to more centralized government. But he gradually came to realize that the opposite had occurred. With governments less in control of information, private entities became increasingly powerful, and the role of such regional blocs and organizations moved to the fore of international politics. Shultz's realization that the new information technologies would decentralize governments seemed valid after the Soviet Union had collapsed. He also concluded that the new technology had outstripped traditional methods of diplomacy when he used a satellite telephone system to maintain contact with US officials on the scene during a Lebanon crisis.

The US State Department's basic organizational structure remains vertically

divided into a number of hierarchal levels but because there has been a pronounced proliferation not only of participants in international relations but also a host of global problems. This type of internal structure is making it increasingly difficult for the US State Department to handle foreign affairs. The Internet, for example, frees new entities such as NGOs and IGOs from forming associational relationships based on territory, allowing them instead to form relationships based on specific global problems. A pronounced proliferation of problems that have an effect on almost all of the international community is observable particularly in the second half of the 20th century. Terrorism, climate change, human trafficking, and drugs, for example, no longer have an impact on just a particular geographical area but the entire world. This has increased the need not just for information on the foreign matters of individual state governments but also for information and the proper organization within the US State Department to make informed decisions concerning the growing number of global problems.

Hence, the second reason for the importance creating the Deputy Secretary in 1980 arose from the external environment which generated new problems that proved difficult to deal with within a rigid organizational structure. As transnational problems and transnational political activity increased, the need for internal horizontal organization within the US State Department was more apparent among state foreign policy leaders as a method for handling the new external environment. Similar to a bureaucracy with a senior management team, the Deputy Secretary, along with 10 other Under Secretaries, formed a second level which is responsible for coordinating all processes and activities within the State Department. The Under Secretaries are assigned to deal with global problems. For example, the Under Secretary for Global

Affairs deals with democracy and human rights concerns whereas the Under Secretary for International Security deals with arms control. They consulted with one another about the international themes that they are in charge of and then report as a group to the Deputy Secretary. The Deputy Secretary then conveys to the Secretary of State the most important perceptions and findings of the Under Secretaries as well as pass on his general instructions to them. The Deputy Secretary and his team of Under Secretaries form a second level of horizontal organization in the US State Department which are responsible for all of the activities of the US State Department and the diplomatic-consular network, in other words, the whole US diplomatic organization. . Although the Secretary of State remains ultimately in charge of the US State Department, the addition of the Deputy Secretary and the coordination of the international assignments of the Assistant Secretaries means that a basic level of horizontal organization has been formed. The US State Department had to organize in such a way so that it no longer implemented policy but also contributed to its creation in an external environment crowded with new entities competing for the same.

The third observation about the functioning of the US State Department also involves its principal officers. Between 1945 and 1961, the State Department was subjected to nearly 50 official and quasi-official studies on the modernization, improvement, and reform of its organization. Despite all these studies and ferment for reform and interagency cooperation, almost all of these proposals were never implemented. The basic components of foreign relations conduct remained fundamentally unchanged. In 1970 a major study, most of which the US State Department adopted, contained 500 recommendations for improvement by integrating

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foreign policy officials with function.¹⁶⁵

By 1990 new participants in international relations and the global problems in which they mobilized to handle were reflected in the studies about the US State Department had begun to deal with broader subjects.¹⁶⁶ To illustrate, these subjects ranged from the nature of the international community, to global issue management, information and intelligence, economics and the environment, and regional and multilateral diplomacy. By 1998, studies about the conduct of foreign affairs focused on the information revolution, the widening participation of the public in international relations, the increase of NGOs involved in international issues, and the information economy which has spawned the growth of multi-national and trans-national corporations. For example, a proposal made by Joe Montville of the State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, known as "Two-Track" diplomacy, was recommended as an alternative way to conduct diplomatic business. The idea was to supplement the management of international ethnic conflicts by increasing the interaction between foreign ministry representatives of sovereign states and leaders of non-governmental organizations skilled in conflict resolution. This method entailed interaction between groups of private citizens (NGOs) and international groups (IGOs), all outside the formal

¹⁶⁵ A complete list studies and commentaries on reorganization and reform of the Department of State and the Foreign Service since 1945 is available in the *Foreign Relations Series*, published by the US State Department and available in their archives.

Note: The primary problem with these studies is that almost none of them was ever implemented. The first major study, *Diplomacy for the 70's: A Program of Management Reform*, which contains a general statement concerning American diplomacy in a changing world, contained 500 recommendations for improvement, most of which the State Department adopted, which concerned integrating personnel with function.

¹⁶⁶ *State 2000: A New Model for Managing Foreign Affairs*, US State Department, 1992.

government structure.¹⁶⁷

During the last 10 years, the US State Department has been forced to deal with the increase of non state actors that have proliferated in international relations. As discussed in Part I more than 15,000 NGOs are at present directly involved in international affairs, and there has been a dramatic increase in TNCs.¹⁶⁸ Nations once connected by foreign ministries and traders are now linked through millions of individuals using the Internet, without central control. The use of new Internet venues by non-state actors is notable because these new actors are altering traditional notions of power in international relations. Hard power is often described as the ability, through threats or rewards, to get others to do what they otherwise would not do. Before the 1970s, power was thought of as belonging only to the state and as being associated with certain coercive abilities, such as military might and economic primacy. Classic diplomacy reflected these circumstances and assumed that only sovereign states controlled international relations. But soft power is becoming increasingly more formidable in a highly connected world. NGOs and other civil-society participants actively compete with states, rivaling governments for legitimacy, public image, credibility, and cultural influence.

Although these new entities increasingly demonstrating their competency in world

¹⁶⁷ McDonald, John. *The Track not Taken*, Harvard International Review, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (Cambridge, Fall 2000) pp.68-71.

¹⁶⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, *World Investment Report 1994: Transnational Corporations, Employment and the Workplace* (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994). The term TNC refers to corporations with foreign assets and is distinguished from the multi-national corporation which is "nationally based" in that decisions remain uni-national in terms of ownership and headquarters management. The TNC, conversely, is managed and owned by people of different national origins.

affairs, high officials at the US State Department are divided in their responses to or recognition of "new non-state players" and on whether to incorporate them into the government's, "state-centered roles, skills and modalities."¹⁶⁹ New and younger high officials in the US State Department almost all "welcome the input, expertise, and specialization of particular NGOs." They point out numerous examples where the US State Department has encouraged participation of American NGOs, such as the population conference in Cairo, the women's conference in Beijing, and the environmental conference in Kyoto. Each official, however, has made it clear that the scale of involvement is different and difficult because of the scope and subject of the negotiations. As Tim Wirth, the State's first Under Secretary for Global Affairs, put it:

The new challenges to diplomacy are very public. These are challenges that include a broad base of NGOs--a very different kind of a constituency. When you think about the difference between negotiating arms control and negotiating climate change, they are two completely different kinds of responsibilities; both very difficult, but the second demanding a significant transition.

But numerous career principal officers oppose their participation by asking, "who elected them anyway?" These diplomats who work in the tradition-bound hierarchy and culture of the State Department are not as willing or likely to "mix it up" with the freewheeling, decentralized Internet culture. Their resistance to NGO participation in advancing America's international agenda is not without reason. Those high officials who resist their participation argue that NGO interests tend to be directed at single

¹⁶⁹ Interviews US State Department. February 2003, March 2003 and October 2004. It is interesting to note, but not surprising given the events of 9/11, that during my interviews with senior, principal officers of the State Department there were two conditions for the interview. First, all but two wanted to remain anonymous; and second, none wanted to be quoted directly. My notes and analysis of all 12 interviews, however, reveal a notable divide between the young, new officials and the career senior officials about the participation of NGO's in diplomatic exchanges.

issues. Unlike the government, which in the national interest must balance the concerns of competing factions, NGOs and corporations address relatively narrow concerns, without consideration to the broader issues that affect the US as a whole. On an issue such as global warming, for example, multi- and trans-national corporations and NGOs would most likely take opposing views; moreover, these high-ranking State Department officials argue, the, “network of NGOs is becoming increasingly more skilled at using the Internet to build international coalitions around single issues which may not be in the national interest.”¹⁷⁰

Simultaneously, those officials that are resisting NGO participation in actual negotiations are also coming to realize the consequences of not allowing these new actors to participate. Citizen support for a particular foreign policy initiative is necessary for its success; without it, the initiative will simply be “dead in the water,” as one official put it. NGOs are engaging in effective campaigns to influence citizens’ perceptions on issues and are influencing international policy by generating public opinion in strategically selected states. By targeting particular constituencies in a state, NGOs can directly influence high government officials who rely on their particular electorate to stay in power. Subsequently, these elected government officials put pressure on principal officers in the US State Department to take a specific position on what is usually a narrow, single issue. This pressure has produced a general frustration among these career officials and an awareness that foreign policy has

¹⁷⁰ Interview, US State Department, March 2003. As stated previously, of the 12 interviews conducted five were with career principal officers, who did demonstrate some resistance to the participation of NGOs. Their objections were based primarily on the idea that these organizations were not officially elected by the people of the US and therefore should not play a significant role in diplomatic relations.

to be approached in a different way from the past.¹⁷¹ The influence of NGOs has not, however, as one official put it, “brought an end to the US as a nation or to the notion of the American people as US citizens. Collectively, people in America have common objectives, objectives that are codified into a national voice through democratic government. The US State Department is one, albeit important, part of that voice.”¹⁷²

Almost all of the respondents associated similar characteristics and components in their descriptions of the term “globalization.” A consistent, almost uniform awareness of globalization exists among these principal officers of the US State Department and is understood as a “phenomenon that entails cross-cutting of issues not constrained by national borders.”¹⁷³ The issues raised by globalization are viewed as “transnational versus international in scope” as more “thematic versus functional” and as resolved by a “public/private partnership” in contrast to a strict, “government to government,” relationship. None of the principal officers interviewed was unaware of the term “globalization” and had, for the most part, a common understanding of the phenomenon.

A more important point is that no apparent contradiction existed among the U.S. State Department officials interviewed about the primacy of information

¹⁷¹ Interview US State Department, February 2003. During one interview, the official had almost a total disdain for the way in which NGOs can disrupt a diplomatic negotiation, mainly because some negotiations can take months and in a matter of weeks be completely shattered; hence, the official’s frustration but realization that these actors must be taken seriously in conducting foreign affairs

¹⁷² Interview, US State Department, February 2003.

¹⁷³ Interview, US State Department, February 2003.

technology and its implications and consequences for the conduct of diplomacy.¹⁷⁴ As one senior official of the Global Affairs Department stated, “the Internet is a vital diplomatic tool to gain the support of people and institutions; to attract people to shared freedoms and values; to engage and persuade others about who we are, what we do, and what we stand for; to educate and bond through the exchange of ideas, people, experiences, and trade; and to demonstrate goodwill and a desire to achieve just political arrangements. Call it what you like--public diplomacy, cyber diplomacy, soft power, or whatever.....it is an essential component in a world that is networked not only government to government but citizen to citizen.”¹⁷⁵ It seems to be well accepted among these high officials that a real collision persists between the formal, contractual language of the State Department and the informal, flexible conversation among people using the Internet. For example, one official states, “when the State Department makes an official pronouncement, written or spoken, it has a special authority because the US government stands behind it.”¹⁷⁶ Official statements therefore require extensive internal, confidential vetting and review before they are publicly announced. Dialogue on the Internet, in contrast, is much more casual, impulsive, and colloquial. Its effects, however, cannot be underestimated because the passions of people around the globe, no

¹⁷⁴ All of US State Department officials interviewed were fully aware of two important facts that related to information technology. The first, was the oral statement of Fernando Burbano, Department of State Chief Information Officer, given before the House Committee on International Relations on June 22, 2000. The statement outlined a comprehensive plan to completely overhaul the US State Department and Overseas computer networks. This included an updated computer infrastructure, the security of global communications networks, interagency coordination capability, and more importantly, to ‘provide the right information to the right people at the right time’. The second, was Colin Powell’s commitment to the overhaul of the US State Department’s IT infrastructure because of its potential in what is presently known as “Public Diplomacy”.

¹⁷⁵ Interview US State Department, March 2003. This official was quoting from an e-mail that was received concerning recommendations about proposed changes in the information structure of the US State Department.

¹⁷⁶ Interview US State Department, March 2003.

matter how inaccurate they may be, can be culminated and then mobilized into a formidable force.

The fourth observation about the functioning of the US State Department since 1975 concerns the status and running of the diplomatic-consular network. According to some observers, claims that we are witnessing the decline of diplomacy often rest on an elementary confusion about the characteristics of diplomacy as both a process through which international relations are conducted and as a set of mechanisms through which these processes are enacted.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, these observers point out that confusion about these characteristics exists because those who see decline in an era of rapid change are focused on the machinery rather than on the process.¹⁷⁸ One of the problems confronting any serious evaluation about diplomatic organizations is the lack of analytical data as opposed to descriptive material that surrounds it.¹⁷⁹ This dearth of information is especially evident in evaluations about the actual system and running of a network of diplomatic-consular missions. Diplomatic-consular missions are linked to a foreign ministry that is the central point which assigns tasks to the missions and in return obtains through particular processes and reactions solutions to foreign policy problems. In short, the machinery makes the process possible and those who participate make the process.

¹⁷⁷ Hocking, Brian. *Diplomacy: New Agendas and Changing Strategies*, Virtual Diplomacy Series, US Institute of Peace, No. 14, Article released July 23, 2001.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Hocking, Brian. *Diplomacy: New Agendas and Changing Strategies*, Virtual Diplomacy Series, US Institute of Peace, No. 14, Article released July 23, 2001. Hocking claims there is a lack of analytical data and that most arguments centered on the decline of diplomacy are focused on the *machinery* rather than the *process*. I would add that there is a lack of data on the actual machinery and the process thereby causing the confusion. This dissertation attempts to correct the confusion by providing data.

As described in section 2.2.1.2, changes in overseas diplomatic and consular representation between 1774 and 1945 were minimal both in terms of the diplomats who served their appointments and of the actual number of permanent missions abroad. To summarize, between 1774 and 1945, a total of 171 years, there was an average growth of 1.1% a year of US permanent missions abroad. In contrast, between 1945 and 1975, a period of 30 years, there was an average yearly growth of 2.3% in US permanent missions abroad. And from 1975 to 2005, a period of 30 years, there has been an average growth of 2.3% a year in US permanent missions abroad. The point is that quantitatively, at least, diplomatic representation abroad did not substantially change from 1774 to 1945, a span of 171 years, when compared to changes just within the last 60 years.¹⁸⁰ At the very least, the data suggests that US permanent missions abroad, a large part of the diplomatic machinery, are not declining; hence, the mechanisms, the US State Department and its network of diplomatic-consular missions, through which the process of diplomacy is made possible, is not experiencing change in the form of any imminent demise caused by globalization.

The US State Department is and remains the central element of the diplomatic-consular mission network. According to the senior advisor to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, the knowledge and management of the organizational composition and activities of each offer of the most important and fundamental challenge to an

¹⁸⁰ See Appendix A, Part II. Graphs contain the actual numbers of US diplomatic representation abroad. Also it is important to note that there is a .93 correlation between the data points (diplomatic missions abroad) and the trend line (exponential curve). Mathematically, this means that this at the very least that there was no decrease in diplomatic representation in the last three decades. If the circumstances were to remain constant (high unlikely and why I am unwilling to make such a conclusion) the exponential curve is suppose to predict another exponential increase in the next 30 years.

increasingly interdependent world. In short, the diplomatic-consular network has to be rational. Embassies, which were “once considered homes” are viewed as “technological centers” that constitute the front line of defense in the battle against a number of nontraditional threats that range from international terrorism to the illicit drug trade. Global criminal organizations, money launderers, and drug traffickers were given as examples that threaten many countries. To enhance the national security of the US, embassies help these countries organize their law enforcement and work with local intelligence officials. As one official put it, “Without people on the ground our efforts to monitor, contain, and eliminate some of these potent nontraditional threats would be severely limited.”¹⁸¹

These nontraditional threats have significantly increased the Ambassador’s role in US embassies. In the past, the role of the Ambassador was proclaimed by former presidents, such as Kennedy in 1961, as the supreme authority at overseas missions, and their role remains the same today. But a significant change in the types of duties and responsibilities of the ambassador has emerged. Before 1975, for example, diplomatic communications were carried on through predictable venues and stable deliberative processes. The circle of diplomatic personnel was well established, the number of personnel with access to accurate, prompt information was relatively small. Cable traffic from US embassies was the primary source of germane information. Before 1975, the ambassador’s role had vacillated between that of a messenger and implementer of foreign policy and that of a contributor and formulator of foreign policy. This role was

¹⁸¹ Interview with Farrar, Jonathan. Senior Executive Assistant to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky at the US State Department, March 2003.

possible because there was adequate time to process information to offer judgments, assessments, and to make foreign policy proposals to the executive.

By 1975, the time horizons of diplomatic decision making by the Ambassador and his personnel had been greatly shortened. Attempting to be messenger, implementer, or contributor to foreign affairs became extremely difficult and so, according to senior officials at the US State Department, placed “extreme pressure” on current US ambassadors.¹⁸² With the speed of information came the problem of less accuracy, less reliable information, and less capability to respond decisively in international crises and events. The “tension between velocity of information and judgment” has inevitably affected foreign policy outcomes.¹⁸³ Increasingly, the ability to quickly filter the glut of information into comprehensive, reliable, and credible knowledge is becoming the primary duty and responsibility of the ambassador. Hard well-researched information is necessary to counter inaccurate information chains that distort public perceptions. The Ambassador’s primary responsibilities lie increasingly in maintaining a competitive advantage in foreign affairs through possessing accurate information. The ambassador plays a key, albeit difficult role, one that now includes persuading a wider public, building new coalitions, talking to groups that traditionally have been ignored. Ms. Pamela H. Smith, Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs at the US Embassy in London, made the point in a speech:

Public Diplomacy will no longer be a job just for certain specialists, like press

¹⁸² Interview with Farrar, Jonathan. Senior Executive Assistant to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky at the US State Department, March 2003.

¹⁸³ Interview with Farrar, Jonathan. Senior Executive Assistant to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky at the US State Department., March 2003.

attaches and cultural attaches. Nearly everybody in an embassy will be engaged in public diplomacy, especially the Ambassador and other senior officers. In this fast-moving environment, the people who know how to choose, sort, edit, and authenticate information will become extremely valuable. The sought-after experts will be what we now are beginning to call "knowledge workers." They will advise the whole embassy team about how to target, distribute, differentiate and authenticate information so it is as useful as possible. In parallel to this trend, I expect that leaders in international endeavors will be successful as they themselves become more adept at using the tools of public diplomacy to gain support for their positions and that there will be a decreasing need to classify and restrict information.¹⁸⁴

On September 18, 2002 the Commission on Public Diplomacy made several recommendations, one of which pointed out the necessity of changing the duties and responsibilities of the entire US diplomatic and consular network. Concerned about the training of Foreign Service Officers, the Commission's view was that all of the FSO should be trained in public diplomacy and that, no one should be made an Ambassador of the United States in any country of the world unless he has excellent skills in public diplomacy. To summarize, the Ambassador no longer functions primarily as the foreign affairs messenger or implementer or as a primary contributor and creator of foreign policy for state leaders but rather function as multi-skilled facilitators of foreign affairs among *rulers and the ruled*.

The fifth observation about the US State Department is the almost exponential increase in treaty making and participation in international conferences and organizations. Today, the United States is a party to more than 6,000 regular bilateral

¹⁸⁴ Paper presented at the 1997 International Conference on Information Technology and Diplomacy http://www.diplomacy.edu/Books/mdiplomacy_book/smith/p.h.%20smith.htm (accessed April 2004).

treaties and agreements with some 194 foreign governments. Approximately 810 pre-1946 bilateral treaties/agreements with 116 countries remain in effect, and 250 were added during the immediate postwar years (1946 to 1949), then increased each decade thereafter, peaking in the 1980s at 1,465 and the early 1990s at 1,087.¹⁸⁵ These figures amount to an average of some 385 a year, or more than one per day, since 1980. Compared to previous periods, the data shows that American bilateral treaty/agreements have substantially increased since 1975. American bilateral treaty making, however, has not only increased in quantity. Many of the subjects of these bilateral treaties and agreements parallel and supplement at least 70 of the subjects of multilateral treaties.¹⁸⁶ More than half the bilateral treaties/agreements complement the multilateral, including such major matters as atomic energy, civil aviation, defense, economic and technical cooperation, extradition, finance, narcotic drugs, postal affairs, scientific cooperation, taxation, and trade and commerce. From this perspective, whereas most bilateral treaty/agreements deal with individual countries, treaties increasingly are concerned with the same global, regional, or functional subjects as those found in multilateral treaties/agreements.¹⁸⁷ Simply, bilateral treaty making about global subjects and concerns has increased almost exponentially since 1975.

To appreciate the totality of the changes in the contemporary American treaty/agreement complex, it is essential to understand the increase in multilateral treaty making. The United States is a party to approximately 6,000 multilateral treaties and

¹⁸⁵ See Appendix A: Data for Part II: *US Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties 1790-Present*.

¹⁸⁶ See Appendix A: Data for Part II: *Treaty and Agreement Subjects 1774-2004*.

¹⁸⁷ See Appendix A: Data for Part II: *Treaty and Agreement Subjects 1774-2004*.

agreements that are in effect.¹⁸⁸ The largest number concern North Atlantic Treaty affairs, energy, trade and commerce, telecommunications, maritime affairs, defense, and finance; these areas, when combined, amount to almost 40% of the total.¹⁸⁹ Most of these have been concluded since 1960, especially during the 1970s. The number of signatories varies, but these treaties are either simply tripartite, quadripartite, and regional or t global in intent and universal in participation. Those that fall into the global-universal category have been signed by 175 or more countries. Those with the largest number of signatories are led by the Constitution of the World Health Organization (nearly 200), the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Constitution of Universal Postal Union, the United Nations Charter, the Red Cross Convention, and the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

The dialogue and groundwork for most multi-lateral treaties takes place during international conferences or at the meetings of international organizations. American participation in organizations that promote international cooperation has nearly doubled since 1975. The increased participation of America in international conferences and organizations, taken with the actual increase in the number of multilateral treaties as well as with the increase in bilateral treaties, principal officers, diplomatic and consular representation abroad, suggests that change is taking place in the conduct of American diplomacy. At the very least, for example, the escalating number of signatories on multi-lateral treaties reflects the growing inter-connectedness of the world. But the

¹⁸⁸ See Appendix A: Data for Part II: *US Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties 1790-Present*.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

increase does not mean that the complex inter-connectedness of the world has rendered the US State Department and its diplomatic network abroad impotent; changes in the US State Department since 1975 do not simply signal, as some scholars have proposed, its downfall in the conduct of foreign relations. Obviously, by the exponential increase (which in and of itself is a significant change) in treaty making and participation in international conferences and organizations, the US State Department has a substantial role to play. Conversely, however, there is one often-overlooked procedure of the US State Department as to its role. In March 1979 the Department of State issued concrete guidelines concerning the participation of private citizens as representatives of affected private-sector interests to serve with American delegations at international conferences, meetings, and other negotiations. Initially, these criteria for inviting such participants fixed the nature and limits of the role such representatives would play. The recruitment of private citizens into a milieu once occupied exclusively by diplomats was just the beginning of introducing new players to world diplomacy, foreshadowing the difficulty that was to come.

Hence, the sixth observation about the functioning of the US State Department and its diplomatic network since 1975 is the difficulty it has recently encountered in not being the *sole* proprietor of information. In the last three decades, information technology has increased the power of informal human associations and activities that lay outside the borders of the state. These associations have not only increased in number but have also gained the ability to act on a global stage, challenging the privileged state-to-state discourse that was once the sole domain of foreign ministries. This change has had serious consequences for the conduct of foreign affairs by the US

State Department. The combination of electronics, satellites, and computers has increased the connectivity among peoples which; according to one senior official “all of which remain abstractions to those whose channels are traditional and whose thinking remains linear.”¹⁹⁰ Rare is the international issue that does not attract organizations that express their point of view in "cyber-space". How has the US State Department responded to a world in the process of globalization? Globalization and its effects are revealed not only in the reorganization of foreign affairs ministries, but also in the shift of its duties, responsibilities, and priorities for conducting diplomacy as perceived by those in charge.

The US State Department's first response is a general recognition and acceptance of the term *globalization and the actual complexity of the situation* among high officials. Globalization is generally understood as a multi-layered phenomenon and it consisting of cross-cutting issues not constrained by national borders. This view acknowledges that a rise in a *new* class of international relations problems has occurred within the last decade. Illustrations of these global problems include the expanding and revised community of nations and the increasing complexity of humanity; population growth and the handling of masses of refugees; disease, health, and sanitation; international financing through banks and other institutions; the seas and fisheries; outer space, satellites, and space stations; preserving and improving the global environment and maintaining access to, and conserving, global resources; terrorism, kidnapping, hostage

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Farrar, Jonathan, Senior Executive Assistant to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky at the US State Department, March 2003. Note: Messages had to be transcribed, translated, and retransmitted. Telegraphy was the method for communicating in the US State Department, and many career officials have had difficulty adapting.

taking, and bombings: weapons proliferation and control, including land mines, bacteriological and gaseous agents, and weapons of mass destruction.

The US State Department's second response to the challenges of globalization has been a strategic increase in the mixture of bi-lateral and multi-lateral diplomatic activity that includes the participation of new actors operating outside the purview of government. The officials of the Office of Global Affairs are fully aware that approximately 15,000 non-governmental organizations currently exist and represent a special interest in any one of the transnational global problems described above. From Rio to Kyoto, Cairo to Beijing, NGOs have demonstrated their impact in the information age. For example, the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in September 1995, brought together governmental delegations from 189 countries, along with representatives of 4,000 accredited non-governmental organizations, to draw up a legal document that sought to lay down edicts that would improve the lives of women. The Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Tim Wirth, recognized the problem in a speech:

Common to all of these dangerous trends -- rising population and drug use, the degradation of international law and environmental stability -- is that they are simultaneously pulling the world together and pushing it apart. The forces of integration and disintegration can be characterized as pressures up and pressures down. The pressure down comes from the grassroots, where local networks of environmentalists, democrats, and NGOs are proliferating the world over. For example, the stars of the Earth Summit in Rio were not governments but environmental NGOs. Women's groups from around the world dominated the organization and agenda of the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna, the Cairo Population Conference last fall and the Social Summit of two weeks ago. We need to nurture these forces as we seek to weld larger

structures that cross familiar borders and power centers.¹⁹¹

In response, the US State Department has encouraged the participation of NGOs, recognizing them as a new vital component to "post-modern" diplomacy. Although literature like "The Track not Taken", promoted by the Harvard International Relations Council in 2000 that claims career diplomats of the State Department have resisted multi-track diplomacy, appears to have changed within the last two years. According to a high ranking official of the State Department for 22 years, an occasional echo of "who elected NGOs" now represents a minor resistance among career diplomats.¹⁹² High ranking officials of the Global Affairs Department also concurred that "post modern" diplomacy consists of an official forum for government-to-government interaction between designated representatives of states and an additional forum which entails interaction with entities, such as NGOs that are all outside the formal government power structure.¹⁹³

The recently appointed Chief Information Officer, however, fully understands the extent of the challenge and is committed to providing the US State Department and its embassies and consulates with open-systems technology that have global network capabilities.¹⁹⁴ The US State Department's response to people who are mobilized into

¹⁹¹ U.S. State Department 95/03/20 SPEECH: by Tim Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs given at Berkeley University, California, March 20, 1995. *The UN and the Next 50 Years*.

¹⁹² Interview with Farrar, Jonathan, Senior Executive Assistant to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky at the US State Department., March 2003.

¹⁹³ Interview with Farrar, Jonathan, Senior Executive Assistant to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky, Global Affairs Department, US State Department, March 2003.

Interview with Kramer, David. Senior Advisor to Under Secretary Paula J. Dobriansky, Global Affairs Department at the US State Department, March 2003.

¹⁹⁴ Burbano, Fernando. *Oral Statement by Department of State Chief Information Officer; Chair, OPAP Interagency Technology Subcommittee; Chair, Critical Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee before The House Committee on International Relations*, June 22, 2000

transnational organizations that can network at a multilateral level is to deploy an “interoperable infrastructure accessible to all agencies to improve communication and collaboration.”¹⁹⁵ This approach emphasizes horizontal interagency connectivity and collaboration to provide the right information to the right people at the right time. The IT modernization project of the US State Department is designed as a knowledge-management system to share information across agency boundaries protected by data encryption and fire walls. The problem remains according to several high officials that were interviewed “ that even though there is a rise in diplomatic efforts to shift from the management of information flows to the public to the actual shaping of the public’s views on international issues, there is the problem of concurrent attempts of NGOs and TSMOs to resist.”¹⁹⁶ Although the US State Department has become a networked organization, it competes with other networked organizations that operate outside government.

The US State Department’s third response to globalization, then, has been to remodel itself into a technological diplomatic network that can compete. High principal officers, ambassadors, and their staffs understand, for example, that the Internet is requisite for combining decentralized fact-gathering and mobilizations with speedy diffusion and knowledge, consensus building, and effective action. But as one official

¹⁹⁵ Burbano, Fernando. *Oral Statement by Department of State Chief Information Officer; Chair, OPAP Interagency Technology Subcommittee; Chair, Critical Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee before The House Committee on International Relations*, June 22, 2000

¹⁹⁶ Interview, US State Department, October 2004.

put it, “the network is only as good as the people who participate in it.”¹⁹⁷ The internal structure of the US State Department must be centralized enough to coordinate its own network, but it has to be able to facilitate other groups of networks so as to have a positive outcome on international issues.

The United States’ recent encounter with that fact came with the terrorist attacks of September 11. While the attacks initially rallied support for the US, they heightened the awareness among government officials that a significant number of people, especially within Muslim populations, view the US with such disdain they that they could become a potential reservoir for terrorists. The consequence of the attack has been a renewed attention to public diplomacy. Excerpts from the summary of the *U.S Public Diplomacy: Background and 9/11 Commission Recommendations* make the point.

In the years prior to September 11th, both Congress and the various administrations downplayed the importance of funding public diplomacy activities, and in 1999 abolished the primary diplomacy agency---the U.S Information Agency. Public diplomacy was often viewed as less important than political and military functions. Even prior to the 2001 attacks, a number of decisions by the Bush administration, including not to sign onto the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Chemical Weapons Ban, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, damaged foreign opinion of the United States. After the decision to go to war with Iraq, much foreign opinion of the US fell sharply, not only in the Arab and Muslim world, but even among some of America’s closest allies.¹⁹⁸ Some foreign policy and public diplomacy experts believe that using public diplomacy to provide clear and honest explanations of why those decisions were made could have prevented some of the loss of support in the war on terrorism. Many U.S policymakers now

¹⁹⁷ Interview, US State Department, October 2004.

¹⁹⁸ My note: See “Poll Results, Gallup/USA Today, February 27, 2002; and the Ten Nations Impressions of America Poll,” *Zogby International*, April 11, 2002.

recognize the importance of how America and its policies are perceived abroad. The US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and both chairmen of the 9/11 Commission recently expressed the view that public diplomacy tools are at least as important in the war on terrorism as military tools and should be given equal status and increased funding.

As indicated by this report, the increase in the use of public diplomacy is the fourth response by the US State Department to the pressures of globalization. In 1980, the U.S. government spent \$518 million on public diplomacy, according to the Office of Budget and Management. Funding increased over the following years and peaked in 1994 to about \$1.5 billion. In constant dollars, however, funding in 2000, 2001, and 2002 dropped below 1980 levels. And in 2003, while the actual dollar amount was about double what it was in 1980, in constant dollars the funding level was about where it was 25 years ago. Although the 9/11 Commission has recommended increasing the funding for public diplomacy, it should be noted that the funding for the last 25 years has increased substantially since 1975

Although the U.S government first officially acknowledged its use of public diplomacy in the middle of the 20th century, public diplomacy has developed new characteristics. Public diplomacy is not just an overseas public relations campaign or a series of exchange programs. Public diplomacy is more than just a government's attempt to bring about understanding for its national goals and current policies, and it differs from classic diplomacy because the heads of governments are not the only direct targets. For example, there is an advisory council made up of NGOs that has regular dialogues with the State Department on economic policy. There is also an advisory council made up of NGOs that has regular dialogues with the State Department on

economic policy. In the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, officials spend about a third of their time meeting with non-governmental organizations. According to one official, “they are very much partners with us in the provision of international relief assistance to refugees, as well as in assisting in resettling refugees in the United States.”¹⁹⁹ The examples that were most often cited on how well the State Department was doing in building global partnerships with NGOs were the 1999 Cairo-Plus-Five²⁰⁰ Review, the Beijing Plus-Five, the moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the International Whaling Commission,²⁰¹ and the Land Mine Treaty,²⁰² which the US did not sign.

The US resolution on China proposed at the UN Human Rights Commission, was another case given to describe the role NGOs play in the way governments interact with one another. In this particular case, the role of NGOs was more in making their respective governments receptive to the kinds of policies that other countries will be proposing and in gaining their support for them. The US State Department, for example, had been talking with all of the member governments of the commission about the China resolution and at the same time, Tibetan organizations around the world were

¹⁹⁹ Interview with David Kramer, Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Global Affairs, March 2003.

²⁰⁰ The 1999 Cairo-Plus-Five Review document, which outlines progress and challenges in implementing the program of action that emerged from the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994. US State Department worked with scores of NGOs throughout 1999 while drafting the Review, and the NGOs were active participants in the negotiation of the document.

²⁰¹ The moratorium followed an international effort involving like-minded governments working with U.S., NGOs, and their regional counterparts all over the world to reduce the killing of whales.

²⁰² What was particularly noted about NGO activity in the effort to ban landmines was their ability to devise an e-mail system that extended throughout the world in an attempt to enlist signers of petitions, to develop a message, and to work on strategy. Although the US did not sign the treaty, these US State Department officials were of the view that the landmine ban initiative totally revolutionized the way much of the world thinks about landmines, including the need to deal with victims.

pressuring their government to support the resolution. In this respect, the view among officials in Global Affairs, is that human rights groups are involved in laying the groundwork for most of the resolutions in the UN Human Rights Commission by influencing their governments as to policy preferences and outcomes. The key tools these NGOs use are picketing, Web sites, newsletters and most have boards of directors whose members are influential in their communities. There are also those that are an association of associations, and bring together groups of NGOs with similar interests to form a coalition. NGOs are also strong partners with many of the UN specialized agencies, and particularly the humanitarian agencies. The UN Family Planning Association works with and through NGOs all over the world in its programs. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees works with and through over 400 NGOs to be able to provide relief and assistance to refugees. So there is a strong relationship operationally.²⁰³

That being noted, however, public diplomacy has generally developed unsystematically in the US State Department.²⁰⁴ There was a general consensus among these officials that the US State Department has a long way to go in other aspects of foreign policy. The duties and responsibilities of principal officers in foreign policy that has a dimension of national security do not include an open dialogue to people who do

²⁰³ Interview, US State Department, October 2004. According to the one high official, this is the case, at least, in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The assertion is that the Bureau has greatly benefited by having a regular dialogue even though everyone involved doesn't agree on everything. The Bureau has been able to maintain a very solid constituency, in part, for what it is trying to do because they have been informed by the NGOs' experiences and their ideas

²⁰⁴ Interview US State Department, October 2004. The official interviewed expressed concern over the fact that every regional, functional, or policy bureau in the State Department develops its own strategic plan for dealing with NGOs and that there is no codified method. For example, in the Global Affairs Department they often send out faxes to interested NGOs and set up a forum of meetings in the State Department on a regular basis. For those NGO representatives that cannot meet at the State Department, they conference by phone. .

not have security clearances. There is less willingness, as well as experience, in dealing with people who are not affiliated with government. And the result is that there are many issues that the State Department addresses which do not have the benefit of broad debate, broad exploration, and input from NGOs. Much of the work of foreign policy has a dimension of national security, and therefore there is less willingness to open the dialogue to people who don't have security clearances, people who are not affiliated with government. But this sort of diplomatic activity is being recognized, as noted in the 9/11 Commission Report on Public Diplomacy, as not very successful in the present international environment.

The essential dimension of public diplomacy today is undertaken by official bodies of one state to target the publics of another for the purpose of persuading these foreign publics to regard favorably the policies of the targeting state. This is not accomplished exclusively by state-to-state interaction, but rather by incorporating the participation and input of new networks. No longer is public diplomacy a state monologue, but rather it is a state dialogue with various new but formidable global actors. When there is no US dialogue with NGOs who have members that are the constituents who elected Congressional officers, they can oppose and put pressure to derail a foreign policy objective. Congressmen who are in power want to remain in office and that means, especially in the House of Representatives, pandering to their constituencies is viewed as important to any other military objective. Moreover, it is very clear that a fundamental shift in how the United States is managing its international relations has occurred. One could reason that when officials in the US government realized that national security substantially depended upon funding a type of diplomacy that

facilitates dialogue not only *among rulers of states* but also *among the ruled associated with mobilized networks* that the functioning of the US State Department had significantly changed. For almost 180 years, the US State Department was the interface of political, economic, and social activity between the United States and the rest of the world. This is not the situation today.

In the summer of 2002, the Bush Administration launched a new permanent, full staffed "Office of Global Communications." The office will not replace other government agencies that have international outreach missions, but it will attempt to coordinate the administration's foreign policy message in more strategic and thematic ways. The office's purpose, said a spokesman, is telling America's story overseas and managing America's image abroad. Whether or not this will make the US government more capable of functioning in a globally networked environment is yet to be seen but the example reflects the current dilemma. American leaders and their diplomats do not have a hammerlock on information relevant to state affairs or knowledge---the key assets of power.

2.3.2 1975 to 2004 Canada's Department of External Affairs

While some scholars claim that the foreign ministry has become seriously ineffective for conducting foreign affairs in the last three decades others assert that the foreign ministry, especially in middle power states, has demonstrated exceptional competence in the current international political system. Some scholars consider the Department of External Affairs an ideal model in Canadian government for the production and implementation of foreign policy. As expressed by the owner who rented the rooms

above his barber shop in Ottawa to External Affairs, this is not a new behavior: “Queer lot, my tenants upstairs,” said Mr. Polls, “they think they are running the world.”²⁰⁵

Any range of assessments, of course, will produce extreme views. Nevertheless, these divergent views exist. One view is that while the power of the US is not eroded the US State Department as a tool for foreign affairs is weak. Canada’s position is conversely discussed. In the case of Canada, it is argued that the power of the modern state as the organizational unit of the international system is seriously eroded but that the Department of External Affairs as the instrument for the conduct of foreign affairs is not weak. The broader objective of this dissertation is to make some sense of these views by compiling such evidence as exists. What changes have been made to the Department of External Affairs from 1975 to the present day? If the responses of the US State Department and the Department of External Affairs to pressures that affect their functions are similar, then the answer to the above question is particularly important in clarifying these divergent views.

The first observation about Canada’s machinery for the conduct of diplomacy is the number of principal officers in charge of the Department of Foreign Affairs has grown exponentially since 1975; while concurrently, the state has become more decentralized. Before 1975, the Department developed maddeningly slowly for some of its diplomats.²⁰⁶ Principal officers were quite accurate in noticing that the first Canadian

²⁰⁵ Taylor, Charles. “The Diplomats: Will Expansion Sacrifice Quality?” *The Globe and Mail*, Toronto, Monday July 18, 1966. <http://www.knobstick.ca/jpgs/globeandmail.jpg> (accessed April 2005).

²⁰⁶ Granatstein, J.L. **A Man of Influence: Norman A. Robertson and Canadian State Craft 1929 to 1968** (Ottawa: Deneau, 1981), pp.380-381. Granatstein presents documents that expressed Robertson’s frustration and others at External Affairs in the foundations of the foreign ministries organizational development.

mission in Washington, DC was not established until 1909, or that only seven overseas posts and 37 foreign service officers existed by the beginning of WWII.²⁰⁷ While the number of principal officers increased a broader concern grew on the part of the Canadian government about the state's surfacing decentralization. The pace of Quebec's international initiatives gave rise to concern in Ottawa about both the activities of the province's representative's abroad (especially the delegate general in Paris) and its relations with the diplomatic and consular corps in Canada. Quebec's campaign for provincial autonomy in international relations was viewed by the Cabinet as having serious repercussions for the Canadian government's international position. Prior to 1970, the Cabinet became increasingly frustrated with the government's limited instruments, which could not adequately carry out the government's will to direct and manage policy. In spite of efforts made during the Trudeau years, innovations designed to foster the growth of a rational system balancing centralization and decentralization were unsuccessful.²⁰⁸

By 1970, the entrenched traditions of national politics and processes frustrated the officers of the Department of External Affairs because foreign policymaking, in the absence of a counterweight of centralized authority and coordination was increasingly

²⁰⁷ See Appendix B: Data for Part II: *Canada's Diplomatic and Consular Permanent Missions Abroad*.

²⁰⁸ Pierre Trudeau was a determined opponent of Quebec's activities in international affairs. He was unwilling to give the French leeway for continued interference, and also wanted faster progress in making Canada's external activities more responsive to Quebec's needs and interests. When he became Prime Minister in 1968, he set out to centralize the Canadian government. First, the foreign branch of the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission became part of External Affairs. Second, all foreign service officers from Canada's International Development Agency (CIDA) and Industry, Trade and Commerce (ITC), were consolidated into one department. This department -- to be known as the Department of External Affairs and International Trade -- would be in charge of trade, aid and immigration as well as the traditional foreign policy functions.
<http://www.dfaic-maeci.gc.ca/departement/history/history-11-en.asp> (accessed March 2005).

difficult. The traditional base of the Department of External Affairs' authority--political reporting, treaty making, and coordination--was no longer sufficient. As one principal officer in the DEA observed, "the power of coordination and the chairmanship of committees were sources of power, but they were not longer very great....I was looking for the power to overcome fragmentation."²⁰⁹

As among the high officials of the US State Department, the thinking among principal officers at DEA was divergent. Although the department appeared embattled and threatened, traditionalists at the DEA were reluctant to convert to modern management, because they had a sense that they were unique. They found the idea abhorrent that a generation of brilliant memo writers should have to be trained in programming, planning, and budgeting, or that they should have to consult with an NGO. As one of the DEA officials said, the "new thinking" now engaged in by many in the department was "stillborn."²¹⁰ Many new principal officers, however, perceived that the world was changing, and this global change was significantly behind their concerns about the appropriateness of existing policies and government machinery.²¹¹ Those who saw fundamental changes in the DEA as a necessity were relatively young. But the views of these young officials gave way to the views of senior DEA officials who exercised authority at the time.

The second observation about the functioning of the Department of External

²⁰⁹ Keenes, Ernie. *Embedded Liberalism and Canada: State Reorganization in the International Political Economy*. Dissertation submitted to the faculty at Carleton University, March, 8, 1991. The author interviewed over 33 officers at DEA for this thesis. The above quote, consequently, is from one of them, albeit, a confidential source

²¹⁰ *Ibid.* Note: Keenes interview was with a former DEA official, 1991.

²¹¹ *Ibid.* Note: Keenes interview was with a junior DEA official, 1991.

Affairs is the realization by principal officers that its area of competence in foreign affairs has been encroached upon. The pressures of globalization on Canada's administrative capacity were increasing, and officials were becoming more aware of globalization's fragmenting effects on the government machinery, both within its foreign ministry and among the other departments. For example, a pronounced internal division began to grow between the bi-lateralists and the multi-lateralists in the Department of External Affairs. As one career officer said, "for much of the post-war period the two central bilateral economic relationships, those with the U.K. and the U.S., were 'housed' in the department's multilateral Economic division."²¹² GATT, for example, was initially perceived as Canada's bilateral treaty with the United States. As the world economy shifted, however, a growing salience of the multilateral approach to foreign policy management was inevitable. Resistance to GATT by principal officers favoring the bilateral approach grew as well, however, because it was argued that when issues got on to a multilateral agenda principal officers in DEA lost control. This resulted in the immediate loss of the DEA's interdepartmental credibility; and moreover, serves as an example of the internal struggle among DEA principal officers that reflected changes in the international economic environment.²¹³

²¹² Keenes, Ernie. *Embedded Liberalism and Canada: State Reorganization in the International Political Economy*. Dissertation submitted to the faculty at Carleton University, March, 8, 1991. The author interviewed over 33 officers at DEA for this thesis. The above quote, consequently, is from one of them, albeit, a confidential source.

²¹³ *Ibid.* Ernie Keenes reasons that the Department of Finance, the Department of External Affairs, and the Department of International Trade and Commerce were comfortable with the division of labor within the state for the management of international economic relations because up until the 1970s there was a clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs relations. What soured "the community spirit" which had existed among these departments was the diffusion of the above. Part of the reason for the continuation of problems that developed among the departments was that there was not enough pressure emanating from outside the country to centralize and give order to the inter-departmental consultation. See his analysis because it details the economic changes in the world that have affected state machinery. The economic aspect of globalization is the source of change for Keenes.

As in the United States, the division of labor that existed among the departments in Canada's government before 1970 was becoming inadequate in terms of establishing a coherent, integrated domestic and foreign policy strategy. The state's instruments and strategy were not rationally linked; in fact, the two became more dispersed, chaotic, and confused as time went by. Illustrative of the problem between the principals at DEA and officials in other Canadian governmental departments was the conflict involving what role the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Regional Economic Expansion could play on a steel trade mission to Japan. DEA officials pointed out that DREE and other offices in the Canadian government misunderstood their respective roles. As A.S. McGill of DEA wrote, "the problems we have been having with other departments are not confined to this particular mission but reflect an inability to date to get a message across to other departmental offices that our role in international economic activities goes beyond issuing passports and sending and receiving messages."²¹⁴

To deal with the decentralization of the state and fragmentation of foreign policymaking, the Department of External Affairs endeavored to reorganize itself into a centralized agency. The success of the Department of External Affairs in solving those problems was not inevitable. Coping with the pressures of globalization (like the US State Department), however, the initiative reestablishing the Department of External Affairs' central agency status came from the Prime Minister's Office. With the support of the Privy Council, the principal officers of External Affairs wanted to go beyond the

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* A.S. McGill, memo, November, 9, 1975. Public Archives of Canada, Record Group 25, 84-85/128, Box 1, File 1-1-11, pt. 2

coordination which had been partially achieved in the early 1970s to gain substantive input over a range of both traditional foreign policies and domestic policies with foreign policy implications. As Allan Gotlieb wrote at the time, “If domestic policies with foreign dimensions are improperly coordinated with external policies, or are inconsistent with Canada’s international goals and objectives, we in the Department of External Affairs are obliged to intervene”.²¹⁵ The point is that the principal officers perceived their duties and responsibilities as having the authority to strategize, create, and coordinate domestic policy involving foreign affairs. The Department of External Affairs was attempting to reinvent itself as a centralizing agency in order to counter the fragmentation of the Canadian state. In this respect, principal officers of the DEA have emphasized the importance of coordination and the need for central management of all aspects of foreign policy involving the Canadian government.

The third observation about the functioning of the Canadian Foreign Ministry is the expansion of the department’s representational network in the world and the ministry’s relations with other branches of Canada’s government. The Canada 21 Council, a group of Canadian scholars and public officials brought together to examine the importance of, “common security,” in Canadian foreign policy, discussed multilateralism in its report *Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century*. The council concluded that cooperation with other nations and peoples would be the only way for Canada to protect the quality of Canadian lives and environment, create and enhance opportunities for Canadians, and guarantee Canadian security. These conclusions are not novel concepts.

²¹⁵ Gotlieb, Allan, *Canadian Diplomacy in the 1980s: Leadership and Service*, (University of Toronto, Center for International Studies, 1979) p.8.

Canada, like other states in the world, is not concerned with any altruistic commitment to international order, but rather desires a means by which vitally important national objectives might be realized (although one would consider international order to be in the best interest of any state). The Council's recommendation that Canada invest its resources in international civil service is consistent with the data reflecting the increase in Canada's diplomatic and consular representation.²¹⁶ Since 1975, the average mission growth per year has tripled. For example, between 1960 and 1970 permanent missions growth averaged about 2.2 missions per year, and from 1970 to 1980 the average growth increased to 7.5 missions per year.

By 1967, External Affairs personnel had to coordinate their activities with those of an increasing number of representatives from other departments in the Canadian government. Just as in the American case, it was reiterated that senior supervision and coordination should come from the ambassador or high commissioner as the official representative of Canada. But the growing need for coordination became evident from problems that were beginning to develop. For example, the ambassador in Bonn, John Starnes, reported in late 1964 that he was impressed by the good working relationships among the seven departments represented there, and between the civilian and military staff, but he was aware that the activities of the mission were often "haphazard." Consequently, he insisted on a plan to strategically organize its growth. Lack of consultation both at home and abroad produced misunderstandings and duplication of efforts that made it difficult for ambassadors to carry out their primary responsibilities

²¹⁶ Appendix B: Data for Part II: *Canada's Diplomatic and Consular Permanent Missions Abroad*.

in Canadian foreign affairs.

The fourth observation about the functioning of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic organization is that, like the U.S. State Department, the DEA is no longer the sole proprietor of information. To a much greater extent than in previous periods, the principal officers of the Canadian foreign ministry have been subjected to pressure not only caused by an increased information flow but also by the fact that communication technologies have drawn private entities into the foreign policy decision-making process.

Before 1970 the development of External Affairs was gradual: its principal officers were not subject to incessant pressure by the media, and the flow of information was controlled by the Canadian government.²¹⁷ During the Lester Pearson government, for example, Undersecretary D'Iberville Fortier was head of the Press and Liaison Division, and his departmental duties included frequent meetings with the minister and weekly briefings of the parliamentary press gallery. Journalists' attention to external affairs was at best intermittent, as noted by Anthony Westell, Ottawa bureau chief of the *Toronto Star*, who observed, "In Canada foreign policy is of importance and news value only from time to time in special circumstances, such as when the Government is engaged in some major initiative or has a role in an international crisis. Most of the time there isn't much news worth suppressing or managing in the area of External Affairs."²¹⁸

Although controversial international issues, like the ones the Lester Pearson

²¹⁷ Hilliker, John. Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age 1946-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1990).

²¹⁸ Westell, Anthony. "Access to News in a Small Capital : Ottawa," in Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, eds., Secrecy and Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 260. See also Freifeld, Sidney. "The Press Officer and External Affairs," *International Journal* 31, No. 2 (Spring 1976), pp. 255-269.

government had to deal with attracted what seemed like their share of media criticism, the exposure pales in comparison to the literal minute-to-minute exposure that principal officers of the Department of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic organization deal with today. Because of Canada's moderate military capabilities, the state's high officials have realized that the state's security is heavily dependent upon the ability to conduct foreign affairs. Using the new information technologies, private actors have crowded the Canadian foreign affairs terrain and placed considerable pressure on the state's ability to maintain national security. The consequences of globalization deepen as citizens connect, mobilize, and then seek to assert control over important areas of public policy that directly affect their lives. This is a fundamental challenge facing not only the U.S. State Department but the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs.

The importance of the information and communication capabilities of any foreign ministry and its diplomatic network cannot be overstated. Whatever the main vehicle of communication is between posts and headquarters, reliable, consistent information is crucial to the operation of diplomacy. In 1966, for example, Canada had more than two hundred employees, including couriers, telegraphers, cryptographers, telephonists, mail clerks, and maintenance engineers. By that time, 47 posts had machine cipher, but only 22 were considered by the head of the Communications Division, Col. W.W. Lockhart, to be well equipped.²¹⁹ As Lockhart's report indicated, the whole Canadian telegraphic communication system was vulnerable to confusion, as the problems after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 revealed. He writes:

²¹⁹ Hilliker, John. Canada's Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age 1946-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's, 1990) pp. 353-355.

Tel Aviv, Cairo, Beirut and Tehran were in the thick of the crisis. The Geneva and Paris relay points were swamped. London, New York, and Washington were information addressees of a large percentage of the traffic generated. Staff was withdrawn from Vienna, Rawalpindi, Nicosia, Bonn, Ottawa and Saigon to render assistance to several posts. Provision of special courier service to the Middle East by Ottawa-based couriers operation out of Paris forced curtailment of the Caribbean courier service, affecting another half dozen posts far removed from the crisis area.²²⁰

Lockhart's report illustrates the frenzy that results when control over mass communications is lost. The communication problems Canada's foreign ministry and diplomatic network encountered in 1968 pales in comparison to the growing number of networks that currently exist in international relations. During the Arab-Israeli crisis in 1968, the vulnerability of communications loss was defined as the disruption of communication between the officials of Canada's foreign ministry and its officials abroad. In 2005, the area of potential vulnerability is not confined to information flow among a state's diplomatic officials but, also among diplomatic officials and civilian and commercial networks that span the globe.

The fifth observation about the Department of External Affairs is that like the United States, the ministry has experienced significant growth in bilateral and multilateral treaty making within the last 25 years.²²¹ In 1970 Canada had negotiated approximately 268 bilateral treaties and in the year 2000 over 650 were completed. What is interesting to note about these bilateral treaties is that within the three last decades 377 of them

²²⁰ Communications to Personnel Services Division, June 22, 1967, DEA file 6-1.

²²¹ Appendix B: Data for Part II: *Canada's Bilateral & Multilateral Treaties 1800-2000*.

dealt with commerce and 672 were negotiated with the US.

Canada concluded no multilateral international treaties prior to 1920 and completed approximately 100 by 1968. The substantial growth in multilateral activity occurred in the last three decades with over 211 multilateral agreements completed in 2000. Of these, 120 involved economic cooperation and 57 involved defense with the European Union and NATO partners. The data provided on Canada's principal officers, diplomatic and consular missions, and treaty making demonstrates, at the very least, of diplomatic activity within Canada's foreign ministry.²²²

DEA's first response to the pressures of globalization was a formidable, concerted reorganization effort in the 1980s. As discussed previously, there was deep concern about the decentralization of the state and fragmentation in foreign policy making in the absence of a centralized authority. In short, a clear sense of a need to reestablish the Canadian state as a unified rational actor began when Quebec campaigned for provincial autonomy in international relations. According to some analysts, the reorganization was a result of the views of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet that Quebec's participation in foreign affairs had serious repercussions for the Canadian government's international position. The reorganization at DEA, was part of a larger reorganization of the state designed to make the machinery of government more purposively rational because Canada was experiencing internal decentralization.

Simultaneously, however, the debate in Canada during the 1980's also included

²²² Some scholars have reviewed only parts of data on foreign ministries and their diplomatic networks. For example, Dr. Andrew Cooper writes, "Much of the debate about foreign missions has been concentrated on their rapid increase in the immediate Cold War period. This expansionary dynamic is certainly full of significance (Wolfe). The rise in number of missions can be used to demonstrate the resilience of foreign ministries, although their cost exacerbates the crisis of resources. "

discussion on the need to reorganize the state in order to adapt to changing international conditions. The discussions on reform were about the organization and purpose of the state in a changed international environment. According to some scholars changes in the international political economy were the factor motivating the reorganization. However, changes in the international political economy, albeit a major component, are but one aspect of the processes of globalization putting pressure on state administrative structures. The proliferation of non state actors and their increased competency in developing communication technology strategies to advertise their message, and reduce coalitional, and maintenance costs also concerned the officials from Defense, External Affairs, Finance, Trade and Commerce.²²³ The basis for the reorganization of Canada's foreign ministry in 1982, consequently, was a combination of concerns among Canadian statesmen. The fragmentation of the state, the growth of the international political economy, and the proliferation of non state actors. As one DEA official stated, "These reform proposals entailed not merely the superficial shifting of deck chairs on the ship of state."²²⁴

The response to reorganize the Canadian foreign ministry was part of a broad effort, among political leaders and scholars, to better understand the nature of the state and the connection between the state and its environment. The reorganization at DEA was intended to make Canada more competitive in a disorderly and unpredictable world. The

²²³ See Part I: *The Immediate Effects of the IT-Globlaization Nexus: New Actors Crowd the State-based International Block* p. 39.

²²⁴ Keenes, Ernie. Keenes, Ernie. *Embedded Liberalism and Canada: State Reorganization in the International Political Economy*. Dissertation submitted to the faculty at Carleton University, March, 8, 1991. The author interviewed over 33 officers at DEA for this thesis. The above quote, consequently, is from one of them, albeit, a confidential source.

problem was that the centralization of the Canadian foreign ministry may not have been the correct response. Many states similarly began to become concerned about the organization and processes of their foreign economic policy bureaucracies. Canada was not unique in this regard. Procedural reform was symptomatic of rising concerns about the stability and predictability of the international economic order in particular. In the 1970s it is reasonable to see that there were good reasons, or incentives, to revise the strategic and instrumental aspects of Canadian participation in the international political economy.

The marriage between trade and foreign policy came to an end in 2004 when Foreign Service Officers and Trade Commissioners parted ways. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, a union within a single department led by one minister, has been divided. The split reversed the 1982 directive from then-prime minister Pierre Trudeau to integrate Trade Commissioners from Industry, Trade and Commerce into External Affairs. Trade policy is at the heart of foreign policy," opines Allan Gotlieb, a former ambassador to the United States and under-secretary of state for external affairs. He was part of a core group that oversaw the fusion of the Foreign Service over two decades ago. "[The split] is not consistent with any movement or arguments... that the long integration should be reversed. I don't believe it's wise, nor do I believe it should happen. I am not [aware] of any benefit whatsoever that could come of this." In addition the Retired Heads of Mission Association (RHOMA), an organization comprised of 270 former Canadian Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Consul Generals, met earlier this year because of their concern that the Foreign Service is being gradually dismantled. One clear manifestation of this happening is the recent decision to

split the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)... our members have personally experienced the difficulties of integrating coherently these two crucial sectors of Canada's foreign policy. Thus, we believe that the decision to partition DFAIT is unfortunate and a step backwards."²²⁵

The Foreign Service has three different streams: consular affairs/political and economic officers, trade commissioners and immigration officers. (The latter officials are part of Citizenship and Immigration Canada). However, officials from up to 15 different government departments operate from Canadian missions and consulates around the world. Among other changes, there are plans to move trade officials from Ottawa's Pearson building on Sussex Drive to neighboring offices at the Old Ottawa City Hall. The Canadian Institute for International Affairs is holding a widely anticipated session on the future of the foreign service at the Lester Pearson Building. At this symposium, former heads of mission, retired government officials and international policy experts will discuss if Canada needs a foreign service.

Obviously, difficulties have emerged with the 1982 reorganization of External Affairs. As a response to the economic aspects of globalization, it appears that the efforts to centralize trade and foreign affairs activity within External Affairs was not sufficient. The difficulties that emerged with this particular response to the processes of globalization are instructive. First, the response was intended to reposition the Canadian state in world affairs. Second, the response was predicated upon the idea that the change in international relations was based primarily and foremost in international political

²²⁵ "Trade Split Causing Sparks: Allan Gotlieb predicts the DFAIT split won't be permanent" *Embassy*, February 16th, 2005. http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2005/february/16/trade_split/ (accessed April 2005).

economics. Third, the response was to centralize the management of these affairs within the Canadian government, specifically within External Affairs. The problem may be that the effects of globalization include far more than the connection of national economies to a global marketplace.

The second response to the pressures of globalization by the Department of External Affairs was the use of public diplomacy. Although the reorganization of DEA in 1982 may have been the wrong response to globalization, the shift of principal officers in DEA from their use of traditional diplomatic methods to public diplomacy may be the right response. Despite the problems of the 1982 reorganization of DEA, the role principal officers of External Affairs played in the signing of the treaty to ban landmines is an example of a new type of competency in international engagement. While a global network of non-governmental organizations was able to stimulate state action using the power of public opinion, it was the adaptation of traditional diplomacy that effectively made the signing of the treaty possible. Careful examination of how events unfolded is necessary to understand how a total ban on landmines came into existence. More importantly, such examination also reveals how the Canadian approach to foreign relations in this particular case has been a contemporary response to the processes of globalization.

What began as an appeal of five NGOs to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to pursue a total ban on landmines in 1991 quickly expanded, when over 659 NGOs in three dozen countries formed the International Coalition to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Despite concerted efforts by the ICBL and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to press for a total ban, governments opted for an

incremental approach by extending the existing treaty laws of Protocol II. This has been formulated in the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention) and was signed by 55 countries back in 1983. The incremental approach resulted in a Review Conference (of Protocol II) held in 1996. The debate over the utility of the existing treaty laws pertaining to the use of landmines went slowly and by the third session of the Review Conference in April-May 1996, it was apparent that an amendment to the Protocol would be insufficient and unlikely to happen.

The lack of progress in amending Protocol II, however, brought groups together in a shared frustration. Consequently, like-minded NGOs and representatives of 12 states met privately during the third session.²²⁶ At an informal dinner provided by the Quaker United Nations Office, the group reviewed its options for a total ban on landmines. Out of several proposals, they opted for a "fast track" plan of action whereby a new forum called the Strategy Conference would be developed specifically to pursue a total ban campaign.²²⁷ During this private dinner and subsequent meeting one week later, Canada utilized its institutional membership in numerous international organizations, including the UN, to quietly lobby states for support in hosting the newly proposed Strategy Conference. When it was publicly announced at the end of the third session of the CCW

²²⁶ See paper, Lawson, R. "Towards a New Multilateralism: Canada and the Landmine Ban." <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/jpia/5.html> (accessed May 2003).

²²⁷ See paper, Baxter and Bishop. "Uncharted Ground: Canada, Middle Power Leadership, and Public Diplomacy". <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/jpia/5.html> Interview done by Lawrence Baxter and Jo-Ann Bishop with Mr. David Atwood of the Quaker United Nations Office, December 5, 1997. Accessed May 2003

Review Conference that Canada would host an International Strategy Conference, the Ottawa Process, as it became known, was launched.

As the principal officers of External Affairs exercised their political and diplomatic expertise for support in the Ottawa Process, it became increasingly clear that the essential leadership traditionally available from the greater powers was non-existent.²²⁸ The United States, Russia, China, and the major European states of Britain, France, and Italy all had various vested interests in opting for the incremental approach to the landmine problem. But a noticeable lack of initiative existed among these developed nations: they were hesitant to participate, much less host, the conference. Responding to these circumstances, the Canadian foreign ministry formed a partnership with the ICBL (a coalition of more than 650 NGOs and the International Red Cross). Instead of restricting participation to states, Canadian leadership brought NGOs and the ICRC into the fold as active and essential participants. The coalition forged a coordinated and strategic effort to not only set a world agenda, but to also maintain the momentum.²²⁹ The newly formed NGO-state relationship was a heady mixture of traditional multilateral and bi-lateral diplomatic practices and a massive NGO campaign to influence public opinion.

When Canada's foreign ministry invited the new non-state actors into the deliberations and campaign for a total ban on landmines, its principal officers were engaging in a new approach to the traditional diplomatic practices of the past. Canadian

²²⁸ Confidential interview with DFAIT official, Ottawa: May 2002.

²²⁹ Collins, Robin. *The Ottawa Process: Key Lessons for NGOs* (Toronto: Oxford, 1998).

diplomats teamed up with leaders of the ICBL to garner support for a total ban on the use of landmines by targeting individual states. The ICBL's function was to influence the public opinion of target states. Through mass letter-writing campaigns and the Internet, local interest groups, the media, and other NGOs of the target states were systematically informed of the global landmine problem. Cogent problem definition and issue-framing are essential to successful agenda-setting and policy approval. The ICBL did galvanize public sympathy and support at the grass roots level, and thus put pressure on the respective governments of the targeted states. Simultaneously, the Canadian foreign ministry facilitated dialogue with the target states through the careful use of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic resources. Bilateral pressure was exerted in routine deliberations with the creative use of *demarches* sent to foreign diplomats and briefing notes sent to Canadian overseas missions. Canadian officials were able to ensure that the landmine issue was on the agenda of major international conferences between October 1996 and December 1997.²³⁰

The role of Canadian foreign ministry principal officers in the land mine case reflects a substantial network-building capacity through multilateral linkages. Basically, this translates into placing as many trained diplomats into as many international, national, and sub-national organizations as possible. The objective is to systematically create special channels of communication that can reach a large number of states regardless of

²³⁰ Beier & Crosby. *The Play of Political and Economic Forces Behind the Ottawa Process, **To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines.*** (Toronto: Oxford, 1998).

size or relative position in the international community.²³¹ Edward Parson argues that citizen concern for the environment has been persistently mixed, labile, and ambiguous, only infrequently reaching and holding the intensity required to provoke major policy change.²³² Even if Parson is right, the result of this partnership remains instructive. At the very least, this example demonstrates that the foreign ministry is a useful instrument for mobilizing groups and facilitating policy outcomes to problems that citizens across the globe perceive as important. The principal officials of DEA engaged in public diplomacy which resulted in the signing of a global treaty to ban landmines by 121 nations.

Although the treaty to ban landmines is a successful case in public diplomacy, it is not the only one. Other examples, include the Greenpeace Campaign against French Nuclear Testing and the Spain-Canada “Fish War”. These three cases focused on the techniques of information and communications to frame the issue and feed it into a groundswell of citizen activism around the world. Dr. Andrew Cooper refers to these snapshots of an emergent cyber-diplomacy.²³³ I would add that they are examples of consistent and competent responses by foreign ministries to the pressures of globalization. Trying to record and evaluate the influence of the state as it works with non-state actors, or through international organizations is difficult and this has led some

²³¹ Keating, T. **Canada and the World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy.** (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993).

²³² Parson, Edward. “Environmental Trends and Environmental Governance in Canada”, *Canadian Public Policy* (Cambridge: JFK School, Harvard University, 2000) .

²³³ Potter, Evan. **Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century.** “Snapshots of an Emergent Cyber-Diplomacy” by Andrew Cooper. (Canada: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2003).

to suggest that the foreign ministry and diplomacy are in long-term, irrevocable decline. The mobilization of both state and non-state actors through public diplomacy, however, demonstrates a competency by the Canadian foreign ministry.

The third response by Canada is the maintenance of a communications infrastructure that allows diplomats privileged access to information. This is an example of how the Canadian foreign ministry, as a unit of the state, is adapting to the new environment. Canada ranks number two compared to the United States which is number one in government IT use.²³⁴ This reflects the Canadian government's commitment to helping Canadian diplomats do their job. Specifically, the government has been working to integrate ICTs into their operating procedures and to develop the capacity to offer all federal government services on-line by 2005. Canada has invested heavily in information technology. According DFAIT documents for fiscal year 1999/2000, the foreign affairs department spent twice what it had five years previously on informatics. The shift in the organization is more than budgetary. DFAIT's Information and Management and Technology Bureau is the largest bureau in the department with an official complement of 425 full-time employees and another 100 consultants on-site.²³⁵ While its efforts are ongoing and incomplete, DFAIT's experience is illustrative of the

²³⁴ The Network Readiness Index 2003-2004: Overview and Analysis, Chapter 1 Government Usage Sub Index Table. 5 The Networked Readiness Index (NRI) is defined as a nation's or community's degree of preparation to participate in and benefit from information and communication technology (ICT) developments. While the Networked Readiness Framework for 2003-2004 is identical to that used in 2002-2003, it is important to note that the underlying variables have evolved. The increase in the number of countries included in the NRI rankings from 82 in 2002-2003 to 102 this year limits the number of variables that can be considered. The research methodology imposes a 65 percent observation rate for each variable over the 102 countries. Variables with fewer observations than this have been dropped. http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcr/GITR_2003_2004/Framework_Chapter.pdf (accessed January 2005).

²³⁵ Potter, Evan. Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (Canada: McGill Queen's University Press, 2003). See pp. 162-169 "Hardware, Software, and Training" written by the Chief Information Officer, Rick Kohler at DFAIT.

challenges prospects, and possible uses of ICTs for diplomats and diplomatic organizations. Over 99 per cent of DFAIT officer-level staff around the globe are connected by a leading edge technology platform called SIGNET (Secure Integrated Global Network), which can support virtually any application as needed. E-mail, desk-to-desk links to other government departments and to public networks around the world are protected by firewall-mediated links to the Internet.²³⁶ In 2000, DFAIT handled over 30 million e-mail messages on its network alone.²³⁷

But the most important long-term impact of ICTs relates to pace. Once again, where states could once rely, literally, on sending diplomatic pouches on a “slow boat to China,” responses must now be almost instantaneous. Delays can have devastating consequences and there is concern among Canadian diplomats that this time crunch leads to less consideration of policy options and responses than in the past. The demand for incisive analysis is as great than ever. Given the stakes, one would think that diplomats would have been among the earliest and most versatile users of these technologies so as to be ahead of the curve, adapt to the faster pace, and reinforce their dwindling information advantage. As in the case of the US State Department there has been resistance among career diplomats in adapting to these changes in the international system. But even career diplomats realize that timely dissemination, exchange, and knowledge is the stock and trade of diplomats. Since foreign ministries are knowledge organizations operating at a global level, issues related to knowledge management are considered essential to their success. Promoting horizontal integration within the

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

Canadian foreign ministry and its diplomatic organization is based on a technological infrastructure that enables diplomats to translate information into credible knowledge. This response, albeit filled with uncertainty, is the operational adaptation of the Canadian foreign ministry to the pressures of globalization.

2.3.3 1991 to 2005 Slovenia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Slovenia is an example of a new state that formed its foreign ministry during the last decade. In the midst of the information revolution, Slovenian leaders have set up their own diplomatic machinery by restructuring the Habsburg, Austro-Hungarian, and Yugoslav blueprint that Slovenia inherited. This explains how the state was able to develop its system under these circumstances for the conduct of foreign affairs and how the formation of this system is different from that of the US and Canadian systems. But this does not explain how the foreign ministry is functioning or how it compares to the other two cases selected for this analysis. The objective of this study is to find out if there is evidence that changes, if any, in foreign ministries are responses to the processes of globalization. Using the same criteria applied to the US and Canadian diplomatic systems should reveal if Slovenia is functioning similarly and if it has encountered any of the same problems that have been established in the other two cases. Once more the criteria used include reviews of the foreign and domestic duties and responsibilities of its principal officers; diplomatic and consular missions abroad; treaty making; participation in international conferences and organizations; and relations with other internal government agencies.

The first observation about Slovenia's foreign ministry is that at zero hour, state

leaders began laying the foundation of the diplomatic machinery by actively recruiting principal officers. Regardless of the size or form of government in a state, any foreign ministry faces the same problem of staffing and organization. The formation of Slovenia's own system for conducting diplomacy was a process that was able to be examined even before the new state emerged. Slovenia had at its disposal one of the most important elements for the foundation of any diplomatic organization-- trained and experienced diplomats.

The first pool of personnel that Slovenian leaders had invited to join the new ministry were diplomats who had two levels of training and experience in foreign affairs. The first pool of diplomats had considerable knowledge of diplomatic tasks, practical experience, and personal acquaintances with diplomats of other states. They were diplomats who had levels of higher education behind them and belonged to the older generation. These senior diplomats represented the basic nucleus and became the principal officers of the Slovenian Foreign Ministry. The second diplomatic level were people, who as a rule entered diplomacy without any prior diplomatic knowledge, but gained it later either on the job or by receiving additional training. Almost 60 of these diplomats had worked for the former Yugoslavia and were recruited by Slovenia.²³⁸

The second pool of personnel that Slovenia invited were people who were qualified and experienced in basic administrative, organizational and technical knowledge. These people became the basic organizational and technical nucleus of the Slovenian foreign

²³⁸ See Jazbec, Milan. **The Diplomacies of New Small States** (US: Ashgate, 2001) Table 4, p. 98. His research provides an account of three groups of personnel that were recruited among the new small states. His data gives a comparison of the personnel composition of the new diplomacies of Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Slovenia is the only one with a ranking of "very strong" with respect to the professional diplomats available at the zero hour.

ministry. The advantage of such personnel is mainly in its familiarity with premises, equipment and basic technical aspects of the whole organization.

Dimitrij Rupel also inherited 50 people, who had dealt mainly with economics in the former secretariat.²³⁹ Engaging successful economists for Slovenia's foreign ministry provided a base for Slovenia to participate effectively in global economic politics: that is, their recruitment was utilized to supply economic skills to career diplomats and, conversely, to supply diplomatic skills to economists. In addition, agreements were made with various institutions (faculties, institutes, the chamber of commerce) in order to ensure a suitable influx into Slovenia's diplomatic service.

In comparison to the US State Department, which had 9 principal officers in 1800 and approximately 60 by 1990, and Canada's Department of External Affairs which had 2 in 1860 and approximately 50 by 1990, the size of personnel available to serve as principal officers was sufficient enough to build Slovenia's foreign ministry expediently. High level diplomats from the former Yugoslavian foreign ministry are the senior principal officers of Slovenia's new foreign ministry. The base of "human capital" that was available to Slovenia from the former Yugoslavia was sufficient to refashion a diplomatic network that had once operated in an undemocratic system.

The second observation about the Slovenian Foreign ministry is that a broad and efficient network was established. The Slovenian ministry's primary objective in 1991 was to establish a network in order to gain international recognition. Without recognition of an independent Slovenia by the international community, the country's

²³⁹ "Slovenia Foreign Ministry, "Economic and Trade Counselors at Diplomatic and Consular Missions" March 1, 2003. List of the Trade Counselors. <http://www.sigov.si/mzz/eng/index.html> (accessed April 2005).

independence would probably not mean much. In 1992, Slovenia opened its first diplomatic missions and consular posts in the “most important” countries, and these countries’ representatives started arriving in Ljubljana in response.²⁴⁰ At present, Slovenia has forty-four diplomatic missions and consular posts abroad; twenty-six countries have their diplomatic missions or consular posts in Ljubljana; and fifty-seven countries cover Slovenia through their missions in Vienna, Budapest or other European capitals. Under contemporary circumstances, Slovenia has managed to form and expand a network that has grown exponentially within the last decade.²⁴¹

Each mission deals with political, consular, informational, economic, and military affairs. This catalog of duties applies mainly to embassies, whereas missions to international organizations stress the execution of individual functions within the multilateral framework and depend on the nature of the international organization to which the mission is accredited. In the organizational sense, like all others each Slovenian mission has a head who represents the sending state in the receiving state as well as manages the mission’s work. The size of the mission, measured by the number of diplomats and other staff, varies to a great extent. No matter what the size, however, the composition of Slovenia’s embassies is generally the same. The person in charge, that is, the head of the mission, is an ambassador. The second diplomat in rank is a

²⁴⁰ *Foreign Affairs Act ZZ-1 No. 007-01/91-3/10*, Ljubljana, 2001. Article 39: (diplomatic and consular ranks) “Diplomatic ranks shall be: ambassador, minister plenipotentiary, minister counselor, first counselor, counselor, first secretary, second secretary, third secretary, attaché. Consular ranks shall be consul-general, consul first class, consul, vice-consul, consular agent. Consular ranks shall be used in consulates and shall compare with diplomatic ranks as follows: consul general – minister plenipotentiary, minister counselor; consul first class – first counselor, counselor; consul – first secretary and second secretary; vice-consul – third secretary; consular agent – attaché.”

²⁴¹ See Appendix C: Data for Part II *Slovenia’s Permanent Diplomatic/Consular Missions Abroad*.

minister, who as a charge d'affaires deputizes for the ambassador in his absence and therefore figures as a deputy for the head of the mission. The military attachés (Defense, Military, Naval and Air attaché) then follow the minister in this hierarchical order. The most important tasks of the mission are performed separately: the political, economic and military functions are handled by one diplomat each, with a special diplomat for OSCE and another for consular functions, whilst the first secretary performs political tasks and follows the work of the UN.²⁴²

The third observation about the current functioning of the Slovenian system is its notable ability to successfully negotiate both bilateral and multilateral treaties. Slovenia's competence in negotiating treaties is reflected in the sheer numbers of both bilateral and multilateral agreements that were completed in a single year. In 1992, approximately 90 bilateral agreements and 282 multilateral agreements were negotiated and prepared by the new foreign ministry. The importance of multi-lateralism in diplomatic activities is growing in the US, Canada, and Slovenia. In the case of Slovenia, multi-lateralism is useful because of its limited resources. Multilateral gatherings offer opportunities for numerous bilateral discussions, an observation that is important for those diplomats who do not have frequent contact with one another. Multilateral gatherings also make a decisive contribution towards the maintenance of a permanent, ongoing dialogue for solving problems. Substantial growth in the number of multilateral and bilateral treaties reflects the competency of Slovenian diplomats; and more importantly, has established the foreign affairs ministry as the appropriate body to

²⁴² See Jazbec, Milan. The Diplomacies of New Small States (US: Ashgate, 2001) Table 8 p. 176.

engage in matters relating to global relations between the new state and other states and international organizations.²⁴³

The Foreign Affairs Act of 2001 has codified the primary position of the Foreign Ministry in the treaty making process. While the Foreign Ministry does allow other state authorities within the Slovenian government to initiate treaties, the initiative must be accompanied by the written approval of the Foreign Ministry.²⁴⁴ Other ministries and government services are allowed to, “engage in foreign affairs within the framework of their competencies.”²⁴⁵ But in matters concerning the implementation of foreign policy, they can only act and perform tasks with the prior consent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, all state administration bodies have to arrange international visits through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will then coordinate the contents and protocol of the program as well as the implementation of any foreign policy agreements.

The fourth observation about the functioning of the Slovenian foreign ministry is Slovenia’s participation in international organizations. In the early nineties, Slovenia began to make intensive planned appearances in the international community, which

²⁴³ *Foreign Affairs Act ZZ-1 No. 007-01/91-3/10*, Ljubljana, 2001. Article 70: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall: engage in matters relating to global relations between the Republic of Slovenia and other states and international organisations; prepare professional bases for the Government, the National Assembly and the President of the Republic as well as other state authorities to adopt positions, assessments and measures relating to matters of importance for the implementation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Slovenia; maintain concern for to the interests of the Slovene minority in neighbouring countries and of Slovenes abroad, in association with other competent bodies and services; and perform other tasks provided for by the present Act and other regulations.”

²⁴⁴ *Foreign Affairs Act ZZ-1 No. 007-01/91-3/10*, Ljubljana, 2001. Article 70: “The procedure for the conclusion of an international treaty shall be initiated by the competent administrative body, but may also be initiated by some other state authority. If the procedure is not commenced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the initiative must be accompanied by the written approval of the Ministry. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall approve or reject the initiative within 30 days of the receipt thereof. “

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

helped facilitate its international recognition on January 15, 1992. In the following two years, it became a member of the two major international organizations in Europe. Besides determining relations with its neighbors, Slovenia directed the aims of its foreign policy to the so called Euro-Atlantic sphere and became a serious candidate for EU and NATO membership. In less than six years after achieving international recognition it was already among the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. On May 22, 1992 Slovenia became the one hundred and sixth member of the United Nations. This membership opened the door wide to all of the most important international organizations.²⁴⁶

Slovenia's participation in international organizations grew rapidly. In 1992, it concluded approximately 282 multilateral agreements, in which over 70% concerned membership of international organizations.²⁴⁷ Paradoxically, Slovenia has arduously sought international confirmation of its existence and identity as a new state, while at the same time has expected to be accepted into the numerous channels of European integration. The consequences of membership in the executive bodies of international organizations, as well as the effects of such membership on the organizational structure and functioning of a diplomacy still being set-up, have yet to be fully understood.²⁴⁸ But at the very least, Slovenia's ambition to play an active role in this community, especially

²⁴⁶ See CIA World Fact Book (2005) UNCTAD, ECE, UNDP, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO, UNIDO, IAEA, FAO, Australia Group, BIS, CE, CEI, EAPC, EBRD, EIB, EU (new member), FAO, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFC, IFRC, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, MIGA, NAM (guest), NSG, OAS (observer), OPCW, OSCE, PCA, PFP, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIK, UNTSO, UPU, WCO, WEU (member affiliate), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO.
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/appendix/appendix-b.html> (accessed February 2005).

²⁴⁷ See Appendix C: Data for Part II *Slovenia's Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements*.

²⁴⁸ See Jazbec, Milan. **The Diplomacies of New Small States** (US: Ashgate, 2001) p. 72-73.

as far as its clearly expressed goals of joining various international organizations are concerned, demonstrate that the country both desired to and has established its diplomatic network. Slovenia's diplomatic organization was set up to execute and meet its foreign policy objectives -- one of the main aspirations of any state system. To achieve these goals, however, the state must first become aware of the international environment in which they exist come to understand diplomacy in terms of its purpose, means of establishment, and guiding principles. Slovenian diplomats' awareness of the pressures exerted by a changed international environment has become more apparent within the last three years. While the growth and progress of Slovenia's foreign ministry and diplomatic network was quite rapid and remarkable, it has recently experienced many of the same problems that have at present confronted the US State Department and the Department of External Affairs in Canada. As problems have emerged, however, the officers of the Slovenian Foreign Ministry have responded to them.

The first response was a call for a complete new development paradigm for Slovenia.

²⁴⁹ Slovenian leaders in general sensed that the role of the state had to change. Although Slovenia's Foreign Ministry and diplomatic organization had only been in existence for approximately ten years, by 2001 a broad consensus emerged that information technology was becoming increasingly dispersed in contemporary society, mobilizing social groups and, more importantly, providing them with alternative means to take action. Stricter limits on governments due to the greater autonomy of Transnational

²⁴⁹ *Slovenia in the New Decade: Sustainability, Competitiveness, Membership in the EU*, (Institute of Macro Economic Analysis and Development, Slovenia, 2005) Strategy was formally adopted by the Slovenia government in May 2001. See "A Different Role of the State" on p 11. <http://www.gov.si-SGRS> (accessed April 2005).

Social Movement Organizations (TSMOS) became widely apparent by 2001. This was the exact same problem that US State Department and Canada's Department of External Affairs officials had encountered. The governing role of the state was facing pressure from the existence of a greater autonomy and importance of self-organized social groups. As in the US and Canada, foreign affairs leaders in Slovenia recognized that any kind of policy development, whether economic, social, or political, could only succeed if there was cooperation with these new participants in international relations. The principal officers of the new Slovenian Foreign Ministry were faced with the same situation as that of the US and Canada, states that had existed for 180 and 108 years, respectively. Information technology, put simply, was narrowing the maneuvering space.

Slovenia's second response was to recognize that an information and telecommunications system was vital to the functioning of the entire diplomatic network. The *Foreign Affairs Act*, for example, legally codified that objective in 2001. Article 12, entitled, *Information and Telecommunication Systems* states:

In line with the Government's development goals and international obligations assumed, the Ministry shall ensure support for the execution of administrative and professional political tasks by establishing a uniform and autonomous information and telecommunications system that will enable connection and compatibility with counterpart systems of the international associations and organizations with which the Republic of Slovenia is associated and, at the same time, provide services to those state authorities which do not have their own system of telecommunications links with foreign countries. The structure, parts, hardware and software solutions, and, in particular, security components of the foreign affairs information system shall be treated as acquisitions of a confidential nature, and their type and purpose shall be defined by Government

regulations on special-purpose equipment.²⁵⁰

The third response deals with problems that emerged in the organizational structure of the Slovenian foreign ministry. The organizational design of the Slovenian Foreign Ministry was initially based on the traditional rigid pyramid of power used by most states. This hierarchy is based on a series of vertical divisions creating levels that enabled groups to carry out specified tasks in a coordinated and supervised manner. The ministry was also horizontally organized utilizing the geographic approach. In 1998, the ministry was divided into ten major fundamental units. Three of those were major bilateral geographic sectors: one for neighboring countries, a second for European and North American countries, and a third for other countries. At this time, Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel announced that the Foreign Ministry, including its network of embassies and consulates, would be reorganized in light of the country's upcoming EU membership. Presenting the restructuring in detail, State Secretary Samuel Žbogar explained that the ministry would combine activities related to the EU and those on bilateral levels, as well as include regional departments into the EU department. The reorganization is aimed at realizing the ministry's recently adopted goals, notably activities related to humanitarian assistance, human security, and development aid. The ministry as of September 2006 will be composed of three directorates. The directorate for the EU and bilateral issues will combine the European affairs department with the departments for regional and bilateral affairs. The directorate for multilateral issues will consist of the departments for human security, development aid, economic relations,

²⁵⁰ *Foreign Affairs Act ZZ-1 No. 007-01/91-3/10: Article 12*, Ljubljana, 2001.

NATO, policy-drafting, and the OSCE. Finally, the third directorate will be tasked with international law and the protection of Slovenian interests

The fourth response by Slovenia was a plan initiated in 2001 to place economic counselors at its diplomatic posts abroad. The use of trade counselors at Slovenia's diplomatic missions is instructive for two reasons. First, the use of such counselors offers diplomats the opportunity to be trained by economists, and vice versa. Second, this type of response is quite different from those of the US and Canadian systems, which do not formally combine trade and foreign affairs together (although a mechanism does exist by which trade and foreign affairs representatives may confer with one another about trade issues that have foreign policy implications). Among other special attachés is an economic diplomat called an economic counselor.²⁵¹

PART III: FINAL ASSESSMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION

3.1 Change in the Development and Functioning of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian Foreign Ministries

The US State Department, Canada's Department of External Affairs, and Slovenia's Foreign Ministry differed significantly in their development. The US State Department

²⁵¹ "Slovenia Foreign Ministry, "Economic and Trade Counselors at Diplomatic and Consular Missions" March 1, 2003. List of the Trade Counselors. <http://www.sigov.si/mzz/eng/index.html> (accessed April 2005).

emerged under difficult circumstances, waging the Revolutionary War while regulating relations among thirteen sovereign American states under a weak confederal system of government that lacked a genuine executive for promoting collective interests and welfare in dealing with foreign affairs. The US became an independent state out of conflict that led to war, inheriting its blueprint for creating and organizing a foreign ministry from Great Britain. Canada also inherited its blueprint for creating diplomatic machinery from Great Britain, but the Canadian system for foreign affairs was organized within and operated out of United Kingdom's system until it peacefully separated and became independent in 1909. Unlike the US, but similar to Canada, Slovenia peacefully emerged as an independent state in 1991. In contrast to the US and Canada, however, Slovenia's foreign ministry evolved out the former Yugoslavia, having experience in diplomacy that dates back to the Hapsburg Dynasty. The historic differences among these countries help to explain why the qualitative analysis in this study reveals that the duties and responsibilities of each state's principal officers, the activities and development of their individual diplomatic-consular missions abroad, their bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaty making, and their participation in international conferences and organizations is considerably different from one another up until the last decade.

The qualitative and quantitative findings of this study reveal that the foreign ministries of these states developed differently from one another. These findings also reflect that in each case, no significant change has occurred in either the functioning or growth of each of these foreign ministries up until the last decade. For example, the US State Department's development over 180 years shows little change or radical difference

in growth or function as compared to the last 30 years of its own development. Canada's development over 109 years also shows little change in its growth or functions under the circumstances in which it evolved. The point is that each state's foreign ministry began with a different foundation for development, and within each state's own progressive scheme the ministry's function and rate of growth has significantly changed. Despite the developmental differences among these three foreign ministries, however, they are at present growing and functioning quite similarly. One consistent factor pervades the historical developments of all three states' foreign ministries. Prior to the last 30 years, information remained exclusively in control of each states' leaders; at present, this is not case. This idea is captured not only in the qualitative but also in the quantitative analyses of the three foreign ministries. In all three foreign ministries, exponential growth can be observed in the primary characteristics associated with any diplomatic organization: principal officers, permanent diplomatic-consular missions, bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaty making, and participation in international conferences and organization.

The most immediate observable effect of the IT-Globalization nexus is an increase in the number of new participants in international relations. A connection between this growth and the rise in new participants may very well exist, but this study has not firmly established that correlation. What this study does adequately establish is the following: even though there has been an increase in the diplomatic activity of all three foreign ministries, there has, paradoxically, been a decline in the exclusive autonomy of foreign affairs leaders because information technology has allowed for the mobilization, interactivity, and of new actors in international relations. The increase of new

participants in international relations is obvious; how they are affecting the foreign ministries' ability to conduct foreign affairs is not as clear. The evidence of this study supports that significant change has occurred in the functioning of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian foreign ministries within the last decade as compared to the past. But what concrete assessment can be made with regards to significant commonalities among these foreign ministries' functions that have developed over the last decade in three different nations?

3.2 Changes in Foreign Ministries and Globalization: Similar Responses by the US, Canada, and Slovenia to the Contemporary Environment

Based on interviews conducted for this study and archival documents researched, for example, one can identify similar problems being dealt with by the foreign affairs leaders of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian foreign ministries. These problems relate to the immediate observable effects of the IT-Globalization nexus that was discussed in Part I, and they include: organizing the internal structure of the foreign ministry so it might act as an effective central network be able to coordinate *other* networks that span the globe; dealing with the increased skill of NGOs to alter foreign affairs; the building of public-private partnerships to solve global issues; updating the information technology infrastructure; easing the extreme pressure put on diplomats to exercise accurate judgment because of "real time" information flows; the problem of because info and judgment must be experts in public diplomacy; FSO all be trained in public diplomacy respond; problems of information technology infrastructure; and problems about diplomatic-consular representation abroad and who is in charge;

The responses by the US, Canadian, and Slovenian foreign affairs leaders to these

problems have also been consistently similar. As has been shown, all three foreign ministries have attempted to reorganize their internal structure with more horizontal integration, realigned their organization thematically rather than being organized by a geographical criteria, adopted the use of public diplomacy which has transformed a, “state monologue” into a “state dialogue,” strategically increased the participation of non state actors in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, reported that the method of work for diplomats requires additional technical training and expertise, and updated and implemented sophisticated IT networks that make “embassies” once considered homes into technological centers of foreign policy making. Principal officials all view themselves not just as implementers of foreign policy, but also as facilitators of diplomatic activity. The observations about the current functioning and the responses of these three foreign ministries are significantly similar; therefore *some correlation must exist between changes in the foreign ministry and the processes of globalization.*

Winston Churchill’s allegory shall have the last word on how changes in foreign ministries are responses to globalization. Once upon a time, began the fable told by the British diplomat, “all the animals in the zoo decided that they would disarm.” To accomplish that laudable goal, the animals convened a diplomatic conference, where, Churchill’s tale went:

The Rhinoceros said when he opened the proceeding that they use of teeth was barbarous and horrible and ought to be strictly prohibit by general consent. Horns, which were mainly defensive weapons, would, of course, have to be allowed. The Buffalo, the Stag, the Porcupine, and eve the little Hedgehop all said that they would vote with the Rhino, but the Lion and the Tiger took a different view. They defended teeth and even claws, which they described as honorable weapons of immemorial antiquity. The Panther, the Leopard, the

them to go quietly back to their states, so that they could feel friendly with one another again“. The lesson here is that diplomatic success cannot be afforded merely by luck. Close attention must be paid to changes in the international system in order to increase the chances that diplomacy will be successful. Identifying change and the magnitude of that change is necessary in order to enhance human security and impede events that may lead to the potential disaster of war. And the question we are left with is: Can foreign ministries and their diplomatic organizations cultivate global security in a world that has significantly changed within the last decade?

Puma, and the whole tribe of small cats all supported the Lion and the Tiger. Then the Bear spoke. He proposed that both teeth and horns should be banned and never used again for fighting by animals. It would be quite enough if animals were allowed to give each other a good hug when they quarreled. Not one could object to that. It was so fraternal, and that would be a great step toward peace. However, all the other animals were very offended by the Bear, and the Turkey fell into a perfect panic. The discussion got so hot and angry, and all those animals began thinking so much about horns and teeth and hugging when they argued about the peaceful intentions that had brought them together, that they began to look at one another in a very nasty way. Luckily the keepers were able to calm them down and persuade them to go back quietly to their cages, and they began to feel quite friendly with one another again.²⁵²

In Churchill's fable, the Zoo was the diplomatic system in the world, the cages represented states, and the animals were state leaders that convened a diplomatic conference where self-interest was the motivation to meet. State leaders formed coalitions with other state leaders at the conference in order to secure individual goals because of the differences in power among them. For example, the turkey was the representative of a state that had little power, the bear represented a middle power state, and the rhino and lion represented the most powerful states. The zoo allowed for fighting but was constrained by the zookeepers. The keepers of the zoo were foreign ministries of the states that wielded the most power in the diplomatic system at that time: they controlled the locking and unlocking of the cages.

Churchill's fable does not accurately describe the present diplomatic system of the world. A powerful wind has swept through the zoo, and all cages in which the animals were confined are now open. The powerful states do not have exclusive control of the diplomatic system in the world and their foreign ministries are struggling to maintain control of their opened cages.

²⁵² Rourke, John. **World Politics: International Politics on the World Stage.** (US: McGraw-Hill, 2000) p. 197. Churchill told this story in a speech on October 24, 1948 and it can be found, among other places, in Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches: 1897-1963*, vol. 5 (1974), p. 5421.

All of the animals from all of the opened cages are free to talk, form groups, and interact in the zoo. The animal leaders of the individual cages do not know how to handle the animals they once represented and were in charge of. Groups of lions, cats, and panthers join together to form an organization called Felines for No Claws. Rhinos form an organization called Rhinos for no Horns. Turkeys, swans, and sparrows from all over the zoo talk and form an organization called Birds without Borders. The animal leader of the lions' cage, the leader of the rhinos' cage, and the leader of the turkeys' cage are confused by these new alliances among their followers.


The animal leaders are particularly confused when these new groups insist on holding special meetings in the zoo -- like a Conference on No Horns and Claws-- or demand to be present at the animal leaders' conferences. While the zoo has not been destroyed, it is also not yet fully reorganized. The animal leaders still meet and talk to hammer out solutions to problems in the zoo, but the newly formed groups in the zoo have a presence. The interaction between these new groups and the leaders are changing the very character of the zoo. The leaders of the Bear cage claim they have the solution as to how to organize the zoo. The leaders of the rhino cage, to their disdain, have to let these new groups like the Rhinos for No Horns participate in their meetings. The leaders of the turkey cage are making sure they are represented in Birds Without Borders, Rhinos for No Horns, and Felines for No Claws.

At this stage, the conclusion that can be drawn from the material and discussion in this dissertation is that the present global political system is radically different from the world that Churchill described in 1948. At the end of his fable, the "keepers" of diplomatic system in 1948 were "luckily able to calm down the leaders and persuade

them to go quietly back to their states, so that they could feel friendly with one another again“. The lesson here is that diplomatic success cannot be afforded merely by luck. Close attention must be paid to changes in the international system in order to increase the chances that diplomacy will be successful. Identifying change and the magnitude of that change is necessary in order to enhance human security and impede events that may lead to the potential disaster of war. And the question we are left with is: Can foreign ministries and their diplomatic organizations cultivate global security in a world that has significantly changed within the last decade?

APPENDIX A:

DATA FOR PART II: PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, U.S STATE DEPARTMENT



Explanations:


From 1789 till 1829, Department of State Principal Officers included Secretaries of State, Secretaries of State ad interim, and Chief Clerks. From 1830 till 1861, the titles of officers remained the same except for the addition of commissioned officers called Assistant Secretaries of State. From 1861 till 1945 the official titles of principal officers in the US State Department were: Secretaries of State, Secretaries of State ad interim, Assistant Secretaries of State, Second Assistant Secretaries of State, and Third Assistant Secretaries of State. Current Department of State Principal officers: Secretaries of State, Deputy Secretary of State, Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries-Geographic, Assistant Secretaries—Functional, Director/Coordinators, Chiefs—management, financial, information, Counselors.

Major Sources of U.S. State Department Principal Officers (Chronological) Produced by the Office of the Historian, US State Department and printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office. The title, individual authors where identified and their dates of publication are provided.

Principal Officers of the Department of State and US Chiefs of Mission: 1778-1988. Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Chapman: Office of the Historian, US Government Printing Office, 1988.

The Biographic Register of the Department of State—in 1950s, later changed to the *Biographic Register* (contains biographies of principal officers of the Department of State and other foreign relations agencies, members of the diplomatic service, Foreign Service, and Foreign Service Reserve, and Foreign Service Staff Officers (published occasionally since 1833; after 1974 issued only as classified editions with limited distribution). Office of the Historian, US Government Printing Office.

**DATA FOR PART II: DIPLOMATIC and CONSULAR
REPRESENTATION ABROAD US STATE DEPARTMENT (actual personnel)**



EXPLANATIONS:

From 1789 till 1801 the titles of diplomats were: Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Resident, Charge'd'Affaires carrying out missions in six countries. From 1801 till 1829 the titles of diplomats were: Envoy Extraordinary/Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Plenipotentiary, Charge'd'Affaires, Consuls with missions in 15 nations. American Diplomats in the period between 1829 through 1861 were Envoy Extraordinary, Ministers Resident, and Charge' d' Affaires, Consuls with missions in 35 nations. From 1861-1945 the titles were: Ambassador, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary, Minister Resident, Minster Resident, Consul General, Charge'd'Affaires, Commissioner, Consul General.

Major U.S Diplomatic Representation Sources

List of Documents Relating to Special Agents of the Department of State, 1789-1906. Natalia Summers (1951)

Register of the Department of State (on American diplomatic representatives, 1789-1873 published in 1973).

Foreign Services List, List of members of field staffs of American posts abroad, commencing in the 1820s under the title List of Ministers, Consuls, and Other Diplomatic Agents of the United States in Foreign Countries (1828-1975).

United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973 , Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Champman, (1973).

United States Diplomats and Their Missions: A Profile of American Diplomatic Emissaries since 1778, Elmer Plischke (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975).

**DATA FOR PART II:
US PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC and CONSULAR
MISSIONS ABROAD**


Time	# Countries
1774	24
1860	35
1945	71
1975	120
2005	202

Velocity Function: $y = (2.67 \cdot (10^{-8}))e^{(0.0089x)}$


Acceleration Function: $y = (2.37 \cdot (10^{-10}))e^{(0.0089x)}$

Period	Avg.#increase per yr	
1	0.1162791	(1774-1860)
2	0.4235294	(1860-1945)
3	1.6333333	(1945-1975)
4	2.7333333	(1975-2005)

Period	Avg%inc./yr
1	0.5
2	1.1
3	2.3
4	2.3



DATA FOR PART II: US Bi-lateral and Multilateral Treaties



Explanation:

Treaties can be referred to by a number of different names: international conventions, international agreements, covenants, final acts, charters, protocols, pacts, accords, and constitutions for international organizations. Usually these different names have no legal significance in international law. Treaties may be bilateral (two parties) or multilateral (between several parties) and a treaty is usually only binding on the parties to the agreement. An agreement "enters into force" when the terms for entry into force as specified in the agreement are met. Bilateral treaties usually enter into force when both parties agree to be bound as of a certain date. For more information on treaties, see Thomas Buergenthal & Harold Maier, *Public International Law in a Nutshell* (2nd ed., St Paul, MN: West, 1990) or *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, vol. 7, pps. 459-514 (Amsterdam: North-Holland)

Domestically, treaties to which the US is a party are equivalent in status to Federal legislation, forming part of what the Constitution calls 'the supreme Law of the Land.' Yet, the word treaty does not have the same meaning in the US and in international law." *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* defines a treaty "as an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." Under US law, however, there is a distinction made between the terms *treaty* and *executive agreement*. "In the United States, the word treaty is reserved for an agreement that is made 'by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate' (Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution). International agreements not submitted to the Senate are known as 'executive agreements' in the United States. Generally, a treaty is a binding international agreement and an executive agreement applies in domestic law only. Under international law, however, both types of agreements are considered binding. Regardless of whether an international agreement is called a convention, agreement, protocol, accord, etc.; if it is submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, it is considered a treaty under US law.

Major Sources for U.S. Treaties and Agreements (Chronological)

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**DATA FOR PART II:
Treaty and Agreement Subjects, 1774-2004**

Subject	1774-1861		1861-1945		1945-1975		1975-2004	
	B	M	B	M	B	M	B	M
Cemetery/Algiers Samoa 1939		2						
Alliance	1							
Right of Accession	1							
Cession	2							
Contract for Financial Aid	2							
Cessation of Hostilities	9							
Abolition of taxes on emigration,	5		1					
Reciprocal personal rights of citizens	2		64					
Amity, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation	58		154					
Claims	38		85					
Research, Education,			47					
Lend Lease/Foreign Aid			82					
Naturalization, Immigration			102					
Military WWI & II			156					
Advancement of peace/ Peace Treaties			61	19				
Commercial relations and reciprocity			160	23				
Arbitration			98	15				
WWII Declarations to Wage War				31				
Armistice/Surrender/arms limitations/reparations/				26				
League of Nations				1				
United Nations System				9				
German Affairs				30				
Hague Tribunal/conventions				3		6		
Inter-American Union/Commission of Jurists				48		17		

Laws of War & Neutrality				4		23		
Extradition	16		104	1	49	1	90	2
Diplomatic Relations/consular Affairs Embassy sites	4		68	1	75	3	178	4
Postal Affairs	3		67	17	98	11	265	12
Smuggling drugs, alcohol			45	1	62	3	124	7
Customs, Revenues, Duties, Commerce, Tariffs* Trade and Finance* 1			101	19	500 *289	24	*532	78
Agriculture/ Agricultural Commodities* 2			37	1	142	11	371*	25
Copyrights, patents, trademarks, exchange of publications			73	4	93	7	103	25
Telecommunications, Weights & Measures, Coinage			19	12	49	38	228	37
North Atlantic Treaty Organization					3	12	1	33
Atomic Energy/Energy					41	36	158	50
Maritime Affairs/Fisheries/ Sea beds					27	22	61	22
Conservation/Environmental Cooperation					26	9	120	27
Taxation					24	1	174	2
Aviation * 3					52	1	275*	10
Property transfer, intellectual property, publications					69	1	124	1
Peace Corps					59		61	
Defense					579		327	20
Scientific Cooperation/space/climate							137	9
Judicial Assistance							74	1
Totals	141	2	1,524	263	2,048	226	3403	365
	1774-1861 (84yrs)		1861-1945 (84 years)		1945-1975 (30yrs)		1975-2004 (30yrs)	

1 Under this subject heading there were 289 treaties dealing with tariffs' (including GATT) during the 1945-1975 period and approximately 532 treaties dealing with finance during the 1975-2004 period.

2 Under this subject heading of the approximately 371 bi-lateral treaties dealt with agricultural commodities during the 1975-2005 period.

3 Aviation applies not only to transport service agreements but also to aeronautical facilities, navigation, air safety, air traffic control, flight inspection service , pilot licensing.

*Tariffs and Trade include GATT

DATA FOR PART II

U.S. Participation in Public International Organizations and Other Agencies*

A. Multilateral Organizations and Agencies Since World War II¹

Treaty or Agreement	Title of Organization	Title of Constitutive Act ²	Date Effective for U.S.
A	African Development Bank (ADB)	Agreement	1983
A	African Development Fund (ADF)	Agreement	1976
A	Agricultural Development Fund (IFAD)	Arts. of Agr.	1977
A	American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood	Conf. Res.	1927
T	ANZUS Collective Security Organization	Treaty	1952
A	Asian Development Bank (ADB)	Arts. of Agr.	1966
	Baghdad Collective Security Alliance (see CENTO)		
T	Bureau of International Expositions	Convention	1968
A	Caribbean Commission	Agreement	1948
A	Caribbean Organization	Agreement	1961
A	Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)	Constitution	1993
A	Central American Tribunal	Protocol	1923
A	Central Bureau of the International Map of the World on the Millionth Scale	Conf. Res.	1921
A	Central Commission for Navigation of the Rhine	Notes	1945
T	Central International Office for the Control of Liquor Traffic in Africa	Convention	1929
A	Central Treaty Organization (CENTO/METO)	Conf. Declaration	1958
A	Colombo Plan Council for Southeast Asia	Constitution	1951
A	Combined Siam Rice Commission	Agreement	1946
A	Combined Tin Committee	Joint Com.	1945
T	Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources	Convention	1982
T	Committee of Control of the International Zone of Tangier	General Act Protocol	1906 1945
A	Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM)	Protocol	1945
T	Customs Cooperation Council (see also International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs)	Convention	1970
A	Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense (Inter-American)	Conf. Res.	1942
A	Emergency Economic Committee for Europe	Conf. Decision	1945
A	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	Agreement	1990
A	European Coal Organization	Agreement	1946

*For comparison with pre-World War II American participation in international organizations and other agencies, see Table 6.10.

¹This list is arranged alphabetically by titles of international organizations. U.S. commitments are designated as "T" (treaties) and "A" (agreements). The treaties are approved by the Senate in accordance with the constitutionally prescribed formal treaty process. Many of the agreements are formal executive agreements approved by both houses of Congress by normal legislative process. Some agreements, primarily embodied in conference resolutions (rather than formal agreements), are confirmed by legislation authorizing participation or providing for representation in the organization and/or financial support. The dates represent not the date of consummation or signature of a treaty or agreement but the date of effectiveness for the United States.

Many of these organizations and agencies are dealt with in the *U.S. Code*, Title 22, especially Chapters 7, 28-30, 35, 36, 45, and 47.

²The following abbreviations are employed: Arb. Rules (Arbitration Rules), Arts. of Agr. (Articles of Agreement), Conf. Com. (Conference Communiqué), Conf. Res. (Conference Resolution), Joint Com. (Joint Communiqué), and Notes (Exchange of Diplomatic Notes).

Multilateral Organizations and Agencies, cont.

	1975	1995
1. World Tourism Organization (successor: International Union of Official Travel Organizations)	Starts	Agreement
2. World Trade Organization (WTO)		

B. Additional Multiparty Organizations and Agencies (Temporary, Suspended, Superseded, or Terminated by 1995)

- Alfred Mission to Observe Czech Elections, 1945-46
 Allied Occupation Control Commissions or Councils for Austria (1945-55), Bulgaria (1944-47), France (1945-47), Germany (1944-49), Japan (1945-), and Romania (1945-47)
 Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 1943-46
 Combined Coal Committee, 1945-47 (superseded by European Coal Organization)
 Combined Food Board, 1945-46 (superseded by Food and Agriculture Organization)
 Combined Footwear, Leather, and Hides Committee, 1945-48
 Combined Lumbered Areas Committee, 1944-46
 Combined Rice Commission, 1946-47
 Combined Rubber Committee, 1945-46 (successive International Rubber Study Group)
 Combined Textile Committee, 1945-46
 European Central-related Transport Organization, 1945-47
 Far Eastern Advisory Commission, Aug. 1945 (superseded by Far Eastern Commission)
 Inter-American Development Commission, 1946-49
 Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Refugees, 1942-45
 International Committee of Refugees, 1939-48 (superseded by International Refugee Organization)
 Intergovernmental Commission for the Diarrhoeal Fevers of Lists of Diseases and Causes of Death, 1945-48 (superseded by World Health Organization)
 International Emergency Food Council, 1946-49 (superseded by Food and Agriculture Organization)
 International Tin Committee, 1951-46
 Interpartisan Warrent Committee, 1945-47

C. Other Organizations and Agencies Entitled To Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities by the United States

- Bondar Government Cooperation Commission, 1961
 Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 1964
 Committee for Labor Cooperation, 1964
 Commission for the Study of Alternatives to the Panama Canal, 1968
 Customs Cooperation Council, 1971
 International Coffee Organization, 1965
 International Committee of the Red Cross, 1968
 International Development Law Institute, 1965
 International Fertilizer Development Center, 1977
 International Pacific Halibut Commission, 1962
 International Secretariat for Volunteer Service, 1969
 North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, 1964
 North Pacific Marine Science Organization, 1964
 Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1975 (superseded by Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development)

1. The following are the names of the organizations, agencies, and committees which are entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities by the United States:

2. The following are the names of the organizations, agencies, and committees which are not entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities by the United States:

Other Organizations and Agencies, cont.

- Organization of African Unity, 1971
 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, 1989
 Pacific Salmon Commission, 1986
 United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property, 1967

D. Bilateral Agencies

- Alaska International Highway Commission—U.S. and Canada
 American-Mexican Claims Commission
 Anglo-American Race Commission
 British-American Joint Patent Interchange Committee
 Canada-United States Inter-Parliamentary Group
 Claims Commissions—U.S. and Spain
 Combined Chiefs of Staff—U.S. and United Kingdom
 Combined Civil Affairs Commissions—U.S. and United Kingdom
 Commission of Inquiry—with 44 other countries
 Filipino Rehabilitation Commission—U.S. and Philippines
 Civil Action Commissions—with 5 other countries
 Great Lakes Fishery Commission—U.S. and Canada
 International Boundary Commission—U.S. and Canada
 International Boundary and Water Commission—U.S. and Mexico
 International Fishery Commission—U.S. and Canada
 International Joint Commission—U.S. and Canada (for reference)
 Joint Agricultural Committee—U.S. and Canada
 Joint Aircraft Committee—U.S. and United Kingdom
 Joint Beethoven-United States Exchange Commission
 Joint Health Control Office—U.S. and United Kingdom
 Joint Newcar-United States-Japanese Commission
 Joint United States-Canadian Commission on Trade and Economic Affairs
 Mexican-American Industrial Commission
 Mexican-United States Agricultural Commission
 Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group
 Maritime Assignments Board—U.S. and United Kingdom
 Permanent Joint Board on Defense—U.S. and Canada
 Texas-Mexican Highway Board—U.S. and Mexico
 United States-Indian Land Commission
 United States-Iran Joint Commission
 United States-Japan Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Affairs
 United States-Mexican Binational Commission
 United States-Mexico Border Health Commission
 United States-Spanish Council
 United States-Luxembourg-Vietnam City Office—U.S., 301, 304, 304a

1. The following are the names of the organizations, agencies, and committees which are entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities by the United States:

2. The following are the names of the organizations, agencies, and committees which are not entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities by the United States:



Data for Part II: US Federal Outlays by Function 1940-2005

Year	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
In Millions of Dollars								
National defense	1,660	6,435	25,658	66,699	79,143	82,965	42,681	12,808
Human resources	4,139	4,158	3,599	2,659	1,928	1,859	5,493	9,909
International Affairs	51	145	968	1,286	1,449	1,913	1,935	5,791
Year	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
National Defense	9,105	13,150	13,724	23,566	46,089	52,802	49,266	42,729
Human Resources	9,868	10,805	14,221	11,001	11,745	11,836	13,076	14,908
International Affairs	4,566	6,052	4,673	3,647	2,691	2,119	1,596	2,223
Year	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
National Defense	42,523	45,430	46,815	49,015	48,130	49,601	52,345	53,400
Human Resources	16,052	18,161	22,288	24,892	26,184	29,838	31,630	33,522
International Affairs	2,414	3,147	3,364	3,144	2,988	3,184	5,639	5,308
Year	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
National Defense	54,757	50,620	58,111	71,417	81,926	82,497	81,692	78,872
Human Resources	35,294	36,576	43,257	51,272	59,375	66,410	75,349	91,901
International Affairs	4,945	5,273	5,580	5,566	5,301	4,600	4,330	4,159
Year	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	TQ	1977	1978
National Defense	79,174	76,681	79,347	86,509	89,619	22,269	97,241	104,495
Human Resources	107,211	119,522	135,783	173,245	203,594	52,065	221,895	242,329
International Affairs	4,781	4,149	5,710	7,097	6,433	2,458	6,353	7,482

Year	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
National Defense	116,342	133,995	157,513	185,309	209,903	227,413	252,748	273,375
Human Resources	267,574	313,374	362,022	388,681	426,003	432,042	471,822	481,594
International Affairs	7,459	12,714	13,104	12,300	11,848	15,876	16,176	14,152
Year	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
National Defense	281,999	290,361	303,559	299,331	273,292	298,350	291,086	281,642
Human Resources	502,200	533,402	568,684	619,329	689,667	772,440	827,533	869,410
International Affairs	11,649	10,471	9,573	13,764	15,851	16,107	17,248	17,083
Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000 estimate	2001 estimate	2002 estimate
National Defense	272,066	265,753	270,505	268,456	274,873	290,636	291,202	298,390
Human Resources	923,765	958,232	1,002,336	1,033,426	1,058,888	1,124,844	1,186,656	1,255,186
International Affairs	16,434	13,496	15,228	13,109	15,243	17,078	19,607	19,052
Year	2003 estimate	2004 estimate	2005 estimate					
National Defense	307,363	316,517	330,742					
Human Resources	1,322,650	1,402,040	1,485,308					
International Affairs	19,297	19,490	19,931					


Note: See U.S Federal Budget Table 3.1 for complete list of all functions in the US Budget.
<http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/hist.html#1>

Data for Part II:
US Defense Expenditures vs. Foreign Affairs Expenditures 1940-2005



Explanation: The top graph demonstrates an exponential growth in foreign affairs expenditures. The bottom graph reveals an 's' curve that relates to defense expenditures. This type of curve means that defense expenditures remained relatively constant from about 1940 until 1969 and then increased substantially up until about 1987. The top of the curve then means defense spending since 1987 till 2005 has remained constant with respect to the rest of the curve. Hence, for the last 18 out of 25 years defense expenditures have remained relatively constant, suggesting that defense spending is highly unlikely to have been the cause of a decline in the US State Department -- assuming there has been such a decline.

**APPENDIX B:
DATA FOR PART II:
Principal Officers of Canada's Department of External Affairs
1860-2005**



EXPLANATIONS:

From 1860 till 1893 the titles of principal officers were: Prime Minister, High Commissioner, Governor General, and Secretary of State. From 1894 till 1911 titles included: Governor General, Under Secretary of State, Secretary of External Affairs, Under Secretary of External Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary, Assistant Under Secretary. Presently, titles include Minister for International Trade, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministers for International Cooperation, Secretary of State, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Minister of International Cooperation, Assistant Deputy Minister, and Director General.

Major Sources of Canada's Principal Officers (Chronological)

Hilliker, John, Canada's Department of External Affairs, vol. 1: *The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 1990).

Hilliker, John., Canada's Department of External Affairs, vol. 2: *Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 1990).

The figures for principal officers in DEA are based on the DEA directories *Canadian Representatives Abroad and Representatives in Canada of the British Commonwealth and Foreign Governments*.


**APPENDIX B:
DATA FOR PART II:
CANADA'S PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC and CONSULAR
MISSIONS ABROAD**

Year	#Missions (total)
1920	1
1930	4
1940	10
1950	39
1960	61
1970	136
1980	178
1990	192
2000	242


Velocity Function: $y = (4.425 \cdot (10^{-77}))e^{(0.0905x)}$

Acceleration Function: $y = (4.00463 \cdot (10^{-78}))e^{(0.0905x)}$

Decade	#Addit'l Missions	Decade	Avg #Missions/year
1	1	<1920	0.1
2	3	1920-30	0.3
3	6	1930-40	0.6
4	29	1940-50	2.9
5	22	1950-60	2.2
6	75	1960-70	7.5
7	42	1970-77	12.9




**DATA FOR PART II:
CANADA'S PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC and CONSULAR
MISSIONS ABROAD (cont.)**



Explanation: Prior to the Imperial Conference of 1926, Canada's sole formal representative abroad was the High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, an office created in 1880. Although Canada began to play an important role in the negotiation of commercial treaties with other countries early in its nationhood, the formal role of representatives of the British government, as co-signers of treaties, continued until World War I. In the negotiation of political treaties Canadian progress was slower and it was not until Dominion status was achieved in 1926 (and confirmed in the Statute of Westminster in 1931) that Canada and the other members of the Commonwealth assumed a role as fully independent nations in external affairs. Independence in internal affairs had been achieved much earlier. After 1926 Canadian representation abroad grew steadily. The status of representatives is hierarchical: high commissioner (in Commonwealth countries) and ambassador (in non-Commonwealth countries) rank highest; then come minister, chargé d'affaires, consul general and consul. Prior to World War II Canada had only six representatives ranked as ambassadors and four high commissioners to Commonwealth countries.

SOURCE: Statistics Canada, *Canada Year Book, 1976-77*, pp. 1095-1103; files of the Historical Division, Department of External Affairs. See also Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad, from Agency to Embassy*. Series Y260-263 available pdf format at: http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/11-516-XIE/sectiony/sectiony.htm#Y260_263 (2005).

**DATA FOR PART II:
CANADA'S Bilateral & Multilateral Treaties 1800-2000**



Explanation:


Treaties can be referred to by a number of different names: international conventions, international agreements, covenants, final acts, charters, protocols, pacts, accords, and constitutions for international organizations. Usually these different names have no legal significance in international law. Treaties may be bilateral (two parties) or multilateral (between several parties) and a treaty is usually only binding on the parties to the agreement. An agreement "enters into force" when the terms for entry into force as specified in the agreement are met. Bilateral treaties usually enter into force when both parties agree to be bound as of a certain date. For more information on treaties, see Thomas Buergenthal & Harold Maier, *Public International Law in a Nutshell* (2nd ed., St Paul, MN: West, 1990) or *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, vol. 7, pps. 459-514 (Amsterdam: North-Holland)

Major Sources Canada's Treaties (Chronological)

Wiktor, Christian L. *Index to Canadian Treaties, 1979-2003* (Halifax, 1982)
 Department of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Law Division, *Canadian Treaty Series (CTS)*
http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/Treaties_CLF/TreatyList.asp (2004)


Appendix C: Data for Part II

Slovenia's Permanent Diplomatic/Consular Missions Abroad



Source: Jazbec, Milan. **The Diplomacies of Small States** (Ashgate Co. US, 2001) Data was obtained for the years 1992, 1995, and 1998 off of Table 11, p. 186.

Data for 1998 until present was obtained from Slovenia's website: <http://www.sigov.si/mzz/eng/>.



Slovenia Foreign Ministry, "International Law Matters: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements" website on 2005 <http://www.sigov.si/mzz/eng/index.html>

Data points were collected and arranged according to the year Slovenia entered the agreement.

The spike in the multilateral agreements is partly due to the fact that Slovenia inherited most of these agreements.

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Candace Halo

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1999-2000 Three quarter time faculty position, Centenary College, NJ

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